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Introduction
What makes for a good health system? What makes a health system fair? And
how do we know whether a health system is performing as well as it could? These
questions are the subject of public debate in most countries around the world.
Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former Director-General of the World Health Organization of
the United Nations in the World Health Report of 2000 on health systems
It is remarkable that there are such large di⁄erences in the way countries organize their
health care system. The extent to which patients carry the costs of their medical consumption
varies considerably across countries and the provision of health care services is in some countries
based on private provision of care, while elsewhere mainly or exclusively public health provision
is in place. Furthermore, there is a wide variation in the degree of regulation on market entry,
pricing and product o⁄ering across countries and across health professionals.
Despite the di⁄erences in the organization of health care markets, virtually all countries of
the world are facing important increases in the health care budget. Over the last two decades,
the aging of the population, the higher levels of chronic disease and disability and the increased
availability of new treatments and technology have exerted upward pressure on overall health-
related expenditure (Saltman and Figueras 1997). OECD reports that health care budgets have
increased with more than 50% since 1980. In 2005, the average OECD country spent 9% of
GDP on health care provision and for the period 1995-2005, health care spending on average
grew faster than GDP.
1Health care reforms to contain costs have therefore been part of the political debate since the
eighties. Over the last decade, the focus of policy has however shifted to the micro-level. That is,
there is a growing belief among policy makers that health systems are not performing e¢ ciently
(Saltman and Figueras 1997). To increase the incentives for e¢ cient behavior, some countries
are now implementing ambitious reforms of their health system such as the implementation
of performance measurement, international benchmarking, DRG ￿nancing (diagnosis related
groups) and yardstick competition in hospital markets. The world is thus experimenting with
many variants but there is no clearly best way to proceed: many questions about health system
performance have no clear or simple answers because outcomes are hard to measure and it is
hard to disentangle the health system￿ s contribution from other factors.
In this dissertation, we evaluate the economic consequences of di⁄erent regulations with
respect to health professionals, i.e. general practitioners (GPs), specialists and pharmacies in
Belgium. That is, the organization of the care system determines the economic environment in
which these health professionals are active and therefore a⁄ects the incentives their behavior as
an economic agent is subject to. In three individual essays, we study the behavior of Belgian
health providers given the economic environment in which they operate. The conclusions of
each of the essays have their relevance in the discussion on cost containment and the optimality
of health policies related to health professionals, which are part of the international debate.
The ￿rst two essays evaluate arguments related to the presence of speci￿c entry barriers for
health providers while the third essay concerns regulation that limits the choice behavior of
patients. As we evaluate the behavior of Belgian health professionals, note that the delivery of
health care in Belgium is mainly private and based on the principles of independent medical
practice. Hospitals on the other hand are mainly public or non-pro￿t. There is a system of
compulsory health insurance, with a broad coverage of the entire population. In general, the
Belgian population is quite pleased with the health care system: there is a good availability of
care, there are rarely waiting lists and the quality of care is perceived as very good.
In many countries, there is intense debate as to whether entry in medical professions should
be regulated or left to market forces. That is, on top of licensing procedures to ensure su¢ cient
quality, some countries have additional barriers to entry into speci￿c medical professions. The
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European Commission has recently taken an interest in this form of professional regulation and
published a report describing the state of professional regulation across European countries
(Paterson et al 2003). This report has launched debate in policy and academic circles on the
desirability of entry regulation in, amongst others, health care markets. The ￿rst two essays of
this dissertation contribute to this debate by investigating the behavior of health professionals
in Belgium. Each of the essays evaluates a speci￿c argument that is used in the policy debate
either in favor or against the presence of entry regulation for health professionals.
More precisely, in the ￿rst essay we study ￿rm behavior given the presence of a population-
based maximum on the number of entrants and high ￿xed margins in the Belgian pharmacy
market. In this context, we draw conclusions on the validity of the public interest motivation
used to sustain this regulation. That is, we evaluate whether the combination of high margins
and entry restrictions as in the current regulation for pharmacies is necessary to obtain su¢ cient
geographic coverage of pharmacy services without generating excessive entry. The second essay
looks at the Belgian GP market in which there are no entry restrictions, next to licensing.
As there are thus no bounds on the degree of GP competition in a local market, we study
whether the remuneration system in Belgium triggers supplier-induced demand in the primary
care market. That is, we study whether GPs arti￿cially increase the demand for their services
(and thus their income level) when they face a high degree of competition.
Another highly debated aspect of the organization of health provision concerns the access of
patients to secondary care. About half of Western-European countries operate under a system
of free access to all care, whereas the other half has a system of gatekeeping (Boerma 2003).
In a gatekeeping system, access to specialists is limited by the requirement of a GP referral
(=mandatory referral scheme). This enforces both the role of the GP as primary care provider
and care coordinator and the rationalization of the use of more expensive secondary care.
The literature on the optimality of mandatory referral schemes is extensive and covers
many di⁄erent aspects. Instead of evaluating the desirability of a gatekeeping system, the
third essay of this dissertation starts from the observation that some of the Western-European
countries where health provision is based on free access are now starting to implement elements
of gatekeeping. We therefore evaluate the validity of the fear for viability issues for the current
body of specialists in case a mandatory referral scheme would be introduced. More precisely,
3the third essay evaluates which types of specialists are most likely to be threatened in their
viability in case the Belgian care system changes from a system based on free choice to a system
with a gatekeeping role for GPs.
The approach we take to study issues of regulation in the health care sector mainly stems
from the ￿eld of New Empirical Industrial Organization. As data availability for health care
markets is often limited due to privacy concerns, we make inference on ￿rm behavior by studying
￿rms￿decisions to operate in a local market. This allows us to understand the determinants
of market structure, such as the impact of market characteristics and the strategic interactions
between ￿rms. The methodology is based on the empirical literature of entry models which
originated with the work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992). The use of
equilibrium models of entry to study health care markets is relatively new and situates itself
primarily in hospital markets (Abraham et al 2007). The speci￿c regulation in the markets of
health professionals however yields interesting extensions to the entry literature.
Next to methodological contributions to this fast-growing literature, we contribute by ex-
panding the application ￿eld of equilibrium models of entry. Whereas entry models have been
primarily used to study the extent of product di⁄erentiation in a free entry context, our research
questions instead focus on the impact of regulation. We demonstrate that equilibrium models
of entry, next to e.g. demand estimations and merger simulation, are useful tools to increase
the understanding of the working of speci￿c markets and to achieve better regulation.
In sum, this dissertation develops advances in the structural modeling of ￿rm behavior,
while the applications focus on policy relevant issues in the organization of health care systems.
The essays therefore carefully balance between Industrial Organization and Health Economics.
Before presenting the research questions, the ￿ndings and the policy implications of the three
individual essays on the behavior of health providers and the e⁄ects of selective professional
regulation into more detail, I provide a brief introduction to the methodology used in the main
part of this dissertation. I present the basic insights of the literature on estimating equilibrium
models of entry and discuss the challenges and the recent advances. I furthermore summarize
the contributions of this dissertation to the literature.1
1The methodology used in essay 2 stems from the health economics literature.
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1.1 Methodology
The ￿eld of Industrial Organization (IO) studies the strategic behavior of ￿rms, the structure
of markets and their interactions. Partly because of its relevance for Competition Law, empir-
ical research mainly deals with measuring the degree of competition between ￿rms. The way
of thinking on market structure and competitive conduct has however evolved considerably
over the last decades. Until the early seventies, the structure-conduct-performance paradigm
(the ￿Harvard tradition￿ ) was the dominant theory. Market structure was assumed to be deter-
mined exogenously and performance (e¢ ciency and market power) was a direct result of market
structure and ￿rm conduct. In the seventies though, IO economists understood that ￿rms act
strategically to a⁄ect the market structure that realizes (the ￿Chicago School￿ ). Theoretical
work started to apply principles of game theory to describe the behavior of ￿rms in markets and
increased data availability launched the challenge for empirical work to capturing real world
￿rm behavior.
Market structure and the degree of competitive conduct in the market are clearly interlinked,
but their relation is not easily captured. In a perfectly competitive market, where prices are
at marginal costs, entry has no e⁄ect on the competitive conduct. However, in imperfectly
competitive markets (i.e. real markets) predicting the change in competitive conduct due to
entry is no longer straightforward. E.g. the entry in a monopolistic market changes the entire
business environment (duopoly). Di⁄erent theoretical models try to describe conduct in an
oligopoly: there are, among others, the model of contestable markets, the Cournot model
of quantity competition and models of sustainable cartels (Tirole 2001). Also empirical IO
economists have recently devoted considerable energy toward modeling how changes in market
structure a⁄ect the extent of competition in a market (Reiss and Wolak 2005). It was however
quickly clear from game-theoretic analysis of oligopoly models that equilibrium properties di⁄er
considerably with the assumptions of the game (Van Cayseele 2002). In the New Empirical IO,
researchers therefore construct structural models that are tailor-made for speci￿c industries in
an attempt to accurately predict the outcomes for these particular industries (Bresnahan 1989).
This however comes at the cost of a wide applicability of the results (Sutton 1997).
51.1. Methodology
To analyze changes in the level of competitive conduct due to entry, the most natural way is
to look at pro￿ts per unit in the market. More precisely, the price-cost margins of ￿rms before
and after entry of an additional ￿rm measure the severity of competition in that market: the
more competitive the market becomes, the higher becomes the downward pressure on price-
cost margins and thus the lower is the average variable pro￿t per consumer of the product.
Unfortunately, data on price-cost margins in an industry are rarely available. The empirical
literature therefore turned to demand estimation to retrieve price elasticities, which are linked
through economic theory to price-cost margins (Bresnahan 1989). However, this technique
typically requires knowledge of ￿rm-level outputs, prices or costs or consumer data. Again, this
type of data on individual ￿rms is rarely available, especially for health care markets which are
often shielded by privacy concerns.
What is easily observed however is the number of ￿rms (providers) that operate in di⁄erent
markets. In the main part of this dissertation, we make inference on the competitive conduct
and strategic interactions between ￿rms by studying their entry decisions in local markets. The
empirical literature on entry models originated with the work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,
1991) and Berry (1992) and has boomed since the publication of Mazzeo￿ s work on the motel
industry (2002). Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) develops econometric models to explain the
number of sellers in a localized product markets. The goal of their work is to understand how
technological, demand and strategic factors a⁄ect market structure and competition. That is,
without extensive data on prices and outputs, this line of research allows drawing conclusions
on the drivers of pro￿tability, competitive conduct and market interactions between ￿rms.
Static equilibrium models of entry
The literature on equilibrium games of entry treats the observed market structure as a realiza-
tion of a two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, all ￿rms decide whether or not to enter, based on
their expected payo⁄s of entering. And in the second stage of the game, those that have entered
the market interact with each other so that payo⁄s are realized. Mostly, this second stage is not
structurally modeled, but instead the game puts forward a reduced form speci￿cation of payo⁄s
to estimate. Given free entry in the market, it is assumed that those ￿rms that decide to enter
expect to be pro￿table. All potential ￿rms that do not enter expect not to be pro￿table. This
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basic assumption of rational ￿rm behavior makes it possible to relate the observation of the
number of ￿rms that enter the market to characteristics of the underlying latent pro￿tability
of ￿rms.
Although its name suggests otherwise, equilibrium models of entry do not study entry
behavior of ￿rms. Instead, the literature deals with the behavior of the ￿rms operating in a
market. In other words, we do not study the process of ￿rms￿entry or exit, but instead focus on
the resulting market structure, i.e. the number of entrants and their characteristics. Since the
essays of this dissertation consider static equilibrium games of entry, i.e. we have information
on the number of entrants in all local market at a certain point in time (cross section), it is
assumed that we observe markets in their long run equilibrium. The model aims to describe
what the long run relations are between market structures and observed market characteristics
without making any inference on how the market evolved to this equilibrium.2
The basic equilibrium game of entry presented by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) concerns
entry decisions by homogeneous ￿rms in a complete information framework. All ￿rms simul-
taneously decide on entry in a local market in the ￿rst stage of the game and interact in the
second stage. If a ￿rm stays out of the market, it receives a payo⁄ of zero (or the value of an
outside option, normalized to zero). Payo⁄s of entering the market are determined by market
characteristics (Xm), which a⁄ect each ￿rm in the same way. Furthermore, in line with the
predictions from theoretical work, payo⁄s are decreasing in the number of competitors (Nm).
Finally, there is some unobserved payo⁄component which is known by all players, i.e. the error
term ("m). That is, take the following expression for payo⁄s in market m:
￿(Xm;N) = ￿ ￿(Xm;N) ￿ "m
Using the equilibrium behavior of ￿rms, we can identify how realizations of the market
level error term translate into equilibrium market structures. That is, equilibrium behavior
under free entry predicts that ￿rms enter the market as long as it is pro￿table to enter the
market (Nash equilibrium). The number of ￿rms we observe in equilibrium therefore equals the
2The recently developed dynamic entry model, see e.g. Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2008), do allow conclu-
sions on the entry and exit behavior of ￿rms. Bresnahan and Reiss (1993) discusses the incentives for ￿rms to
enter and exit into more detail, in light of the importance of unobserved sunk costs.
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maximum number of ￿rms that can be pro￿table given the market characteristics (Xm, "m).
As a result, the probability that n ￿rms operate in market m is given by the probability that
￿rms are pro￿table given this market structure, while additional entry would not be pro￿table:
Pr(N = nm) = Pr(￿ ￿(Xm;nm) ￿ "m > ￿ ￿(Xm;nm + 1))
The technique to determine the market characteristics that drive payo⁄s and to determine the
e⁄ect of competitors consists of maximizing the model￿ s probability of observing the realized
market structure. Using the model￿ s equilibrium conditions, a reduced form speci￿cation of
￿rms￿payo⁄s and an assumption on the distribution of the market unobservables, the researcher
constructs a likelihood function and searches the parameter space for the maximum.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) applies this model to local markets of e.g. doctors, plumbers
and dentists and demonstrates that the estimation results can be used to construct a measure
of changes in competitive conduct due to entry. That is, when it can be assumed that variable
pro￿ts are proportional to market population, we can deduce the minimum per ￿rm market
size to sustain a certain number of ￿rm entrants. The change of these ￿ entry thresholds￿with
the number of entrants in the market gives an indication of the extent to which the degree of
competition changes.3 That is, when an additional entrant increases the degree of competition
in the market, pro￿t margins drop. This increases ￿rms￿ break-even output level and thus
increases the minimum market size to survive. For example, under perfect collusion, ￿rms
cooperate to sustain the monopoly pro￿ts. The entry of an additional ￿rm therefore has no
impact on pro￿t margins (assuming that this entrant will be part of the cartel), so that the
entry threshold is independent of the number of entrants. On the other hand, when ￿rms
compete, ￿rms￿entry thresholds increase as pro￿ts margins decrease: the necessary market size
to be pro￿table in the market increases with the entry of an additional competitor.
3The ratio of the entry thresholds only provides insight in changes in competitive conduct and not in levels.
For example, the model cannot distinguish between market that is perfectly competitive from the ￿rst entrant
(p=mc) and perfect collusion in the market. In both cases, extra entry does not change the entry thresholds.
Furthermore, when ￿xed entry costs also vary with the number of entrants, the increase in entry threshold can
originates from increases in ￿xed costs of entry. We refer to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) for a full discussion.
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Recent advances
The challenge of constructing a realistic equilibrium model of entry lies in allowing for ￿rm
heterogeneity. That is, instead of considering the number of entrants in a market, it is interesting
to evaluate the entry decisions of di⁄erent types of ￿rms or individual ￿rms: who enters the
market? The empirical literature has mainly focused on problems of product di⁄erentiation.
That is, the researcher studies to which extent ￿rms￿payo⁄s decrease less due to the entry of
an other-type ￿rm, compared to the entry of a same-type ￿rm. E.g. Mazzeo (2002) studies
the motel market in which he di⁄erentiates between low and high quality motels and Berry
(1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) look at the impact on airline pro￿ts of other airlines
servicing the same routes. It is thus assumed that payo⁄s of entering the market are not only
decreasing in the number of ￿rms of own type, but also in the number of ￿rms of the other
type. In other words, the entry decisions of ￿rms of the di⁄erent types are strategic substitutes:
the probability of entering the market is decreasing in the action of ￿rms of the other type.
Assuming that ￿rms of di⁄erent types bene￿t from each others￿entry decisions, i.e. entry
decisions are strategic complements, yields di⁄erent equilibrium conditions in the model. This
case is however rarely addressed in the empirical literature (Sweeting 2007).4
Whereas introducing ￿rm heterogeneity in the entry model clearly adds to the realism of the
game, it entails some econometrical di¢ culties: entry decisions of the di⁄erent types of ￿rms
are strategic interdependent so that the number of ￿rm entrants of the other type is endogenous
in the entry decision of a ￿rm. The literature has focused on two resulting problems. First, the
uniqueness of an equilibrium is not guaranteed. Second, allowing for a higher number of ￿rm
types rapidly becomes complex.
When there is strategic interdependence in the entry decisions of di⁄erent type of ￿rms,
multiplicity issues arise. In other words, there is no unique market structure equilibrium for
4Note the di⁄erence with the concepts of substitutes and complements: the ￿rms of di⁄erent types can produce
outputs that are substitutes or complements in the eyes of consumers. Instead, we consider a strategic decision
of ￿rms: ￿rms choose whether or not to enter the market. The entry decisions of other-type ￿rms change the
marginal payo⁄s of entering the market. There is however a connection with the products being substitutes or
complements: when the types produce e.g. substitutes, the decision of other-type ￿rms to enter the market and
to produce output in that market will generate a negative demand e⁄ect on ￿rm￿ s payo⁄s. This decreases the
payo⁄s of entering the market. However, the entry decisions of other-type ￿rms can also a⁄ect the payo⁄s of
entering the market through e.g. cost aspects.
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certain realizations of the model primitives. E.g. the market can sustain exactly one entrant,
but the entrant can be of either type 1 or type 2: there are two possible market equilibria,
(1;0) and (0;1). Therefore, the probabilities of observing the di⁄erent market structures do not
sum up to one, which makes the empirical model incoherent: we cannot construct a likelihood
function to take to the data. Apart from the multiplicity problem, it remains hard to estimate
a realistic model as the extent of ￿rm heterogeneity is limited in the model. As indicated above
in the basic model of Bresnahan and Reiss, the technique relies on specifying the mapping of
the model primitives onto equilibrium market structures: only the realization of error terms
within certain areas corresponds to observing speci￿c market structures. This speci￿cation can
become very complex once the researcher allows for more than two types in the market.
Several solutions to the problem of multiple equilibria have been o⁄ered in the empirical
literature. First, the researcher can focus on outcomes that are unique for all model primitives,
such as the number of ￿rms rather than their identities. This is the original approach followed
by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a), but reduces ￿rms to homogeneous entrants. A second solution
consists of specifying an equilibrium selection mechanism. Whereas one can work with a random
selection rule, as in Bjorn and Vuong (1984), most research has modi￿ed the structure of the
game to obtain a unique prediction. Di⁄erent modi￿cations to the simultaneous entry game
of complete information have been used. Berry (1992) and Mazzeo (2002) assume a sequential
rather than simultaneous order of moves. In the product di⁄erentiation setting, this implies
that the ￿rst mover has the advantage of pre-empting entry by other (-type) ￿rms. Seim (2007)
and Aradillas-Lopez (2007) on the other hand move from a complete information game to one
of incomplete information and assume that the same equilibrium is chosen in similar markets.
Einav (2003) ￿nally assumes sequentiality in the order of moves in the incomplete information
framework. A ￿nal solution prevents the misspeci￿cation of the model without solving the
multiplicity issues: researchers abandon point identi￿cation of the estimates and focus instead
on identifying the parameter set for which the underlying model is consistent with the data (set
identi￿cation: Tamer 2003, Andrews, Berry and Jia 2004, Ciliberto and Tamer 2004). Assuming
that the information set is incomplete rather than complete and the use of set identi￿cation
also permit for a higher degree of ￿rm heterogeneity in the model (Seim 2007).
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Contributions
We contribute to the growing literature on the estimation of entry models in essays 1 and 3.
In both papers, we allow for di⁄erent types of ￿rms to interact in the market. In essay 1, we
focus on a game with two types of ￿rms: GPs and pharmacies. In essay 3, we allow for a higher
number of ￿rm types interacting in the market, as we study the strategic interactions between
GPs and di⁄erent specialist types (e.g. dermatologists, gynecologists, pediatricians). Contrary
to the bulk of the empirical entry literature, the research questions we address are not questions
of product di⁄erentiation. As a result, in both essays we put forward entry games that are novel
in the literature to address our speci￿c research questions on health professionals.
In the ￿rst essay, we study the Belgian pharmacy and GP markets. To estimate their
drivers of pro￿tability and the e⁄ect of competitors and other-type ￿rms on payo⁄s of entry,
we model their entry decisions as a sequential game of complete information. The model builds
on the model by Mazzeo (2002) but di⁄ers from the literature in two main respects. First,
entry in the pharmacy market is not free, but restricted based on population criteria. We
show in the essay that the equilibrium conditions of the free entry model (i.e. ￿rms enter as
long it is pro￿table to enter) can be adjusted to take up the maximum number of pharmacies
that is allowed to be present in the market. Second, whereas the bulk of the literature studies
product di⁄erentiation, we analyze a situation in which the entry decisions of the di⁄erent
types are strategic complements. That is, the model assumes that ￿rm payo⁄s are increasing in
the number of ￿rms of the other type (the assumption of their entry decisions being strategic
substitutes is rejected in the estimation results).
These adjustments to the equilibrium conditions of the game do not only allow us to better
describe the reality, but also permit to simulate the e⁄ect on the realized market structures
upon changes to the entry (and price) regulation. The essay is therefore furthermore unique in
the static entry literature as it is able to draw direct policy implications on the existence and
the speci￿cs of the establishment act for pharmacies in Belgium. That is, our structural model
set-up allows performing policy simulations on what the equilibrium market structure would
look like under alterations of the law.
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Note that we assume all GPs and all pharmacies in a market to be the same. In other
words, ￿rms of the same type are assumed homogeneous. As a future extension, it would
be interesting to allow for heterogeneity in the pharmacy market, as the data permits the
identi￿cation of cooperative pharmacies. These cooperative pharmacies might base their entry
decisions on di⁄erent payo⁄s compared to independent pharmacies as they are often not-for-
pro￿t. Although there are few cooperative pharmacies in our sample of markets, separately
controlling for their entry decisions can provide additional understanding of the working of
the pharmacy market. Remark that it is hard to allow for the extra ￿rm heterogeneity in the
model put forward in this essay and that the bias on the estimated strategic interaction e⁄ects
between pharmacies and GPs is expected to be small.5
The third essay aims to identify the nature of the strategic interactions between GPs and
specialist types, which requires the empirical model to account for three speci￿c features. First,
we do not know a priori how the strategic interactions between the types are characterized:
GP payo⁄s can both be increasing or decreasing in the presence of di⁄erent specialist types.
Second, we can not exclude the possibility that the strategic interaction e⁄ects between GPs
and a speci￿c specialist type are asymmetric in sign. That is, the entry decision of a GP
can be a strategic complement to the entry decision of the specialist, while the latter is a
strategic substitute to the entry decision of the GP. And third, there are many di⁄erent types
of specialists, so that the model has to allow for a high degree of product heterogeneity. We
contribute to the literature by putting forward a static entry game that copes with all three of
these features. We argue in the essay that modeling and estimating ￿rm conduct should allow
for realistic and ￿ exible strategic interactions between types of ￿rms. This however involves
abandoning either the pure strategy assumption or the assumption of complete information.
We present an incomplete information entry game with sequential entry decisions to model
the entry decisions by the di⁄erent physician types. Contrary to most models in the literature,
5First, there is no reason why the estimated coe¢ cients that measure the e⁄ects of the presence of the number
of pharmacies on the pro￿tability of the physicians would be biased due to not accounting for ￿rm heterogeneity
in the pharmacy market. We might on the other hand overestimate the e⁄ect of physicians on pharmacy payo⁄s,
but only to the extent that the presence of a cooperative is positively correlated to the number of physicians:
if so, entry in the unpro￿table market is explained by the positive e⁄ect of physician presence. Otherwise this
e⁄ect is part of the market unobservables: the markets with a cooperative pharmacy have a low error realization
to explain the entry above what should be pro￿table.
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this game excludes issues of non-existence of equilibria when the strategic interaction e⁄ects are
asymmetric in sign. It furthermore permits estimation of the interaction e⁄ects in the presence
of a high degree of ￿rm heterogeneity and without any restrictive assumptions on the underlying
payo⁄ functions.6
Some ￿nal remarks are in place. First, the incomplete information game presented in the
last essay is more ￿ exible compared to the former one. That is, whereas the model in the
￿rst essay relies on the assumption of strategic complementarity in the entry decisions of GPs
and pharmacies, the model presented in the third essay allows for the identi￿cation of the
interaction e⁄ects, without any prior assumptions. We however ￿nd that the estimation of the
incomplete information game con￿rms the conclusions on the pharmacy and GP markets of
essay 1. Despite the lower ￿ exibility, the assumption of completeness of the information set is
preferred in the ￿rst essay as we focus on and model only the interactions between two types
of ￿rms. Controlling for possible correlation in the models￿unobservables is thus important.
Second, for the reasons discussed above, the model presented in the ￿rst essay is not suitable for
answering the research questions of essay 3. The inability of the more ￿ exible model to allow for
correlation in ￿rms￿unobservables is compensated by estimating the strategic interaction e⁄ects
while controlling for many di⁄erent types of ￿rm entrants. Third, in principle, we would be able
to answer the research questions of essay 1 and essay 3 simultaneously in one entry model of
incomplete information. Currently, we assume that there are no strategic interactions between
pharmacies and specialists of di⁄erent types and that the strategic interactions between GPs
and pharmacies and between GPs and specialist types are not a⁄ected by the entry decisions of
specialists and pharmacies respectively. In other words, essay 1 does not control for the strategic
interaction e⁄ects found in essay 3 and vice versa. Whereas we could allow for these e⁄ects
to be present by estimating the entry decisions of all types simultaneously, the computational
burden would increase rapidly and additional assumptions, e.g. on the sequence of entry, would
have to be imposed for estimation.
6The same remark as above applies for this essay: ￿rms of the same type are assumed to be homogeneous. As
the data does not allow to identify those specialists that work in hospitals and as we have no further information
on the characteristics of the physicians, relaxing this restriction is however not feasible at this point. Note that
we control for the presence of hospitals in explaining the pro￿tability of physicians to reduce the related concerns.
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Finally, the entry models do not explicitly model the presence of supplier-induced demand,
the topic of essay 2. However, in case inducement is present, this e⁄ect is partly captured in
the estimated coe¢ cients of the number of competitors and in the estimated coe¢ cients of
market controls which are positively correlated with GP or specialist density. In essay 1, the
presence of supplier inducement can e.g. explain the ￿nding of a lack of competitive pressure
in the GP market: GPs do not require a higher market size to survive in the presence of more
competitors, as they counter the negative pressure on payo⁄s by inducing demand. There is
however no impact on the simulation results. For essay 3: in case GPs respond to the entry
of a specialist by inducing demand for their services, the ￿ real￿strategic interaction e⁄ect of
specialists on GP payo⁄s could be overestimated. In this case, we underestimate the competitive
e⁄ect of specialists on GPs and thus also the impact of gatekeeping. The presence of supplier
inducement would thus strengthen our ￿ndings with respect to the viability threats associated
to the introduction of mandatory referral schemes.
1.2 Research questions and ￿ndings
Essay 1: Entry and Regulation - Evidence from Health Care Professions
In chapter 2, we evaluate the presence of the Establishment Act for pharmacies in Belgium in
light of the recent interest of the European Commission to deregulate professional services. As
in many other countries, the number of pharmacies that can operate in a Belgian municipality
is limited based on population criteria. Entry in the pharmacy market is thus restricted.
Furthermore, the pharmacy market is characterized by price control: pharmacies get a ￿xed
margin of on average 23% on every item they sell. The public interest view motivates this
combination of entry regulation and high ￿xed margins in terms of guaranteeing availability of
pharmacy services in rural areas without generating excessive entry elsewhere.
The aim of this essay is to evaluate whether there is empirical evidence to support this view.
We study the e⁄ects of the current entry regulation on the entry behavior of pharmacies using
a structural model of entry and simulate the expected changes in the market structure when
pharmacies￿entry would be liberalized and margins are dropped. These policy simulations allow
us to evaluate whether the current availability of pharmacy services would deteriorate when
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policy changes take place, as implied by the public interest view argumentation. We speci￿cally
incorporate the physician market in the analysis (in this essay, physicians are de￿ned as GPs)
as this related market will be a⁄ected by changing policies in the pharmacy market (indirect
policy e⁄ects).
To estimate the drivers of pro￿tability, the e⁄ect of competitors and other type ￿rms and
the impact of the entry regulation, we model the entry decisions of two types of ￿rms, physicians
and pharmacies, as a sequential game of complete information. We control for the entry re-
strictions in the pharmacy market and assume strategic complementarity in the entry decisions
of pharmacies and physicians. Using market characteristics and information on the number of
pharmacy and physician entrants per local market, we estimate the e⁄ects of market character-
istics on ￿rms￿payo⁄s of entering the market. We ￿nd little evidence of competition within type
for both pharmacies and physicians and the assumption of strategic complementarity between
the types is con￿rmed: physicians￿payo⁄s of entering increase in the number of pharmacies
that is active in the market and vice versa.
Using the estimated coe¢ cients from the entry model in the current situation, we predict
the changes in market structure in case the ￿xed margin for pharmacies is reduced and in case
the entry is (partly) liberalized. We ￿nd that the number of both physician and pharmacy
entrants decreases in case the ￿xed margin for pharmacy is dropped and that there would
be more entrants of both types when entry in the pharmacy market is liberalized. But more
importantly, the policy simulations show that a combination of entry deregulation and drops
in margins in the pharmacy market can generate a similar entry pattern as currently is the
case. As a result, we ￿nd that large tax savings can be obtained by decreasing the margin
for pharmacies, while this not necessarily reduces the availability of pharmacy (and physician)
services across the country.
The policy implications of this essay are clear. The public interest view motivates the current
regulation of high margins and entry restrictions as a way to ensure availability in rural areas
without excessive entry elsewhere. However, as we are able to generate a comparable provision
of pharmacy and physician services under less stringent policies, we ￿nd no support for this
view. On the contrary, we ￿nd that substantial savings can be reached through deregulation.
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To the extent that there are no other valid arguments for the existence of the Establishment
Act, our ￿ndings favor a reduction in the entry restrictions in the Belgian pharmacy market.
For the Belgian pharmacy market, we thus conclude that the current entry regulation on
top of licensing is not welfare enhancing. Our essay furthermore provides a tool for policy
makers to test whether the existence of entry restrictions based on population criteria in other
countries or for other professional services is in the interest of the public or rather in the
interest of the incumbents in the industry. This is important in the debate on the liberalization
of professional services, as it sheds objective light on the desirability of competition reducing
entry requirements.
Essay 2: Supplier Inducement in the Belgian Primary Care Market
The second essay, presented in chapter 3, focuses on the behavior of GPs in their competitive
environment. The Belgian primary care market is characterized by a high availability of services:
GP density is amongst the highest in Europe (OECD Health Data). On average, the number
of patients per GP is therefore rather low. Furthermore, there is a fee-for-service system, where
GPs are paid according to the number of contacts with patients, so that a change in the number
of contacts directly a⁄ects GP income. At the same time, GPs can in￿ uence the demand
for primary care to a large extent, because of high degrees of uncertainty and information
asymmetry concerning health care services. Depending on her competitive environment, the
GP can have incentives to increase the number of contacts that patients consume above what
would be optimal. This is known in the literature as supplier-induced demand.
This essay performs an empirical exercise to test for the presence of this inducing behavior
by Belgian GPs as it has important consequences for the optimality of health policy. That is,
in case suppliers can change the preferences of consumers, the traditional neoclassic model of
supply and demand used to predict the e⁄ects from policy changes does not apply.
To study whether we can ￿nd evidence of supplier induced demand in Belgium, we use
a unique GP-level dataset on the yearly number of visits of all Belgian GPs. In line with
the predictions from theoretical models on GP behavior, the identi￿cation strategy is based
on ￿nding evidence of marginal inducement: does per capita consumption increase with GP
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density? As there are important identi￿cation issues, we do not put forward a structural model
for identifying inducing behavior, but instead follow an empirical approach suggested in the
health economics literature by Carlsen and Grytten (1998). That is, we correct for other possible
explanations of a positive link between GP density and consumption. For example, an increase
in the number of GPs also implies a decrease in the transportation costs and waiting times for
patients, which positively a⁄ects the demand for care (availability e⁄ect). The identi￿cation
strategy consists of splitting up the e⁄ects of GP density on GP level consumption according
to the level of GP density. The underlying theoretical framework predicts that the e⁄ects in
the GP dense markets are instructive for inducing behavior.
We contribute to the literature in two respects. First, we provide an overview of the main
ideas put forward in the empirical testing of supplier inducement. While providing a general
theoretical background, we focus on the discussion of the empirical implications of the hypothe-
ses that stem from theoretical work. E.g. we discuss how changes in the degree of information
asymmetry can a⁄ect the extent to which GPs induce demand. Second, we study the presence
of supplier-inducement in Belgium using a unique dataset and furthermore investigate which
type of contacts GPs typically use for demand inducement: consultations or visits.
The empirical analysis of the Belgian primary care market shows a positive relation between
GP density and the number of contacts per capita. Our results can furthermore not reject that
Belgian GPs are partly responsible for this ￿nding by inducing demand for their services. If they
induce demand, we ￿nd that GPs have a preference to induce through consultations, despite
the higher fee for visits. In the margin of the analysis, we furthermore ￿nd some indication
that GPs in markets with a low GP density use their discretionary in￿ uence over the demand
to reduce the number of contacts (visits).
When GPs induce demand for their services, a higher GP density level in the market is
associated to higher GP care consumption and thus higher health expenditures. This extra care
is furthermore not needed: patients contact GPs more often than they would in case they were
fully informed. In an era of ever-increasing health care budgets, policy measures to limit the
GP density on local market level can therefore be optimal. That is, a lower GP density reduces
the incentives for GPs to induce demand. Total health consumption will therefore decrease, in
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principle without an accompanying drop in the health status. This strategy is already followed
in Belgium by the installment of a limitation to the number of incoming students in medicine
and the Impulseo I-plan by the Flemish government to give ￿nancial incentives to GPs to locate
in areas with a low GP density.
Essay 3: Strategic Interaction between General Practitioners and Specialists:
Implications for Gatekeeping
Characterizing the nature of the strategic interactions between GPs and specialist types (e.g.
dermatologist, gynecologist) is the topic of the essay presented in chapter 4. Economic argu-
mentation is not conclusive on whether a GP bene￿ts from the presence of a specialist type or
rather it is harmful for the GP. On the one hand, the presence of a specialist allows the GP to
refer patients with complicated health concerns, which reduces the cost of treatment for the GP
(referral e⁄ect). On the other hand, in the absence of gatekeeping, patients have the choice to
visit a specialist instead of a GP, which implies that there is competition for patients between
specialists and GPs (competition e⁄ect).
The aim of this paper is to conduct an empirical investigation for the Belgian physician
markets on whether the referral or the competition e⁄ect dominates the relation between GPs
and di⁄erent types of specialists. This is not only an important feature of the health care system
to know, it also contains information on the expected transition costs of the implementation
of gatekeeping. That is, it is instructive for predicting which specialist types are likely to be
treated in their viability when mandatory referral schemes are introduced. More precisely, when
GPs are harmed by the presence of a specialist type (competition e⁄ect dominates), this implies
that patients often go to this specialist type without a referral of the GP and that moreover
GP care would su¢ ce for a large part of these patients. As a result, once access to specialist
care is limited to referrals, this specialist type will loose a substantial portion of its patientele
which leaves them unpro￿table.
We identify the strategic interactions between GPs and specialist types by modeling their
entry decisions as an incomplete information game with sequential entry decisions. Using
information on market characteristics and on the number of GPs and specialists of di⁄erent
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types per market, we estimate the drivers of pro￿tability and the strategic interaction e⁄ects
between the physician types. Our results indicate that specialist types bene￿t from the presence
of GPs in the market. On the other hand, the e⁄ect of specialists on GP payo⁄s depends on the
specialization ￿eld. Dermatologists and pediatricians have a negative impact on GP payo⁄s,
while the entry decisions of gynecologists, ophthalmologists and throat, nose and ear-specialists
(TNE) are strategic complements to the entry decision of GPs. No signi￿cant e⁄ect is found
for psychiatrists and physiologists. Our ￿ndings therefore indicate that dermatologists and
pediatricians attract a lot of patients for whom GP care would su¢ ce, while the patientele of
gynecologists, ophthalmologists and TNE-specialists either get referred or correctly self-refer to
these specialist types.
Across the world, policy makers are debating whether or not to implement gatekeeping into
their health care system and policy makers in France, Germany and Belgium have started to
introduce some elements of gatekeeping over the last years. The discussion on the implemen-
tation of mandatory referral schemes are mainly based on e¢ ciency and cost arguments, but
the empirical evidence of the bene￿ts of a gatekeeping system are not as strong as one would
want. Our essay argues that, parallel to the discussion on the desirability of gatekeeping, also
the transition costs that accompany the implementation of gatekeeping should be considered.
Given our results, we expect considerable transition costs to realize when gatekeeping would be
introduced in the Belgian care system. Especially dermatologists and pediatricians are likely
to experience a fall in the demand for their services, which can result in viability problems. It
is up to the policy makers to decide whether or not to maintain the entire body of specialists
through ￿nancial mechanisms or to retrain a portion of them.
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Entry and Regulation - Evidence
from Health Care Professions
Abstract1: In many countries pharmacies receive high regulated markups and are protected from com-
petition through geographic entry restrictions. We develop an empirical entry model for pharmacies
and physicians with two features: entry restrictions and strategic complementarities. We ￿nd that the
entry restrictions have directly reduced the number of pharmacies by more than 50%, and also indirectly
reduced the number of physicians by about 7%. A removal of the entry restrictions, combined with a
reduction in the regulated markups, would generate a large shift in rents to consumers, without reducing
the availability of pharmacies. The public interest motivation for the current regime therefore has no
empirical support.
1The paper in this chapter is joint work with Frank Verboven.
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2.1 Introduction
The regulation of liberal professions, such as lawyers, notaries and pharmacies, has been a
widespread phenomenon in many countries. It consists of a variety of measures restricting both
entry and conduct. While U.S. courts already started to more consistently apply antitrust laws
to many professional services after a Supreme Court Decision in 1975 (Wise (2000)), European
countries have only recently shown an interest to liberalize professional regulation.2
In this paper, we look at pharmacies and physicians in Belgium to shed new light on the
e⁄ects of entry and conduct regulation. As in many other European countries, both professions
are subject to strict conduct regulation through regulated fees or markups and bans on most
types of advertising. In addition, the number of pharmacies is restricted on a geographic basis.
An establishment act imposes a maximum number of pharmacies per municipality based on
population criteria, implying that new pharmacists typically need to buy up existing estab-
lishments if they want to operate independently. These regulations have often been motivated
to be in the public interest. In particular, the combination of high ￿xed markups and tight
geographic entry restrictions to pharmacies has been defended to ensure a minimum availability
of supply in the less pro￿table regions without inducing excessive entry elsewhere. The private
interest view challenges these motivations, arguing that the regulations are anti-competitive
and have no bene￿cial e⁄ects to other parties.3
To evaluate the public interest motivation of the current regime, we develop an econometric
model of entry by two types of professions: pharmacies and physicians (de￿ned as general
practitioners). We extend previous free entry models of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Mazzeo
(2002), to account for two key features speci￿c to this market. First, entry of pharmacies is
not free because of the geographic entry restrictions. In municipalities where the constraint
is binding, it is therefore only possible to infer how many ￿rms are still pro￿table, but not
2This interest is evident from Paterson et al.￿ s (2003) extensive report for the European Commission, describing
the state of professional regulation in Europe. This report subsequently led to an o¢ cial Communication, COM
(2004) 83, showing the Commission￿ s commitment to liberalize the professions.
3Various policy reports have recently been published. In a detailed report, the U.K.￿ s O¢ ce of Fair Trading
(2003) concluded that free entry by pharmacies in the U.K. would bene￿t consumers. The O.E.C.D. (2000)
obtained similar conclusions based on the experiences in a larger set of countries. But it also emphasized that
a holistic view be taken: simply introducing free entry of pharmacies without any accompanying measures to
lower the currently high regulated markups would likely create (or strengthen) excessive entry.
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from how many ￿rms onwards entry would become unpro￿table. Second, the entry decisions of
pharmacies and physicians may be strategic complements, i.e. entry by one type of ￿rm may
make entry by the other type more pro￿table. The entry model can be used to draw inferences
about competitive interaction, both within and between the professions. In addition, it allows
us to assess to which extent the geographic entry restrictions on pharmacies have limited the
number of ￿rms, either directly the pharmacies or indirectly the physicians because of their
strategic interdependence.
We apply the model to a data set for Belgium, which is representative for many other
European countries with geographic entry restrictions on pharmacies. The data contain infor-
mation on the number of pharmacies and physicians per market (town), and the corresponding
demographic characteristics in 2001. Regarding competitive interaction, we ￿nd that entry
into one profession has a positive e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of entry into the other profession,
suggesting that the entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent professions are strategic complements.
Furthermore, entry does not lead to intensi￿ed (non-price) competition among ￿rms of the same
profession. Regarding the geographic entry restrictions, we ￿nd that they have substantially
limited the number of ￿rms. A simple removal of all geographic entry restrictions without any
accompanying measures would more than double the number of pharmacies, and also indirectly
increase the number of physicians by 7% due to strategic complementarities. Combining a full
removal of the entry restrictions with an absolute reduction in the pharmacies￿gross markups
by up to 7:5 ￿ 15% (down from the current 23%), would keep the total number of pharmacies
in the country constant. Our overall conclusions are that an appropriate combined policy of
reduced geographic entry restrictions and reduced regulated markups can lead to a large shift in
rents to consumers (tax payers) without necessarily reducing geographic coverage. This strongly
indicates that the current regime of high regulated markups and restricted entry protects the
private interests of pharmacies rather than the public interest.
There is a small related empirical literature on free entry and social ine¢ ciency. Berry and
Waldfogel (1999) show how free entry of radio stations can be ine¢ cient in an imperfectly
competitive market. Hsieh and Moretti (2003) look at real estate agents, and document the
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ine¢ ciency of free entry in a market with ￿xed regulated markups.4 In contrast to these studies,
we concentrate on a case of restricted entry. In principle, given that markups are regulated at
a distortionary high level, it may be socially desirable to introduce a second distortion and
restrict entry. However, our analysis shows how a properly combined policy of loosening the
entry restrictions and lowering the markups may lead to large shifts in rents from pharmacies to
consumers (tax payers) without reducing the availability of supply. In the concluding section,
we come back to the question whether these shifts in rents are bene￿cial.
Our analysis also relates to empirical work on vertical restraints. Lafontaine and Slade
(2008) review a number of cases, including work on exclusive territory restrictions. They com-
pare the estimated welfare e⁄ects of voluntary restraints with those of government-mandated
restraints. They conclude that voluntary restraints tend to have bene￿cial welfare e⁄ects,
whereas mandated restraints tend to have detrimental e⁄ects. Our results appear to further
strengthen this broad conclusion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the markets of pharmacies and
physicians, with the entry and conduct regulations, and introduces the data set. Section 2.3
presents the econometric entry model and section 2.4 discusses the empirical results. Section
2.5 analyzes the implications for policy reform and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The markets of pharmacies and physicians
Health care markets are subject to extensive regulation in most countries. The regulations have
often been motivated by e¢ ciency considerations; Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) provide an
overview of the various market failures associated with the supply of basic health care services.
In addition, equity concerns and private interests have often been invoked to explain the gov-
ernment interventions. In this section we provide a selective overview of the health care markets
in which the pharmacies and physicians operate in Belgium. We focus on those elements that
motivate our econometric model. We begin with a discussion of the entry process, including the
4For a theoretical analysis of the conditions under which free entry may be socially ine¢ cient, see for example
Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
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presence of geographic entry restrictions on the pharmacies as imposed by the Belgian govern-
ment. We next discuss the general economic and regulatory factors in￿ uencing the nature of
competitive interaction within and between the two professions. Finally, we provide descriptive
statistics of our collected data set, documenting some of the discussion and introducing our
subsequent econometric analysis.
2.2.1 Entry and geographic restrictions
Both pharmacies and physicians need to satisfy minimum educational standards. Physicians,
which we de￿ne as general practitioners (as opposed to specialists), need to obtain a university
degree in medical sciences. Until recently, every high school graduate was eligible to start this
degree. Since 1998, some measures have been installed to restrict the number of incoming
students, e.g. an introductory examination at the start of the ￿rst year in Flanders. However,
this potential entry restriction is irrelevant for our empirical analysis, which covers the year
2001 (i.e. before the 1998 incoming students graduated). In practice, only a minority of
the students (about 25%) with a medical degree choose to become a physician (in the sense
of a general practitioner). Other employment opportunities are to become a specialist, an
occupational health o¢ cer, an expert for the health insurer, etc. There are no essential further
restrictions to setting up a physician￿ s practice.5 In particular, a physician can choose to locate
an establishment anywhere in Belgium. According to the WIV (2002), the majority of physicians
(about 78% in 2001) operate as a single-person establishment. In recent years, there has been a
development to form associations of several physicians, but these are considerably less developed
than in other countries.
Pharmacies also need to satisfy minimum educational standards; see Philipsen (2003) for
a detailed review. A university degree in pharmaceutical sciences provides the right to inde-
pendently prepare and sell drugs in an existing establishment. However, in contrast to the
physicians￿case, this degree is not su¢ cient to entitle one to set up a new establishment. Since
1974, there exists an establishment act, imposing geographic entry restrictions on the number of
5There are some requirements of secondary importance. The Medical Committee needs to certify the medical
degree. Furthermore, the applicant has to enroll with the medical association (Order of Physicians) and to
register at the National Institute of Health Insurance (RIZIV).
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pharmacies based on population criteria. Many other European countries have adopted similar
acts. The most comparable population-based establishment acts exist in Finland, France and
Portugal. Other countries with geographic entry restrictions in some form include Spain, Italy
and the U.K.
More speci￿cally, the act stipulates that there should be no more than one pharmacy per
2;000 inhabitants in small municipalities (with fewer than 7;500 inhabitants); no more than one
pharmacy per 2;500 inhabitants in intermediate municipalities (with a number of inhabitants
between 7;500 and 30;000); and no more than one pharmacy per 3;000 inhabitants in the
larger municipalities. For example, in a municipality with 6;000 inhabitants, there can be
no more than one pharmacy per 2;000 inhabitants, implying that there can be at most 3
pharmacies. The act provides slightly more lenience, i.e. lower threshold population levels, if
the physical distance between a new candidate pharmacy and any incumbent is su¢ cient large.
Because of the establishment act, people with a university degree in pharmaceutical studies
have only two ways to start an independent pharmacy: either apply for a new establishment
at a location where the entry restrictions are not yet binding, or buy an existing pharmacy
from an incumbent. The latter is the more common event; it is often a transaction between
an incumbent who has reached retirement age and a candidate pharmacist who has obtained
several years of experience in the same or in another pharmacy. With the average number of
pharmacists (with a university degree) working in a pharmacy at 1:5, most pharmacies operate
as single-person establishments as in the physicians￿case.
2.2.2 Competitive interaction
We ￿rst discuss the geographic dimension, showing that competitive interaction essentially takes
place at the local level. Next, we discuss the relevant institutional factors determining the (local)
competitive interaction within each of the professions and between the two professions.
Competitive interaction at the geographic level
Consistent with earlier health care studies, it is reasonable to de￿ne the relevant geographic
markets at the town level. The population within each town is typically concentrated around
the center, with the exception of the densely populated urban areas, which we will exclude
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from our sample. As will be discussed below, both physicians and pharmacies cannot engage in
advertising or other active promotional selling activities, so that it is reasonable to expect that
the patients￿choices are largely guided by local information. Furthermore, survey evidence indi-
cates that the majority of patients do indeed not travel outside their town to visit a physician.
In the Netherlands, a country with similar demographic characteristics as Belgium, 85% of the
patients travel less than 5 kilometers, which usually falls within the geographic boundaries of
the town. Furthermore, 94% of the Belgian patients have a single ￿xed physician, which is
conceivably located close to the patient￿ s home. For the pharmacies, a recent study by the
OFT (2003) ￿nds that only 6% of the patients visit their pharmacy while commuting to work,
further con￿rming the local nature of competitive interaction. Note that our market de￿nition
for assessing competitive interaction is narrower than the municipalities on which the establish-
ment act is based: municipalities typically consist of 1￿4 towns (59% of municipalities with 1
town; 90% of the municipalities with 4 or fewer towns).
Competitive interaction within each of the two professions
Physicians provide medical consultations on a fee-for-service basis. A ￿xed price is negotiated
between the government and the health insurer. Physicians are free to charge a higher price, but
the social insurance companies do not reimburse patients for the extra price. In practice, only
15% of the physicians have not signed the ￿xed price agreement. Self-regulation traditionally
prevented physicians from competing through advertising, though in recent years and under
pressure of the European Commission there has been an increased tolerance towards informative
advertising. While price and advertising competition have traditionally been quite limited,
physicians have a broad range of other possible instruments to compete for patients: availability
(consultation hours, waiting times and possibility to make appointment), quality and time spent
on medical consultations (which can show a large variation among physicians), and willingness
to provide medical prescriptions and sick-days.
Pharmacies have the exclusive right to sell drugs. In contrast to most other countries, this
exclusivity applies to both prescribed drugs and over-the-counter (OTC) drugs. The prices of
drugs are ￿xed by the Ministry of Economic A⁄airs, after negotiations with the pharmaceutical
companies and the pharmacies￿association. The pharmacies obtain a ￿xed margin of 31% of
the drug price, up to a ceiling of 7:44e per package. Because this ceiling has not been adjusted,
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the average percentage margin has gradually declined from 28% in 1994 to 23% in 2001 (de
Bruyn (1994) and De Bruyn (2006)). In sum, for most products there is essentially no price
competition. Advertising has until recently also been prevented due to self-regulation by the
pharmacies￿ association, but there are various potential non-price instruments: availability
(opening hours), quality of service and advice, and the supply of an assortment of general care
products.
To summarize, competition among physicians and among pharmacies has until recently
been limited with respect to price and advertising instruments, but there are a variety of other
possible instruments at their disposal to compete for patients. We will come back to this in the
empirical analysis when interpreting our results on the e⁄ects of entry on competition.
Competitive interaction between the two professions
The two professions￿core services are potentially strong complements: physicians provide med-
ical consultations and prescribe drugs, while pharmacies are responsible for selling the drugs.
As a result, the nearby presence of one profession could strongly bene￿t the other profession
(since geographic proximity matters, as we discussed above). The degree of complementarity
is however not perfect and it may actually be asymmetric: not all consultations end with a
prescription, and several drugs can be sold by pharmacies without a prescription. If patients
would often visit the physician without a subsequent visit to the pharmacy (because no drug
was prescribed), then the presence of a pharmacy would only have a small impact on the physi-
cians￿pro￿t. Hence, pharmacies would only be weak complements to physicians. Conversely, if
patients would often visit a pharmacy without a preceding visit to the physician (because the
drug requires no prescription or was prescribed by a specialist), then physicians would only be
weak complements to pharmacies. The degree of complementarity in both directions is therefore
an empirical question. The above study by the OFT (2003) suggests a strong complementary
link between both professions: up to 47% of U.K. patients go to the pharmacy immediately
after having visited their physician.
While the professions￿ core services are complementary, they regularly operate on each
other domain, so that they may also be viewed as providing substitute services. This has
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led to many con￿ icts between pharmacies and physicians.6 In addition to providing medical
advice, physicians frequently o⁄er free drugs to their patients, obtained from the pharmaceutical
companies as a way to promote their products. The pharmacies do not oppose to such drug
promotions per se, but they claim that the distribution should remain the exclusive right of the
pharmacies. Conversely, pharmacies also provide services that are in the physicians￿domain.
They o⁄er an increasing amount of independent medical advice to patients when selling their
drugs. This development has actually been actively promoted by the European Commission: in
the near future, pharmacies will be partly rewarded on a fee-for-service basis, rather than as a
percentage of their sales, giving them additional incentives to provide medical advice; they will
also obtain the right to substitute the prescribed drugs by equivalent but less expensive generic
alternatives. Furthermore, even if physicians would not want to sell drugs and pharmacies
would not want to provide medical advice, their services may be literally substitutable in a fair
number of cases. In sum, while the professions￿core services appear to be complementary, they
may also be substitutable to some extent.
This discussion has largely focused on the demand-side factors in￿ uencing the extent of com-
petitive interaction between pharmacies and physicians. In principle, competitive interaction
may also stem from supply-side factors. For example, pharmacies and physicians may generate
knowledge spill-overs and learning e⁄ects, which can a⁄ect both their variable and ￿xed costs.
The health care literature we have surveyed has however not put emphasis on these sources of
competitive interaction. We will therefore interpret our subsequent empirical ￿ndings on the
strategic interdependence of entry decisions as largely stemming from the discussed demand-side
sources.
2.2.3 Overview of the data
An overview of the data documents part of the above discussion, and introduces our subsequent
econometric analysis. The data set contains information on 1;136 markets in 2001, de￿ned at
the town-level as motivated by our earlier discussion of the relevant geographic markets. To
6An interesting discussion of the con￿ icts arising from competition between physicians and pharmacies is
provided in an article of the Belgian newspaper De Standaard (08/06/2004), with the self-explanatory translated
title ￿Why physicians want to sell drugs, and pharmacies want to provide medical consultations.￿
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reduce potential problems with overlapping markets, we do not include urban towns, which are
de￿ned by a population density of more than 800 inhabitants per km2 or a population of more
than 15;000. This reduces our sample of towns to 847. We obtained similar conclusions based
on the full sample of 1;136 towns. We have information on the number of active pharmacies and
physicians per market from RIZIV (the National Institute of Health insurance).7 We combine
this with information on the demographic characteristics of each market from NIS (National
Institute of Statistics), Ecodata (Federal Government Agency for Economics) and RSZ (the
National Institute of Social Security).
Table 2.1 presents counts of the observed market con￿gurations, which we will model in our
econometric analysis. For example, there are 142 markets with no pharmacies or physicians, and
58 markets with one pharmacy and two physicians. There are also several market con￿gurations
that never occur, e.g. three physicians and more than three pharmacies. More generally, the
table shows that there is a quite strong correlation between the number of pharmacies and
physicians; the correlation coe¢ cient is 0:85. This strong correlation may be due to common
observed and unobserved factors in￿ uencing the pro￿tability of pharmacies and physicians.
However, our discussion above suggests that the correlation may also be due to the fact that
both professions provide complementary services. Our econometric analysis will attempt to
distinguish between these alternative possibilities (conditional on distributional assumptions).
The ￿nal row shows the percentage of all markets (broken down by the number of pharma-
cies), in which the geographic entry restriction imposed on the pharmacies is binding, in the
sense that no additional pharmacies are allowed to enter by the establishment act. This will
be important in our empirical analysis. The entry restrictions are binding for 82:3% of all the
markets. Binding entry restrictions occur the least frequently in markets with two established
pharmacies, but even here the percentage is quite large (74:7%). Note that the entry restrictions
are also frequently binding in markets without pharmacies. While this may seem counterintu-
itive, it follows from the fact that the markets (towns) are smaller than the municipalities on
which the establishment act is based. It is therefore possible that no pharmacies are allowed to
7In accordance with RIZIV, a physician is de￿ned as a generalist with more than 49 patients and annually
more than 199 consultations, of which more than 0.9% are house visits. Our results are robust against stricter
de￿nitions.
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Table 2.1: Observed market con￿gurations*
number of pharmacies Total
0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
0 142 11 1 0 0 0 0 154
1 62 36 2 0 0 0 0 100
2 27 58 3 0 1 0 0 89
3 6 38 16 3 0 0 0 63
number of 4 8 35 31 4 0 0 0 78
physicians 5 0 13 20 5 1 1 0 40
6 0 12 22 15 2 1 0 52
7 0 5 18 23 2 1 0 49
8 0 6 7 12 12 1 0 38
9 0 3 9 11 6 2 0 31
10 0 0 9 9 11 4 3 36
11+ 1 2 8 20 35 25 26 117
Total 246 219 146 102 70 35 29 847
restricted entry 199 179 109 85 61 35 29 697
% of total 80,9 81,7 74,7 83,3 87,1 100,0 100,0 82,3
￿ Source: RIZIV as discussed in the text.
enter in one town, because there are already too many pharmacies in other towns of the same
municipality. Note also that when the entry restrictions are binding, the establishment act may
sometimes be violated. This is due to historical factors, since many pharmacies were set up
in anticipation of the act, and these pharmacies were not forced to shut down at the moment
the act was introduced.8 However, the excess number of pharmacies is generally small in these
cases, and it is in any case not relevant for our econometric framework below.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on the demographic variables, which may a⁄ect the
pro￿tability of both professions. We include information on population size, the percentage of
young people (under the age of 18), the percentage of elderly (over the age of 65), the percentage
of foreigners, the unemployment rate, mean income, and a dummy variable to account for
structural di⁄erences between the region of Flanders and Wallonia.
8In some cases a violation of the entry restrictions may be due to an exception clause in the act, which allows
an additional entry under certain circumstances (population and distance of existing pharmacies).
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics*
Variable Description mean std. dev.
# pharmacies Number of pharmacies 1.76 1.81
# physicians Number of physicians 4.93 4.62
ln(population) Logarithm of population 7.91 1.13
% young Fraction of population, 17 years or younger 22.50 2.55
% old Fraction of population, 65 years or older 16.11 2.79
% foreign Fraction of population with foreign nationality 4.27 5.67
% unemployed Unemployment rate 5.61 2.80
Flanders Dummy variable, 1 for the region of Flanders 0.39 0.49
mean income Mean income (in 10,000e) 2.47 0.40
￿ 847 observations (markets in 2001). Source: RIZIV, NIS, Ecodata, and the RSZ as discussed in text.
2.3 The entry model
Section 2.2 shows that several central institutional facts should be incorporated in our empirical
framework. First, the interaction within and between pharmacies and physicians is local, and
it is reasonable to de￿ne the geographic markets at the town level. Second, pharmacies and
physicians on balance provide largely complementary services, so that entry in one profession
may have a positive net impact on the pro￿tability of entry in the other profession. Third,
the entry of pharmacies is regulated. For each municipality (typically consisting of about 1￿4
towns) there is a maximum number of pharmacies based on population criteria. Entry by
physicians is not restricted on a geographic basis. Fourth, conduct is regulated: pharmacies
received a regulated average gross margin of 23% in 2001, and physicians are paid on a fee for
service basis. Both professions are also subject to advertising restrictions, but can potentially
compete in other dimensions (e.g. opening hours, quality of service).
Our entry model will incorporate these features. The model ￿ts in the recent empirical entry
literature, as initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992). This literature
models entry as a strategic game, and aims to draw inferences about unobserved payo⁄s ￿
a latent variable ￿from the equilibrium relationship between the observed market structure
and market characteristics, such as market size. Our own model is a static one, in the spirit
of Mazzeo (2002); for dynamic entry models see Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2008) and their
review of other recent work. Mazzeo distinguishes between two types of substitute ￿rms, and he
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models the total number of ￿rms of each type as the (unique) equilibrium outcome of a strategic
free entry game. We extend the static entry literature in two respects. First, we account for
the fact that entry may not be free, i.e. there may be binding entry restrictions for one of the
two types of ￿rms (pharmacies). Second, we allow for the possibility that the entry decisions
of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are (net) strategic complements, rather than strategic substitutes.9
Vives (2005) provides a background overview of games with strategic complementarities. His
framework includes applications when the ￿rms￿decision variables are continuous, but it can
also be applied to situations where the decision variables are discrete as in our entry context.
2.3.1 Payo⁄s
There are two types of ￿rms, i = 1;2. Firms of type 1 are pharmacies, and ￿rms of type 2
are physicians. Each ￿rm decides whether or not to enter the market. The entry decisions can
be summarized by the total number of ￿rms of each type i entering the market, as denoted
by the random variable Ni. Equilibrium realizations of this random variable are denoted by
ni. Because of the geographic entry restrictions the maximum allowed number of pharmacies
in the market is n1, so N1 ￿ n1. Following the discussion in section 2.2, n1 is equal to the
maximum allowed number of pharmacies in the municipality minus the number of ￿rms in the
other markets of the same municipality. If N1 < n1, the entry restriction is not binding in
equilibrium; if N1 = n1 the entry restriction is binding.
Firms of the same type are identical, i.e. there is no heterogeneity between ￿rms of the same
type, similar to Mazzeo (2002). Hence, ￿rms of the same type have the same payo⁄ functions.
If a ￿rm of either type i does not enter, its payo⁄s are normalized to zero. If a ￿rm of type i
enters, its payo⁄s depend on the total number of entering ￿rms of both types, as given by:
￿￿
i(N1;N2) = ￿i(N1;N2) ￿ "i; (2.1)
9Previous work has not considered the possibility that entry is restricted. As far as we know, the possibility
that entry decisions are strategic complements has also not been treated within an equilibrium entry model,
although there are some related papers: Sweeting (2005) on the timing of radio commercials and Cohen and
Mazzeo (2005) on branch investments.
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where ￿i(N1;N2) is the deterministic component of payo⁄s, and "i is a random component,
unobserved to the econometrician. The precise relationship between the payo⁄s and the number
of ￿rms of each type re￿ ects the nature of competitive interaction. Our ￿rst assumption is that
entry decisions by ￿rms of the same type are strategic substitutes. Davis (2006) provides a
careful analysis of this assumption in a general class of quantity games including discrete entry
games.10 In our framework, the assumption that entry decisions by same-type ￿rms are strategic
substitutes means that a ￿rm￿ s marginal pro￿ts from entering (i.e. ￿￿
i(N1;N2) ￿ 0) decreases
when another ￿rm of the same type decides to enter. This simply amounts to assuming that a
￿rm￿ s payo⁄s (under entry) are decreasing in the number of ￿rms of the same type.
Assumption 1. (Entry decisions by ￿rms of the same type are strategic substitutes)
￿1(N1 + 1;N2) < ￿1(N1;N2)
￿2(N1;N2 + 1) < ￿2(N1;N2)
for all N1 and N2. This assumption is consistent with the previous empirical entry literature,
and is central to characterize the Nash equilibrium outcomes below.
Regarding ￿rms of di⁄erent types, we assume that their entry decisions are strategic com-
plements or independent. This is in line with our background discussion in section 2.2.2, which
showed that the pharmacies￿and physicians￿core services are complementary even though some
degree of substitutability between related services cannot be ruled out. Intuitively, we assume
that a ￿rm￿ s payo⁄s are increasing in the number of ￿rms of the other type, but not by too
much.
10See in particular Davis￿Assumption 3 and his subsequent discussion. Let sj denote ￿rm j￿ s action and s￿j
￿rm j￿ s competitors actions. In Davis￿framework, a single index function Q(sj;s￿j) summarizes the e⁄ects of
the competitors￿actions on pro￿ts, whereas in our framework there are two index functions (for the two types
of ￿rms). Our framework is however more restrictive in several other respects: ￿rms (of the same type) are
identical, a ￿rm￿ s action is either to enter or not to enter, sj = f1;0g, and the index function (for a single type)
is simply the number of ￿rms, i.e. the sum of all entry decisions, N = Q(sj;s￿j) =
PK
k=1 sk, where K is the
number of potential entrants.
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Assumption 2. (Entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements or
independent)
(a) ￿1(N1;N2) ￿ ￿1(N1;N2 + 1)
￿2(N1;N2) ￿ ￿2(N1 + 1;N2)
(b) ￿1(N1 + 1;N2 + 1) < ￿1(N1;N2)
￿2(N1 + 1;N2 + 1) < ￿2(N1;N2)
for all N1 and N2. Assumption 2 (a) states that a ￿rm￿ s payo⁄s (under entry) are either
increasing in or independent of the number of ￿rms of the other type. Hence, the marginal
pro￿ts from entering (i.e. ￿￿
i(N1;N2)￿0) weakly increase when a ￿rm of the other type decides
to enter, so that their entry decisions are (weak) strategic complements. Assumption 2 (b)
says that the extent of strategic complementarity between ￿rms of di⁄erent types is weaker
than the extent of strategic substitutability between ￿rms of the same type. Hence, payo⁄s
decrease when there is an additional ￿rm of both the own type and the other type.11 It is also
possible to reverse Assumption 2, i.e. assume that entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types
are strategic substitutes (but not by too much). This would be similar to Mazzeo (2002). We
have also considered such a model, but found that it was not supported by the data.
Note ￿nally that our assumptions allow for the possibility of asymmetries in strategic in-
terdependence. Hence, consistent with our discussion in section 2.2.2, it is possible that the
entry decision of a pharmacy has a stronger positive impact on a physician than vice versa.
The reverse is also possible. We will come back to this when discussing our empirical results.
Based on Assumptions 1 and 2, we can now derive the equilibrium number of ￿rms and the
implied likelihood function to be taken to the data. In the empirical analysis, we will verify
whether these assumptions are indeed satis￿ed at the obtained parameter estimates.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with nonbinding geographic entry restrictions
When entry restrictions are not binding, i.e. N1 < n1, each ￿rm freely decides whether or not
to enter, given the entry decisions of the other ￿rms. As is well-known, there are many pure-
11Strictly speaking, we only require one of the pair of inequalities in Assumption 2 (b) to be strict.
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strategy Nash equilibria in this entry game. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) resolve this problem
in two alternative ways. First, they aggregate the non-unique Nash equilibrium outcomes to
obtain an econometric model for the total number of ￿rms entering in a Nash equilibrium. In
their application in which all ￿rms are substitutes, this yields a unique prediction for the total
number of entering ￿rms. Second, they put additional structure to the entry game and assume
that ￿rms move sequentially. This alternative approach yields a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium at the disaggregate ￿rm level. Mazzeo (2002) can be viewed as a combination of
both approaches: he speci￿es a model for the total number of ￿rms per type entering in a Nash
equilibrium, and then re￿nes the Nash equilibrium to obtain a unique prediction for the total
number of ￿rms per type.12 We take a related approach here.
The market con￿guration (n1;n2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if the random
component of pro￿ts " = ("1;"2) satis￿es the following conditions:
￿1(n1 + 1;n2) < "1 ￿ ￿1(n1;n2) (2.2)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) < "2 ￿ ￿2(n1;n2):
When (2.2) is satis￿ed, n1 ￿rms of type 1, and n2 of type 2 ￿nd it pro￿table to enter, and
no additional ￿rm of either type has an incentive to enter; hence (n1;n2) is indeed a Nash
equilibrium outcome. If " has full support, Assumption 1 guarantees that there are realizations
of " for which (2.2) holds, so that the market con￿guration (n1;n2) is observed with positive
probability.
However, (n1;n2) may show multiplicity with other Nash equilibrium outcomes for some
realizations of ". Intuitively, the multiplicity stems from coordination problems, as is illustrated
in Figure 2-1. The bold lines delineate the areas of " for which the market con￿gurations (1;2)
and (2;3) are the Nash equilibrium outcomes. The shaded rectangle is the area of overlap, where
both market con￿gurations are Nash equilibrium outcomes. Note that the area of multiplicity
12There have also been alternative approaches to the multiplicity of equilibria in static entry games. See, for
example, Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) and Seim (2006).
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would disappear if ￿rms are independent, i.e. if the conditions in Assumption 2(a) hold with
equality, so that ￿1(2;2) = ￿1(2;3) and ￿2(1;3) = ￿2(2;3). As the extent of complementarity
increases, the area of multiplicity increases. Figure 2-2 shows an extreme case of strong com-
plementarity. In this case, the entire area of " for which (1;2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome
is a subset of the area of " for which (2;3) is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, there would be no "
for which (1;2) is a Nash equilibrium without (2;3) also being one. Assumption 2(b) rules out
this possibility, since it requires that ￿1(2;3) < ￿1(1;2) and ￿2(2;3) < ￿2(1;2).
Figure 2-1: Nash equilibria with strategic complements
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In general, the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium outcomes can be characterized as follows.
If ￿rms of di⁄erent types are independent, i.e. Assumption 2(a) holds with equality, then the
market con￿guration (n1;n2) is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome in the area of " satisfying
(2.2). In contrast, if the entry decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements, i.e.
Assumption 2(a) holds with strict inequality, then (n1;n2) may show multiplicity with other
Nash equilibrium outcomes for some realizations of ". In the Appendix, we show the following
three results:
1. (n1;n2) may only show multiplicity with Nash equilibrium outcomes of the form (n1 +
m;n2 + m), where m is a positive or a negative integer. For example, if (1;2) is a Nash
equilibrium outcome, there may be multiplicity with, say, (0;1) or (2;3) or (3;4) but not
with (2;4).
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Figure 2-2: Nash equilibria ￿strong strategic complements
( ) 2 , 1 2 p
( ) 3 , 2 2 p
( ) 3 , 1 2 p
( ) 4 , 2 2 p





2. (n1;n2) necessarily shows multiplicity with (n1 +1;n2 +1) and (n1 ￿1;n2 ￿1). The area
of multiplicity with (n1 + 1;n2 + 1) is given by:
￿1(n1 + 1;n2) < "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 + 1;n2 + 1) (2.3)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) < "2 ￿ ￿2(n1 + 1;n2 + 1);
and similarly for (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
3. While (n1;n2) may also show multiplicity with (n1+m;n2+m) for m > 1 or m < 1, these
areas of multiplicity are necessarily a subset of the areas of multiplicity with (n1+1;n2+1)
and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
Taken together, these results imply that the areas of " for which (n1;n2) shows multiplicity
with any other Nash equilibrium outcome are simply given by the areas of overlap with the
outcomes (n1 + 1;n2 + 1) (given by (2.3)) and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
The multiplicity problem follows from the weak structure implied by the Nash equilibrium
concept. To obtain unique predictions, we put additional structure on the entry game. We
assume that ￿rms make their entry decisions sequentially, i.e. after observing all previous entry
decisions, and impose the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium re￿nement.13 When entry decisions
13This approach is in the spirit of Mazzeo (2002), but adapted to the circumstances of our application to health
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of other-type ￿rms are strategic complements, it is not necessary to make speci￿c assumptions
regarding the exact ordering of entry moves. This additional structure makes it possible to
assign a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome to every realization of ". Suppose " is
such that both (n1;n2) and (n1+m;n2+m) are Nash equilibrium outcomes (with m a positive
or negative integer). The outcome with the fewest number of ￿rms cannot be subgame perfect,
since there would then always be an additional ￿rm of one type with an incentive to enter, in
anticipation of triggering further entry by a ￿rm of the other type as well. Hence, when there
are multiple Nash equilibrium outcomes, the one with the largest number of ￿rms is the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. Making use of our earlier characterization of the multiplicity
of Nash equilibrium outcomes, it immediately follows that (n1;n2) will be a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if (i) " satis￿es conditions (2.2) and (ii) " does not satisfy
conditions (2.3). This can be illustrated on Figure 2-1. The market con￿guration (1;2) is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if " falls in the relevant area bounded
by the bold lines, minus the shaded area in the lower left corner.
Assuming that " has a bivariate density f(￿), it is now possible to derive the probability that
the market con￿guration (n1;n2) will be observed as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome when entry restrictions are not binding:












care professions. Mazzeo assumes that ￿rms can choose their type at or after entering. We instead assume that
￿rms ￿rst choose their type. The potential entrants of each type subsequently make their entry decision without
being able to change their type. This is a reasonable assumption in our setting, since training to become physician
or pharmacy is costly and time consuming. In practice, physicians and pharmacies rarely retrain. Note that our
assumption that ￿rms choose their type before entering yields subgame perfect equilibrium conditions that are
computationally more tractable than Mazzeo (2002).
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2.3.3 Equilibrium with binding geographic entry restrictions
Non-geographic entry restrictions, e.g. minimum requirements of competency, are common to
all ￿rms and do not require a special treatment. They directly enter the payo⁄s of the ￿rms
through observable or unobservable factors a⁄ecting ￿xed costs.
Binding geographic entry restrictions, in contrast, require modifying the traditional free
entry framework. In this case N1 = n1, so that there may be type 1 ￿rms (pharmacies) that
have an incentive to enter but are not able to do so because of the entry restriction. This
has the following immediate implication. From the market con￿guration (n1;n2) it is no longer
possible to infer that entry by n1 + 1 ￿rms would be unpro￿table. Hence, with binding entry
restrictions the market con￿guration (n1;n2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if "
satis￿es the following conditions:
"1 ￿ ￿1(n1;n2)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) < "2 ￿ ￿2(n1;n2):
(2.5)
For ￿rms of type 2 these conditions are still the same as in (2.2). For ￿rms of type 1 they are
di⁄erent, since it is no longer possible to infer a lower bound on pro￿ts from observing (n1;n2).
This actually simpli￿es the problem of multiple Nash equilibrium outcomes. With nonbinding
entry restrictions, we showed that (n1;n2) may only show multiplicity with Nash equilibrium
outcomes of the form (n1 + m;n2 + m), with m either a positive or a negative integer. When
the entry restrictions are binding, it is immediately obvious that there can no longer be such
multiplicity for positive integers m. Hence, (n1;n2) can only have multiplicity with equilibria of
the form (n1 +m;n2 +m), for negative integers m. However, similar to the case of nonbinding
entry restrictions, the equilibrium with the fewer number of ￿rms cannot be selected as the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The market con￿guration (n1;n2) is therefore the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if " satis￿es (2.5).
The probability of observing the market con￿guration (n1;n2) as the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium when entry restrictions are binding becomes:
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We can now specify the likelihood function for our cross-section of markets on observed market
con￿gurations and the corresponding market characteristics. We suppress a market subscript
m indexing the unit of observation. For both markets with nonbinding and binding entry
restrictions, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for every possible
realization of ". Hence, the probabilities of observing a market con￿guration, as derived by
(2.4) and (2.6), can be sensibly used to construct the likelihood function. De￿ning a dummy
variable d = 1 if N1 < n1 and d = 0 otherwise, the contribution to the likelihood function of a
representative observed market con￿guration is:
l = dPr(N1 = n1;N2 = n2) + (1 ￿ d)Pr(N1 = n1;N2 = n2); (2.7)
where the probability terms are de￿ned above by (2.4) and (2.6).
Specify the density f(￿) as the bivariate normal density, with a parameter ￿ measuring
the correlation between "1 and "2. There are some interesting special cases of this model.
First, suppose that the payo⁄s are independent of the number of ￿rms of the other type, i.e.
Assumption 2(a) holds with equality, so ￿￿
i(N1;N2) = ￿￿
i(Ni) for each type i. In this case the
second term in (2.4) vanishes, so that the model reduces to a bivariate ordered probit model with
censoring, where the censoring refers to observations where the entry restrictions are binding.
Second, if in addition the entry restriction is not binding for any observation, the model reduces
to an uncensored bivariate ordered probit model. Third, if the correlation parameter ￿ = 0,
we end up with two traditional ordered probit models, one for each type, as estimated by
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and several subsequent contributions. In the empirical analysis,
we will also present the results from the ￿rst two special cases and compare it with the general
model.
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It remains to specify the payo⁄s ￿￿
i(N1;N2) entering the likelihood function through the
probabilities (2.4) and (2.6). Consider the following linear speci￿cation:
￿￿
i(N1;N2) = ￿i ln(S) + X￿i ￿ ￿
j
i + ￿k
i =Ni ￿ "i: (2.8)
The variable S is market size, measured by the number of consumers (population), X is a
vector of other observed market characteristics, such as average income, percentage of elderly,




￿xed e⁄ects for type i when there are, respectively, j ￿rms of the own type and k ￿rms of the
other type.
The ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i are similar to the ￿cut-values￿in simple ordered probit models, and
measure the e⁄ect of j ￿rms of the own type on payo⁄s.14 The ￿xed e⁄ects ￿k
i measure the
e⁄ect of k ￿rms of the other type on payo⁄s, and re￿ ect the extent of strategic complementarity
between the entry decisions of di⁄erent types. One may reasonably expect the complementarity
e⁄ect to be stronger when there are few ￿rms of the own type. We incorporate this by dividing
￿k
i by the number of ￿rms of the own type.15 A more general approach would be to specify a full
set of ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
jk




i =Ni. This more general speci￿cation would however require a too large number of parameters
to be estimated.
As is common in discrete choice models, the scale of the payo⁄s is not identi￿ed. To proceed
with estimation, we restrict the standard deviation of "i, ￿i, to be equal to one. This restriction
is irrelevant for our empirical analysis in section 2.4. In our counterfactual analysis in section
2.5, however, we need to identify the scale of the payo⁄s, so we will then put additional structure
on the payo⁄s. Apart from the scaling issue, the ￿xed e⁄ects are not all identi￿ed. For each
14Some studies simply include the number of own-type ￿rms as an explanatory variable, i.e. they include a
term ￿￿iNi instead of the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i. This is more restrictive, as it assumes that the di⁄erences between
two consecutive ￿xed e⁄ects are always the same (￿i).
15This has the intuitive implication that the e⁄ect of an other-type entrant on the aggregate pro￿ts of all
own-type ￿rms is independent of the number of own-type ￿rms. Not dividing ￿
k
i by Ni would imply that the
e⁄ect of an other-type entrant on the aggregate own-type pro￿ts would increase with the number of own-type
￿rms.
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type i we set the ￿rst own-type ￿xed e⁄ect to zero, i.e. ￿1
i = 0.16 Furthermore, for each type i
we set ￿0
i = 0.
Note that the strategic complementarities (the ￿k
i ) are identi￿ed through our parametric
assumptions. Intuitively, conditional on observed market characteristics the number of pharma-
cies and physicians may be correlated because of strategic complementarities (captured through
the ￿k
i ) or because of unobserved market characteristics a⁄ecting both professions payo⁄s (cap-
tured through the correlation parameter ￿). We distinguish between both possibilities based
on the assumption that the error terms have a bivariate normal distribution. Other entry
models with two or more types make similar parametric assumptions to obtain identi￿cation,
e.g. Mazzeo (2002).17 To identify the strategic complementarities non-parametrically would
require appropriate exclusion restrictions, i.e. specifying certain market characteristics that
a⁄ect either the pharmacies￿payo⁄s or the physicians￿payo⁄s and not both. Since there are no
obvious such restrictions in our application, we rely on our parametric assumptions to obtain
identi￿cation.18




















Since we normalized ￿1
i = 0 and ￿0




16The constant term ￿
0
i in the vector ￿i then becomes identi￿ed. Alternatively, one can normalize ￿
0




17Mazzeo (2002) also assumes a normal distribution to identify the e⁄ects of other-type ￿rm entry decisions,
which are strategic substitutes in his case. While he does not estimate ￿, he performs a robustness analysis of
his results by assuming alternative values of ￿.
18This relates closely to the identi￿cation issues encountered in measuring complementarities in organizational
design with a single decision maker. Athey and Stern (2003) develop a structural framework to identify comple-
mentarities and show the importance of proper exclusion restrictions. Miravete and Pernias (2006) apply their
framework using a maximum likelihood approach.
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all be positive. The ￿rst row of inequalities in (2.9) simply says that an additional ￿rm of the
own type decreases the payo⁄s.19 The second row says that an additional ￿rm of the other type
increases the payo⁄s. Finally, the third row states that an additional ￿rm of both types reduces
the payo⁄s. In the empirical analysis, we will verify whether these conditions are satis￿ed. If
they are, the estimates are consistent with the initial assumptions of the model.
2.4 Empirical analysis
Our empirical entry model with entry restrictions and strategic complementarities is given by
(2.7), where the probabilities are de￿ned by (2.4) and (2.6) and the payo⁄s are given by (2.8).
The model is internally consistent if Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis￿ed, i.e. if the estimated
own-type and other-type ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i and ￿k
i satisfy the conditions in (2.9).
There may be up to 11 pharmacies and up to 21 physicians in a market, implying a large
number of ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i and ￿k
i . It is necessary to impose restrictions on the pharmacies￿
own-type ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
1, since the entry restrictions are always binding in markets with more
than 4 pharmacies: for j > 4, we therefore restrict ￿
j
1 such that there is no further competitive
entry e⁄ect.20 To estimate the other-type ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿k
i , we impose restrictions following a
￿bottom-up￿approach: we begin with a limited number of other-type ￿xed e⁄ects and then
add more until they no longer di⁄er signi￿cantly from the previous one. We end up with a
speci￿cation with one signi￿cant other-type ￿xed e⁄ect in the pharmacies￿payo⁄s, ￿1
1, and four
signi￿cant other-type ￿xed e⁄ects in the physicians￿payo⁄s, ￿1
2 :::￿4
2 (where we set ￿k
1 = ￿1
1
for k > 1, and ￿k
2 = ￿4
2 for k > 4). The model is internally consistent, i.e. the estimated
parameters satisfy all the conditions given by (2.9). Note that we also estimated an alternative
model, in which the entry decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic substitutes (the





i is a su¢ cient but not a necessary condition for Assumption 1 to be satis￿ed. The necessary and






i =((Ni(Ni + 1)). We present the su¢ cient condition,
since it is easier to interpret in the empirical analysis, and since it was always met anyway.
20To obtain these restrictions on ￿
j
1, for j > 4, we start from Bresnahan and Reiss￿(1991) entry thresholds
measures of competition. De￿ne the entry thresholds S
j;k
i as the market size at which the j-th ￿rm of type i
would just be willing to enter when there are k ￿rms of the other type, i.e. the market size such that (2.8) is
equal to zero. If the per-￿rm entry threshold for the j-th own-type entrant is the same as that of the (j ￿ 1)-th
own-type entrant (given that there are no other type ￿rms), there is no competitive entry e⁄ect. Using (2.8), it




1 + ￿1 ln((N1 ￿ 1)=N1). Hence, we impose this restriction on the
pharmacies￿own-type e⁄ects for j > 4.
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reverse of Assumption 2). However, we found that the estimated parameters often violate that
model￿ s assumptions, i.e. the other-type ￿rms often have a positive e⁄ect on payo⁄s, while the
assumption of strategic substitutes requires the opposite. See Schaumans and Verboven (2006)
for details on that model.
Table 2.3 presents the parameter estimates. The speci￿cation in the third column is our
general model, accounting for both entry restrictions and strategic complementarities. For com-
parison purposes, the speci￿cation in the ￿rst column presents the estimates of an uncensored
bivariate ordered probit model, which assumes no binding entry restrictions and no strategic
complementarities (all ￿k
i = 0). The speci￿cation in the second column shows the estimates of
a censored bivariate ordered probit model. This still assumes there are no complementarities,
but it accounts for the fact that entry restrictions on pharmacies are binding in some of the
markets.
A comparison between the ￿rst and the second column clearly demonstrates the importance
of accounting for the presence of geographic entry restrictions on pharmacies. Several of the
parameters change to a substantial extent. A Hausman test con￿rms that the parameters dif-
fer signi￿cantly across the two estimators (test-statistic of 531:9). Hence, the consistent model
which accounts for the entry restrictions should be preferred. Furthermore, a comparison be-
tween the second and the third column shows that the ￿k
i are jointly signi￿cant (likelihood ratio
test statistics of 41:78). This indicates that there are signi￿cant strategic complementarities be-
tween the entry decisions of pharmacies and physicians. These estimates take into account that
the error terms entering the two professions￿payo⁄s may be correlated, as captured by the
parameter ￿. Recall however our earlier discussion that we do not identify the strategic comple-
mentarities based on exclusion restrictions, but rather based on our parametric assumptions,
including the bivariate normal distribution for the error terms.
We now discuss the parameter estimates of the general entry model in more detail. Market
size, as measured by population, is the most important market characteristic a⁄ecting the
pharmacies￿and physicians￿payo⁄s. This is consistent with the results from previous entry
models, such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In line with expectations, the population￿ s age
distribution has an important impact on payo⁄s. More speci￿cally, the percentage of elderly in a
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Table 2.3: Estimation results*
Bivariate ordered probit models General model with
No account for Account for strategic complements
entry restrictions entry restrictions
Pharmacies￿payo⁄ equation
constant -19.05 (1.18) -14.09 (3.40) -13.54 (1.82)
ln(population) 2.49 (0.06) 1.95 (0.12) 1.43 (0.13)
% young -0.31 (2.48) 0.73 (9.18) 0.22 (4.26)
% old 10.18 (2.43) 19.00 (5.20) 19.32 (3.54)
% foreign -1.03 (0.94) -0.94 (0.96) -1.00 (1.08)
% unemployed 9.20 (2.22) 22.71 (4.85) 23.06 (4.40)
Flanders -0.03 (0.14) 0.13 (0.34) 0.11 (0.25)
income -0.43 (0.14) -0.35 (0.18) -0.32 (0.19)
￿2
1 2.26 (0.11) 1.50 (0.18) 1.09 (0.23)
￿3
1 3.64 (0.13) 2.56 (0.20) 1.94 (0.30)
￿4
1 4.83 (0.15) 3.14 (0.22) 2.37 (0.35)
￿1
1 ￿ ￿ 0.78 (0.29)
Physicians￿payo⁄ equation
constant -19.41 (0.94) -19.28 (1.12) -17.42 (0.98)
ln(population) 2.54 (0.07) 2.53 (0.08) 2.27 (0.07)
% young 3.45 (2.08) 2.22 (2.25) 2.02 (2.15)
% old 6.85 (1.84) 6.81 (1.90) 5.98 (1.89)
% foreign -3.61 (0.73) -3.58 (0.69) -3.43 (0.72)
% unemployed 2.30 (1.83) 2.29 (1.98) 0.67 (1.89)
Flanders -0.65 (0.12) -0.56 (0.13) -0.58 (0.13)
income 0.32 (0.11) 0.32 (0.12) 0.37 (0.11)
￿2
2 1.30 (0.10) 1.32 (0.10) 1.23 (0.10)
￿3
2 2.34 (0.12) 2.36 (0.12) 2.27 (0.13)
￿4
2 2.99 (0.13) 3.09 (0.13) 2.91 (0.14)
￿1
2 ￿ ￿ 0.16 (0.19)
￿2
2 ￿ ￿ 2.01 (0.29)
￿3
2 ￿ ￿ 3.89 (1.01)
￿4
2 ￿ ￿ 5.99 (0.83)
￿ 0.32 (0.03) 0.05 (0.07) -0.15 (0.09)
Log Likelihood -2,255.6 -1,761.5 -1,740.6
￿ The number of observed markets is 847. Standard errors are in parentheses. The other
estimated ￿
j
2 are not shown; constraints on the other ￿
j
1 and ￿k
i are discussed in the text.
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market has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on both professions￿payo⁄s; the e⁄ect is stronger for
the pharmacies. The other market characteristics only have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the payo⁄s of
one of the two professions. The percentage of foreigners has a negative e⁄ect on payo⁄s, but the
e⁄ect is signi￿cant only in the case of physicians. Physicians do not obtain signi￿cantly di⁄erent
payo⁄s in markets with higher unemployment, whereas pharmacies tend to obtain signi￿cantly
higher payo⁄s in such markets, consistent with other studies showing that the unemployed tend
to consume more drugs. Income per capita positively and signi￿cantly a⁄ects the physicians￿
payo⁄s. Finally, there are some regional di⁄erences: payo⁄s to physicians are signi￿cantly
lower in the region of Flanders than in the other two regions (Brussels and Wallonia). This
may be due to either di⁄erent medical consumption habits or to better alternative employment
opportunities in the region of Flanders.
The own-type ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i are all positive and show an increasing pattern, as required by
the ￿rst condition in (2.9). This implies that additional entry by ￿rms of the same type lowers
payo⁄s (strategic substitutes). The same pattern occurs for the other-type ￿xed e⁄ects ￿k
i ,
satisfying the second condition in (2.9). This means that additional entry by ￿rms of di⁄erent
types raises payo⁄s (strategic complementarity). Finally, one can verify that the third condition
in (2.9) is satis￿ed for all observed market con￿gurations. Intuitively, this means that the extent
of complementarity between ￿rms of di⁄erent types is lower than the extent of substitutability
between ￿rms of the same type.
Note that the strategic complementarities implied by the other-type e⁄ects ￿k
i are asym-
metric: pharmacies tend to yield larger bene￿ts to physicians than vice versa. As discussed
in section 2.2.2, such an asymmetry in complementarities could not be ruled out a priori. It
can be interpreted as follows. On the one hand, a visit to the physician may rather likely
result in a prescription and in a subsequent visit to the pharmacy. Hence, physicians tend to
bene￿t strongly from the nearby presence of pharmacies. On the other hand, a visit to the
pharmacy may often occur without a necessary preceding visit to the physician, because of
over-the-counter drugs, or drugs prescribed by specialists. Hence, a pharmacy is less dependent
on the nearby presence of physicians.
Further insights in the magnitude of the ￿xed e⁄ects can be obtained from the entry thresh-
olds implied by the model. These are the critical market sizes (population levels) required to
472.4. Empirical analysis







































































































































support a certain number of ￿rms, for a given number of ￿rms of the other type. Figure 2-3
shows the entry thresholds for pharmacies (top part) and physicians (bottom part) in relation
to the number of ￿rms. For both professions the critical market size to support a certain num-
ber of ￿rms increases roughly proportionally with the number of ￿rms. Following Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991), one may interpret such a proportional relationship as evidence that additional
entry does not lead to intensi￿ed competition. In section 2.2.2 we already discussed that neither
pharmacies nor physicians can use price or advertising to compete. Our estimates thus imply
that both professions do also not appear to use the other non-price instruments (such as qual-
ity of service) in response to additional entry. Some caution is however warranted. In general,
the entry threshold ratios are only informative about the change in competition in response
to entry, but not about the level of competition to start with. In principle, it could thus be
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possible that even monopoly pharmacies and physicians already behave competitively, because
of the threat of new entry as in contestable markets. However, at least for the pharmacies, this
possibility appears to be rather unlikely. As Table 2.1 showed, the entry restrictions stemming
from the establishment act are binding in the majority of the markets, so that most monopoly
pharmacies are e⁄ectively protected from the threat of new entry.
As a ￿nal point on Figure 2-3, note that the lines shift downwards when there are additional
￿rms of the other type. Hence the critical market sizes drop as there are more ￿rms of the other
type, re￿ ecting the extent of strategic complementarities between both professions.
2.5 Policy reform towards pharmacies
According to the public interest view, pharmacies receive high regulated markups in combina-
tion with tight geographic entry restrictions to ensure a su¢ cient coverage of pharmacies in
the less attractive areas, without triggering excessive entry elsewhere. To evaluate whether this
view has empirical support, it is necessary to assess the combined e⁄ects of both liberalizing
entry and reducing the regulated markups.
Our counterfactual analysis essentially proceeds as follows. First, to account for entry lib-
eralization, we adjust the maximum allowed number of pharmacies per municipality upwards
by a factor ￿ ￿ 1. Equivalently, this amounts to dividing the population threshold criteria set
out in the establishment act by this factor ￿. For example, ￿ = 1:1 amounts to lowering the
required number of inhabitants per pharmacy from 2;000 to 1;818. Second, to account for
the pharmacies￿reduced regulated markups, we adjust the net markups downwards by a factor
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. For example, ￿ = 0:75 means that net markups drop to 75% of the original levels.
We then use the parameter estimates of the entry model to make new entry predictions under
alternative levels of ￿ and ￿. For ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1, we obtain the status quo predictions of
the current regime (same entry restrictions and same markups). If ￿ is arbitrarily large, we
obtain predictions when entry becomes completely free. The reader who is not interested in
the details of our approach can skip section 2.5.1 and immediately go to the discussion of our
￿ndings in section 2.5.2.
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2.5.1 Approach
We ￿rst discuss how to make entry predictions after entry liberalization without changing the
pharmacies￿regulated markups (alternative values of ￿ keeping ￿ = 1). For each market, we
take 1;000 draws from the estimated bivariate normal distribution for the error terms "1 and
"2. For each market and draw, we compute the maximum number of pharmacies and physicians
that can pro￿tably enter, subject to the considered entry restriction (￿). We then average these
numbers over the 1;000 draws to obtain the expected number of pharmacies and physicians
per market. There is one issue stemming from the fact that the establishment act restricts
the maximum allowed number of pharmacies at the municipality level and not at the market
(town) level, which is the unit of our analysis. For example, entry liberalization may allow
for one additional pharmacy in a certain municipality, but this does not stipulate in which
market within the municipality the additional pharmacy may enter. In our counterfactuals
we will assume that the extra allowed pharmacy will enter (if pro￿table) in the market where
the pro￿ts are highest. More generally, if entry liberalization allows for one or more than one
additional pharmacies in a municipality, we assume that they enter (as long as pro￿table) in
the markets where pro￿ts are the highest.21
We also make entry predictions after a reduction in the pharmacies￿regulated markups (in
combination with entry liberalization). More precisely, we look at a drop in the net markups
￿ by a factor ￿, where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, i.e. a drop from ￿ to ￿￿. To model the e⁄ects of such
a markup drop, we require a more precise economic interpretation of the pharmacies￿payo⁄s
￿￿
1(N1;N2), as speci￿ed earlier by (2.8). In a direct interpretation the payo⁄s are simply pro￿ts.
We adopt an alternative interpretation here. De￿ne a pharmacy￿ s pro￿ts as ￿￿
1(N1;N2) =
S￿R(N1;N2)exp(￿"1) ￿ F1(N1;N2), where S is the number of consumers (de￿ned before),
R(N1;N2) is revenues per consumer, F1(N1;N2) is ￿xed costs, and "1 is a multiplicative error
term capturing unobserved variable pro￿ts or ￿xed costs. This assumes that the variable
pro￿ts (￿rst term) are proportional to the number of consumers S, and that the net markup
21As a robustness check, we also did our counterfactuals under the assumption that the establishment act
applies at the market (town) level rather than at the municipality level. This is a simpler but less realistic
approach, yet the counterfactual results are similar. See Schaumans and Verboven (2006).
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￿ is constant and uniform across markets. Both assumptions are reasonable for pharmacies.22
Pharmacies then enter if and only if ￿￿
1(N1;N2) ￿ 0, or equivalently if and only if
￿￿
1(N1;N2) = ln(S) + ln(￿) + ln(R(N1;N2)=F1(N1;N2)) ￿ "1 ￿ 0: (2.10)
Hence, the payo⁄s ￿￿
1(N1;N2) receive the interpretation of the logarithm of the ratio of variable
pro￿ts over ￿xed costs, and all included variables should be interpreted as a⁄ecting this ratio.23
Specifying ln(R(N1;N2)=F1(N1;N2)) = X￿1 ￿ ￿
j
1 + ￿k
1=j and substituting into (2.10), we
essentially obtain our earlier payo⁄speci￿cation (2.8). The main di⁄erence is that the coe¢ cient
on ln(S) is now restricted to 1 (because variable pro￿ts are proportional with S). Consequently,
the standard deviation of "1, i.e. ￿1, becomes identi￿ed: we can interpret the earlier estimated








=￿1, i.e. as containing the net markup ￿. We can therefore model a lowering
of the pharmacies￿ net markups from ￿ to ￿￿ as a reduction in the intercept from ￿0
1 to
￿0
1 + ￿1 ln(￿). Using this new intercept, we can proceed as before to make entry predictions
for alternative values of ￿ and ￿.
Our counterfactuals consider a relative reduction in the net markup from ￿ to ￿￿. To
retrieve the absolute reduction in the gross markup ￿ (currently regulated at 23%), we would
require additional information on the variable retail costs other than the wholesale costs. A
reasonable starting point is to assume that the other variable retail costs are zero, so that
￿ = ￿.24 The absolute reduction in the gross regulated markups is then simply ￿(￿ ￿ 1),
where ￿ = 23%. As a robustness check, we will also consider the possibility that there are
other variable retail costs, so ￿ < ￿. It can be veri￿ed that the implied absolute gross markup
reduction is then given by ((1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿))￿(￿￿1). In this formula, we again have ￿ = 23%,
and we set ￿ = ￿ ￿10% = 13%, i.e. we assume that other variable retail costs amount to 10%.
22Gross markups are regulated at a uniform rate and our empirical results showed no evidence of non-price
competition. Furthermore, there are no scale economies in distribution to pharmacies, apart from the ￿xed costs
of setting up a pharmacy.
23This is similar to Genesove (2001), and it di⁄ers from e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) who directly interpret
￿
￿
1(N1;N2) as pro￿ts (so that the error term has the interpretation of an additive pro￿t component).
24The pharmacies￿most important other retail costs are labor costs. It is not unreasonable to treat these as
￿xed, since time spent on servicing patients is essentially ￿xed during opening hours (in contrast to physicians
who spend a variable amount of their time on servicing patients).
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2.5.2 Findings
Table 2.4 summarizes the entry predictions under alternative regulatory policies towards entry
and markups of pharmacies. The results are based on the estimates of the general model
with strategic complements (third part of Table 2.3). We obtain similar results from the model
without strategic complements (second column of Table 2.3 with ￿k
i = 0), except that there
are of course no indirect e⁄ects on the physicians in that case. Table 2.4 compares three entry
regimes: the status quo entry regulation (Panel A with ￿ = 1), ￿partial￿entry deregulation
where the maximum allowed number of pharmacies in each market is doubled (Panel B with
￿ = 2), and a full free entry situation (Panel C with ￿ large). We also consider four possible
net markups (four di⁄erent columns): no change in the markups (￿ = 1), relative drops to
75% and 50% of the original levels (￿ = 0:75 and ￿ = 0:5) and a non-uniform markup drop to
￿ = 0:4 for large markets (above-average population size) and ￿ = 0:6 for small markets. To
illustrate, the relative net markup reduction of ￿ = 0:5 amounts to an absolute gross markup
reductions from 23% to 11:5% if there are no other variable retail costs than wholesale costs,
and to 5:8% if other variable retail costs amount to 10%.
The ￿rst column of Table 2.4 shows the predictions under the three entry regimes, assum-
ing no changes in markups.25 The total number of pharmacies (the sum across all markets) is
predicted to increase from 1;515 to 2;330 (or +54%) under partial entry deregulation, and to
4;140 (or +173%) under full free entry. The current entry restrictions, which Table 2.1 docu-
mented to be binding in more than 80% of the markets, are thus also economically important.
Furthermore, the ￿rst column shows that entry deregulation would also have indirect e⁄ects
on the physicians. Their number would increase from 4;371 to 4;563 (or +4%) under partial
entry deregulation, and to 4;683 (or +7%) under full free entry. These e⁄ects stem from our
earlier ￿nding that the entry decisions of pharmacies and physicians are strategic complements.
Finally, the ￿rst column shows how the geographic coverage of health care services changes
after entry deregulation. For example, full free entry would drastically reduce the number of
markets without a pharmacy from 242 to 145. This large reduction stems from the fact that
25The model predicts the status quo outcomes reasonably well. For example, Table 1 showed that there are
246 (154) markets without any pharmacy (physician), whereas the model predicts that there are 242 (152) such
markets.
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Table 2.4: Summary entry predictions under alternative regulatory policies*
net markup change
￿ = 1 ￿ = 0,75 ￿ = 0,5 nonuniform
Panel A - no change in entry restrictions (￿ = 1)
number of pharmacies 1515 1437 1273 1230
number of physicians 4371 4337 4269 4264
number of markets without pharmacy 242 254 286 279
number of markets without physician 152 153 154 154
Panel B - maximum number of pharmacies doubles (￿ = 2)
number of pharmacies 2330 2067 1663 1595
number of physicians 4563 4488 4362 4343
number of markets without pharmacy 186 207 255 244
number of markets without physician 144 146 150 150
Panel C - full free entry in the pharmacy market (￿ is large)
number of pharmacies 4140 3191 2176 2088
number of physicians 4683 4566 4399 4391
number of markets without pharmacy 145 180 242 227
number of markets without physician 127 136 145 143
￿ ￿ = 1 refers to no change in entry restrictions, ￿ = 2 a doubling in the maximum number of
allowed pharmacies, and ￿ large to full free entry. Similarly, ￿ = 1 refers to no change in the
net markups, ￿ = 0:75 to a drop in the net markups by 25% and ￿ = 0:5 to a drop in the
net markups by 50%. Finally, column ￿ nonuniform￿gives the entry predictions under a nonuniform
regime of markup drops: towns with a lower than average population size get a markup drop
of ￿ = 0:6, whereas a markup drop of ￿ = 0:4 applies to bigger towns. All entry predictions
are based on the parameter estimates of the general entry model with strategic complements, last
column of Table 2.3.
the current entry restrictions were actually binding for 199 of the uncovered pharmacy markets,
as documented earlier in Table 2.1.26
Policy makers such as the O.E.C.D. have warned against too simple conclusions regarding
the e⁄ects of liberalizing entry regulations. According to the public interest view the high
regulated markups and tight entry restrictions ensure a su¢ cient coverage of pharmacies in
the less attractive areas, without triggering excessive entry elsewhere. To evaluate this view,
it is therefore important to look at the combined e⁄ects of lowering markups and liberalizing
entry restrictions. The second and third columns of Table 2.4 show the e⁄ects from uniformly
26Recall that this is due to the fact that the entry restrictions apply at the larger municipality level rather
than at the market level. Hence, the constraint may be binding in an uncovered market if there are already too
many pharmacies in other markets of the same municipality.
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scaling down markups by a factor ￿ = 0:75 or ￿ = 0:5. If this is done without liberalizing
the entry restrictions (panel A), the total number of pharmacies evidently drops from 1;515 to
respectively 1;437 and 1;273. Geographic coverage would also decrease: the number markets
without pharmacies increases from 242 to respectively 254 and 286. In contrast, if the markup
reductions are combined with entry liberalization (panels B and C), the number of pharmacies
would no longer decrease. For example, the number of pharmacies increases from 1;515 to
2;176 if a 50% net markup reduction is combined with full free entry.27 Furthermore, reduced
geographic coverage is no longer necessarily a source of concern under a combined policy. For
a markup reduction of ￿ = 0:75, the total number of markets without any pharmacy actually
drops from 242 to 207 under partial entry liberalization and to 180 under full free entry. For
a larger markup reduction of ￿ = 0:5, geographic coverage slightly worsens from 242 to 255
unserved markets under partial deregulation, but it remains unchanged at 242 unserved markets
under full free entry (panel B third column).
To avoid that geographic coverage goes down after a large markup reduction, the government
could use additional instruments. For example, it could favour pharmacies in the smaller markets
through non-uniform markup regulation. The fourth column of Table 2.4 shows the e⁄ects from
scaling down the markups in a non-uniform way, by a factor ￿ = 0:4 in markets with an above-
average population size and by ￿ = 0:6 in markets with below-average population size. Such
a policy indeed helps to improve geographic coverage. For example, when the non-uniform
markup drop is combined with full free entry the number of markets without a pharmacy goes
down to 227.
In sum, the public interest motivation for combining high markups and tight entry restric-
tions as a way to ensure geographic coverage does not ￿nd empirical support. The government
may in fact ensure a higher geographic coverage by simultaneously liberalizing the entry re-
strictions and lowering the regulated markups (either uniformly or in a non-uniform way by
favouring the pharmacies in the smaller markets).
27The indirect e⁄ects on physicians are small but the availability of physicians usually slightly increases when
entry liberalization is combined with a lowering of the markups.
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To further explore this, it would be interesting to know the optimal number of ￿rms and the
required policies to ensure this. A complete welfare analysis is not possible within our empirical
framework. However, we can address a related question that sheds partial light on this issue.
We ask how the entry restrictions can be liberalized (through ￿) and the net markup can be
reduced (through ￿) in such a way that the total number of pharmacies in the country remains
constant at the current predicted level of 1;515. We then also compute the associated reductions
in the absolute gross markups and the number of markets without any pharmacy. By keeping
the total number of pharmacies constant, we maintain the current level of duplicated ￿xed costs
in the country, and look at the e⁄ects on the pharmacies￿rents and local geographic coverage.28
Table 2.5 shows the results from this policy experiment. The ￿rst and second columns
show the combinations of entry restrictions and net markups such that the total number of
pharmacies in the country remains constant at the predicted status quo level. To illustrate,
multiplying the maximum allowed number of pharmacies to ￿ = 1:75 requires a drop in the
net markups to ￿ = 47% of the original levels. In general, as the entry restrictions become
more liberalized (higher ￿), the net markups should drop by more (lower ￿) to keep the total
number of pharmacies in the country constant. With full free entry, the net markups can drop to
34:6% of the original levels. To know how these changes translate into absolute reductions of the
regulated gross markups, the third and fourth columns consider the cases with no other variable
retail costs than wholesale costs (￿ = ￿), and with other variable retail costs amounting to 10%
(￿ = ￿￿10%). Gross markups can drop by a large amount, even if there are other variable retail
costs. For example, if entry would become fully free, the regulated gross markups can decrease
by between 7:5% and 15% in absolute terms without changing the total number of pharmacies.
Note however that in this policy experiment the number of markets without a pharmacy would
increase. Hence, a combined entry/markup policy such that the total number of pharmacies is
kept constant reduces geographic coverage to some extent. To preserve geographic coverage, a
relatively moderate entry liberalization policy may therefore be adequate. For example, setting
￿ = 1:5 already implies a substantial markup drop of ￿ = 0:533 to keep the total number of
pharmacies constant, and raises the number of unserved markets to only 259. Furthermore,
28Of course, if the current number of pharmacies is actually too high, it would be even better to further reduce
the markups for a given entry policy (and vice versa if the current number is too low).
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Table 2.5: Entry restrictions, markups and geographic coverage keeping the total number of
pharmacies constant*
degree of entry net markup drop absolute gross markup drop number of markets
restriction ￿ by factor ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ 10% without pharmacy
1 1.000 0 % 0 % 243
1.25 0.664 -7.7 % -3.9 % 250
1.5 0.533 -10,7 % -5.4 % 260
1.75 0.471 -12.2 % -6.1 % 270
2 0.433 -13.0 % -6.5 % 278
2.25 0.411 -13.6 % -6.8 % 283
2.5 0.396 -13.9 % -7.0 % 288
large 0.347 -15.0 % -7.5 % 308
￿ For each considered ￿ (￿rst column), the relative net markup drop ￿ is computed (second column) such
that the total number of pharmacies remains constant at the predicted status quo level of 1;515 . The third
and fourth column show the absolute gross markup drops corresponding to the relative net markup drop ￿,
assuming that retail costs other than wholesale costs amount to respectively 0% (so that ￿ = ￿) and 10%
(so that ￿ = ￿ ￿ 10%). The ￿fth column shows the corresponding number of markets without pharmacy.
a non-uniform markup drop may be introduced to improve geographic coverage. For example,
￿ = 1:5 can be combined with a markup drop of ￿ = 0:433 in markets with above-average
population size and ￿ = 0:791 in markets with below-average population size. This would
also keep the total number of pharmacies constant, and at the same time improve geographic
coverage to only 235 unserved markets.29
Overall, these policy counterfactuals illustrate that the government can generate potentially
large budgetary savings from liberalizing entry without reducing the availability of supply.
2.6 Conclusions
We have studied the role of professional regulation in health care professions. We have looked at
geographic entry restrictions on Belgian pharmacies, as combined with high regulated markups.
We consider both the direct impact of the regulations on the pharmacies, and the indirect
impact on the physicians. We ￿nd that the geographic entry restrictions have substantially
29More generally, we considered policies of alternative ￿ and non-uniform markup drops such that the total
number of pharmacies remains constant. The results from these counterfactuals are available on request. They
show that geographic coverage improves if the markup drop is su¢ ciently non-uniform.
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reduced the number of pharmacies, and have also reduced the number of physicians (since the
professions￿entry decisions are strategic complements). Given that the markups are regulated
at a distortionary high level, these entry restrictions may in principle be socially desirable.
We have therefore also looked at the combined e⁄ects of the entry restrictions and regulated
markups. Our results shows that a suitably designed policy that simultaneously liberalizes the
entry restrictions and lowers the regulated markups would lead to substantial shifts in rents
from pharmacies to consumers (tax payers) without necessarily reducing the availability of
supply.
The next question is whether these ￿ndings are su¢ ciently strong to warrant conclusions
to liberalize the professions. The answer depends on the nature of the current rents to phar-
macies. If they are simply a transfer, liberalization would only have distributional e⁄ects. Two
arguments may, however, be provided as to why the pharmacies￿current rents may be socially
wasteful. First, their rents are to the detriment of consumers as taxpayers. This will be ine¢ -
cient to the extent that the required taxes create distortions elsewhere in the economy. Second,
the rents themselves may have been dissipated in the form of wasteful investments. Along the
lines of Posner￿ s (1975) argument, pharmacies and their organization would need to engage in
ine¢ cient lobbying and related activities to maintain the rents.
We hope that our analysis will stimulate additional research, which is highly relevant from
a policy perspective. In the U.S., e⁄orts have already been done to liberalize entry and conduct
regulation, but exceptions such as taxicabs remain. In Europe, policy makers have only recently
opened the debate to reform the liberal professions, and to make their practices in line with
competition policy. The European Commission recently published a large report by Paterson
et al. (2003) documenting the country-speci￿c regulations of several professions, such as ac-
countants, engineers, lawyers, pharmacies, and notaries. As another example, the U.K.￿ s O¢ ce
of Fair Trading (2003) published a report on reforming the pharmacies. Our analysis shows
how these policy issues can be addressed by suitably adapting empirical models of free entry to
account for entry restrictions and other relevant factors.
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2.7 Appendix
This Appendix ￿rst characterizes the multiplicity of Nash equilibria outcomes when the entry
decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements.
If the entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements, i.e. Assumption
2(a) holds with strict inequality, then (n1;n2) may show multiplicity with other equilibrium
outcomes of the general form (n1 + m1;n2 + m2). The three Claims below show that the
multiplicity can be characterized in a simple way if Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis￿ed. Taken
together, these Claims imply that the areas of " for which (n1;n2) shows multiplicity with any
other Nash equilibrium outcome are simply given by the areas of overlap with (n1 + 1;n2 + 1)
and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
De￿ne A(n1;n2) as the set of " for which (n1;n2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome, as given
by the conditions (2.2) in the text. Furthermore, de￿ne B(n1;n2;m1;m2) as the set of " for
which both (n1;n2) and (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) are a Nash equilibrium, i.e. B(n1;n2;m1;m2) =
A(n1;n2) \ A(n1 + m1;n2 + m2), where m1 and m2 are positive or negative integers.
Claim 1. B(n1;n2;m1;m2) is empty if m1 6= m2. I.e., (n1;n2) may only show multiplicity
with Nash equilibrium outcomes of the form (n1+m;n2+m), where m is a positive or a negative
integer.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there are also equilibrium outcomes of the form (n1 +
m1;n2 + m2), where m1 6= m2. There are several cases:
(i) If m1 > 0 and m2 < 0, then "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 +m1;n2 +m2) ￿ ￿1(n1 +m1;n2) ￿ ￿1(n1 +1;n2),
by the conditions for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be a Nash equilibrium, by Assumption 2(a)
and by Assumption 1.
(ii) If m1 > 0 and m2 ￿ 0, and m1 > m2, then "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 + m1;n2 + m2) ￿ ￿1(n1 + m1 ￿
m2;n2) ￿ ￿1(n1+1;n2), by the conditions for (n1+m1;n2+m2) to be a Nash equilibrium,
by Assumption 2(b), and by Assumption 1.
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(iii) If m1 ￿ 0 and m2 > 0, and m1 < m2, then "2 ￿ ￿2(n1 +m1;n2 +m2) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2 +m2 ￿
m1) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2 +1), by the conditions for (n1 +m1;n2 +m2) to be a Nash equilibrium,
by Assumption 2(b), and by Assumption 1.
(iv) If m1 < 0 and m2 > 0, then "2 ￿ ￿2(n1+m1;n2+m2) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2+m2) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2+1),
by the condition for (n1+m1;n2+m2) to be Nash, by Assumption 2(a) and by Assumption
1.
(v) If m1 ￿ 0 and m2 < 0, and m1 > m2, then ￿2(n1;n2) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2 + m2 ￿ m1 + 1) ￿
￿2(n1 + m1;n2 + m2 + 1) < "2, by Assumption 1, by Assumption 2(b), and by condition
for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be Nash.
(vi) If m1 < 0 and m2 ￿ 0, and m1 < m2, then ￿1(n1;n2) ￿ ￿1(n1 + m1 ￿ m2 + 1;n2) ￿
￿1(n1+m1+1;n2+m2) < "1, by Assumption 1, by Assumption 2(b), and by the condition
for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be Nash.
In all cases we have obtained a contradiction with the conditions (2.2) for (n1;n2) to be a Nash
equilibrium outcome.
Claim 2. B(n1;n2;1;1) and B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1) are not empty. I.e., (n1;n2) shows multiplicity
with (n1 + 1;n2 + 1) and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
Proof: The set B(n1;n2;1;1) is given by the conditions (2.3) in the text. Since we assume that
Assumption 2(a) holds with strict inequality, this set is not empty. A similar reasoning applies
to the set B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1).
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Claim 3. B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿ B(n1;n2;1;1) if m > 1, and B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿ B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1)
if m < ￿1. I.e., while (n1;n2) may also show multiplicity with (n1 +m;n2 +m) for m > 1 or
m < 1, the areas of multiplicity are a subset of those with (n1 +1;n2 +1) and (n1 ￿1;n2 ￿1).
Proof: The set B(n1;n2;m;m) is given by:
￿1(n1 + 1;n2) ￿ "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 + m;n2 + m) (2.11)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) ￿ "2 ￿ ￿2(n1 + m;n2 + m);
which may or may not be empty. Since the left-hand-side in (2.11) is the same as in (2.3), and
the right hand side in (2.11) is less than in (2.3) by Assumption 2(b), we have B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿
B(n1;n2;1;1) if m > 1. A similar reasoning applies to show that the set B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿
B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1) if m < 1.
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Supplier Inducement in the Belgian
Primary Care Market
Abstract: We perform an empirical exercise to address the presence of supplier-induced demand in
the Belgian primary care market, which is characterized by a ￿xed fee system and a high density of
General Practitioners (GP). Using a unique dataset on the number of contacts of all Belgian GPs, we
￿rst investigate whether we can ￿nd evidence of demand inducement. We furthermore investigate which
type of contacts GPs typically use for inducing demand: consultations or visits. Our results indicate
that there is a positive e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consumption of primary care. We cannot reject
that GPs are responsible for part of this e⁄ect through inducing behavior. Furthermore, GPs especially
employ consultations to induce demand.
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3.1 Introduction
According to OECD Health Data, on average OECD-countries spend 8:9% of their GDP on
health care (2003). The public health expenditure even amounted to 10:1% of GDP for Belgium
in 2003. In this era of ever-increasing budgets for health care, studying the functioning of
health care markets becomes very important. The key to controlling the budget namely lies in
providing the correct set of incentives to all parties involved. Only when one fully understands
how e.g. consumers and suppliers make their decisions in this market, one can hope to construct
a tool to restrain the increase in public health expenditures.
Researchers often look at demand and supply ine¢ ciencies in the health insurance system
for explaining the high consumption levels. But also the role of the General Practitioner (GP,
referred to as ￿ she￿ ) is important in constructing policies to reduce the overall consumption
of medical care. That is, because of the high degree of information asymmetry in health
care markets, patients delegate authority to health providers, so that GPs control the health
consumption of their patients to a considerable extent (Arrow 1963, Zweifel and Manning 2000).
It is thus crucial to understand the behavior of the GP and her reaction to changes in her direct
environment. One of the most debated issues concerning their behavior is the question whether
or not GPs induce demand for primary health care: do GPs exploit their agency relation by
providing excessive care when they face a negative income shock?
It should not be surprising that the study of supplier-induced demand (SID) is well doc-
umented in health economics since it has far-reaching implications (Reinhardt 1989). If it is
true that suppliers, and more speci￿cally health providers, induce demand for their services,
the standard neoclassic models no longer apply. That is, the traditional relationship between
demand and supply does not exist for the medical care markets when consumer preferences
are strongly in￿ uenced by health providers. This a⁄ects to a large extent the optimality of
di⁄erent public health policies. For example, if GPs engage in inducing demand, restrictions
on the number of GPs can be a good idea, whereas drops in fees would not have a signi￿cant
impact on the budget (Schroeder 1992). However, although SID is well documented, there is
neither a unanimous opinion on the presence of inducement nor on the approach for testing it
(McGuire 2000).
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The market under investigation in this paper is the Belgian primary care market. Accord-
ing to the literature, the Belgium health care system provides the perfect setting for demand
inducement by GPs: patients are charged only a co-payment for the care they receive, GPs are
paid according to a ￿xed fee schedule and the number of GPs per capita is high. Furthermore,
there is some prior indication of inducement. Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2005) study the
change in public health expenditure after the increase in co-payment in 1994 and the linear
drop in fees for health providers in 1997. They document that public health expenditures only
experienced a small drop as the immediate price e⁄ect was compensated by quantity increases
in the following years (see also Van de Voorde et al 2001 and Cockx and Brasseur 20011). There
are thus reasons to believe that inducement is present in the Belgian health care system.
We perform an empirical exercise to test for inducing behavior by Belgian GPs. A unique
data set on the individual performance of all registered GPs in Belgium is used to investigate the
relation between the number of visits per GP and GP density. Identi￿cation of inducement is
based on the conjecture that when GPs induce demand for their services, per capita consumption
in a region increases proportionally with GP density (McGuire 2000). We start the empirical
analysis by looking at initial indications in the raw data, after which we resort to regression
analysis to test for the inducement hypothesis. We estimate the impact of GP density on
the number of contacts per GP to draw conclusions on the e⁄ect on per capita utilitzation
of care. We use instrumental variables to correct for the reverse causation argument of GPs
locating where the demand is highest. Furthermore, to control for an increase in demand due to
consumer preferences instead of inducing behavior by GPs (a higher GP density implies lower
travel and waiting costs) we estimate the e⁄ect of GP density for di⁄erent groups of markets,
where the level of GP density of markets determines the grouping. This follows the argument
by Carlsen and Grytten (1998) that availability is especially an issue in markets with a low GP
density while inducement occurs mainly in markets with a higher GP density.
1In both papers, the price elasticity of demand is estimated based on detailed data of Belgian consumers
and their consumption of medical care. They use the increase of the out-of-pocket price of primary health care
in 1994. The price elasticity of demand provides indirect evidence of SID since, in the presence of SID, the
reaction of the demand to price changes is diluted by the reaction of the supply side. Both papers ￿nd small
price elasticities, which can indicate that part of the reduction in demand due to the price increase is countered
by demand inducement by the GPs (Cockx and Brasseur 2001 adjusts the estimated elasticities for Belgium in
Van de Voorde et al 2001 downwardly).
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Next to investigating the presence of inducement, we additionally look at the way GPs induce
demand.2 That is, GPs can increase the number of contacts by inducing either consultations or
visits. The costs and bene￿ts associated to inducing a contact namely di⁄ers across the types
of contacts, which yields di⁄erent incentives for the GP to induce demand. It is informative to
investigate which type of contacts Belgian GPs typically employ for their inducing behavior, as it
yields insights in the relative importance of the di⁄erent cost and bene￿t aspects of inducement.
The results of our cross-sectional study on Belgian GPs indicate a positive e⁄ect of GP
density on per capita consumption of GP services. Contrary to the conclusions of Carlsen and
Grytten (1998) and subsequent work on Norway, our ￿ndings cannot reject the presence of
inducing behavior of GPs, although part of the e⁄ect is to be ascribed to availability e⁄ects
and/or downward demand management by GPs. We thus ￿nd indications of the presence of
supplier-induced demand in the Belgian primary care market. Further analysis shows that
Belgian GPs seem to prefer the use of consultations to induce demand, despite the higher fee
for visits.
In this paper we start in Section 3.2 by introducing the concept of supplier inducement and
the general modelling approach in the literature. It should be clear that we do not develop
in detail any speci￿c model of inducement or GP behavior. Instead we discuss elements from
di⁄erent models in the literature and focus on the main intuitions. The paper focuses on the
empirical exercise and we refer to McGuire (2000) for further background. Section 3.3 discusses
the organization of the Belgian primary care market, where we make the link with issues of
supplier-induced demand and present the data for testing inducement in the Belgian primary
care market. Section 3.4 presents the empirical approach taken in this paper for testing the
presence of inducing behavior by Belgian GPs. We discuss both the underlying principles of
the technique and the empirical implementation. The results of the empirical analysis of the
Belgian primary care market are presented in Section 3.5. After ￿nding some evidence of
supplier inducement by Belgian GPs, we investigate in Section 3.6 which type of contacts GPs
employ for their inducement activity. Section 3.7 concludes.
2The most related question that has been addressed in the literature is the distinction between inducing the
number of contacts or inducing the content of a treatment (Birch 1988, Delattre and Dormont 2003). We instead
focus only on the number of contacts and look at the number of di⁄erent types of contacts: consultations and
visits.
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3.2 The study of demand inducement
The origin of supplier inducement can be traced to two features of health care markets. First,
there is an extensive information asymmetry between GPs and patients (Arrow 1963). Second,
the GP has a dual role as both the advisor of the patient as well as the provider of the health
services (Wolinsky 1993). These features enable the GP to guide the decision process to a
considerable extent. More speci￿cally, the GP can exert direct in￿ uence on the demand function
of the consumer by altering the patient￿ s perceptions of his needs and of the capacity of medical
technology to satisfy them (Evans 1974). The GP can thus recommend services that do not
pass the objective patient cost-bene￿t thresholds (Dranove 1988). When an exogenous shock
exert a negative pressure on her income/utility level, the GP can have the incentive to induce
more contacts with her patients to maintain her income/utility level, in case she is reimbursed
according to the number of contacts. As a result, the inducement hypothesis predicts that when
e.g. an additional GP enters the market or GPs￿fees drop, there is a higher consumption level
in that market, which is driven by the behavior of GPs.
As inducing behavior of the health professions would have important implications for the
optimality of health care policy, we investigate whether this behavior is present in the Belgian
primary care market. Note the di⁄erence between inducement and useful agency (McGuire
2000). In case the individual consumer underestimates his demand for care (￿ illness behavior￿ ,
Mechanic 1968), the in￿ uence of GPs on the demand of patients is in line with his behavior as a
perfect agent. Supplier inducement in contrast involves the use of her discretionary in￿ uence on
the preferences of patients to consume redundant care. This results in overconsumption of the
medical care, generated by the economic self-interest of GPs. On the other hand though, remark
that more care is generally considered to be good, especially given the negative externalities of
an illness. In this light, the regulator himself often provides incentives to patients to consume
more care through public campaigns for regular check-ups. This paper does not consider the
impact of supplier inducement on health outcomes but investigates the presence of inducement
because of the consequences for public policy (Labelle et al 1994).
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The hypothesis of supplier inducement is hard to test since a sound analysis should capture
all the peculiarities of the health care markets. As Grytten et al. (1995) put it:
A sound analysis requires a model that deals with the provision of suboptimal,
optimal and supraoptimal levels of health care; it should account for a world of ill-
informed and perhaps misinformed consumers; the model should take into account
that physicians are both concerned with the patient￿ s well-being and their own well-
being; and ￿nally, institutional factors should be taken into account. Often, health
services are provided in markets which are subject to complex government subsidies
and regulations.
Furthermore, the empirical testing of supplier inducement is complicated as pure consumer
demand is never separately observed in the data: the observed consumption of care is the
results of both consumer and producer preferences. There is however an extensive literature
that models the decision problem of the GP and although it can not account for all the speci￿cs
of the problem, testable hypotheses are put forward with respect to the presence of supplier
inducement. Due to the identi￿cation problem related to the demand for care, the literature
mainly tests for the presence of marginal SID, i.e. the change in consumption due to changes
in GP behavior when income shocks occur.
The type of information on the use of primary care provision determines to a large extent
which type of conclusions on inducement can be drawn. Traditionally town-level data was
used, as in e.g. Fuchs (1978), but these aggregated approaches were highly criticized due
to identi￿cation issues (e.g. Auster and Oaxaca 1981, Frank 1985). As in the recent years
data availability has improved considerably, micro-models to re￿ne the testing are developed.
However, not only is there no consensus on the methodology to correctly identify inducing
behavior, also the results are far from conclusive.
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Empirical models of inducing behavior are designed to test hypotheses generated by a model
of GP behavior. Most of the models in the literature are partial models of utility maximization
(or disutility of discretion models) in the spirit of Evans (1974).3;4 In general, GP utility is
assumed to be a⁄ected by three components, as represented in:
UGP = UGP(Y;W;D) (3.1)
First, GP utility is positively a⁄ected by the income level, Y . Since we will study a setting of
a fee-for-service system, income is directly related to the number of contacts the GP supplies
through the fee level. Marginal utility of income is decreasing: a change in GP income has a
stronger impact on the utility level when the income level is relatively low (UGP
Y > 0, UGP
Y Y < 0).
Second, GP utility is negatively a⁄ected by the workload, W (or positively a⁄ected by the
amount of leisure): for every contact the GP completes, some e⁄ort and time are required.
GP utility is furthermore decreasing concavely in workload. That is, when the GP has only a
few contacts, the utility loss associated to e⁄ort costs of an additional contact is small, while
that extra contact will substantially decrease GP utility when the GP is already struggling
to ￿nish her work (UGP
W < 0, UGP
WW < 0). Finally, GP utility is a⁄ected by costs resulting
from exerting discretionary in￿ uence on the demand, D. In other words, deviating from the
consumer￿ s optimal level of provision by e.g. inducing behavior comes at a cost. Inducement
costs are related to the e⁄ort and time costs to convince patients to consume the extra contact
and to pay the extra price. They also include moral costs associated with deviating from the
optimal level of provision (￿ internal conscience￿in Evans 1974, McGuire and Pauly 1991 or the
e⁄ect of patients￿utility on GP utility in Calcott 1999). These costs have a negative impact
on GP utility and are increasing convexly in the amount of induction: it continues to take a
3We combine elements from di⁄erent models. For more rigorous theoretical models, we refer to Evans 1974,
McGuire and Pauly 1991, Gruber and Owings 1996 and McGuire 2000.
4Other models include models of pro￿t maximization, where pro￿ts are maximized instead of utilities (Stano
1987, Dranove 1988). In the target income theory, GPs do not maximize their utility or income but target some
￿ optimal￿income level. It is however a black-box how the target income is determined (Newhouse 1970). In price
rigidity models, the reaction of GPs to e.g. a fee cut is to be explained by incentives to bring the market in a
new equilibrium (Cromwell and Mitchell 1986, Delattre and Dormont 2003) and in models based on persuasion
games, the utilization of care is a result of a consensus between GP and patient (Pauly 1980, Rochaix 1989).
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higher e⁄ort level to induce extra contacts and the internal justi￿cation of inducement becomes
harder the higher the level of induced demand. Also, in an intertemporal consideration, the
GP risks losing patients once the inducing behavior is revealed (Dranove 1988, Wolinsky 1993).
The more one induces demand, the higher is the risk of detection (UGP
D < 0, UGP
DD < 0).
The consumer side of the care market is mostly not speci￿ed within the inducement models
and is taken as exogenous. In general though, the consumer demand for GP services is deter-
mined by consumer utility, which depends on at least three factors. First, obviously the general
health status is important: the worse the general health, the higher is the need for health care
and thus the higher is the utility of consuming care services. Second, demand is a⁄ected by
the shadow price of GP care. This consumer price consists of two components: the co-payment
for the consumed GP services (￿xed) and the costs of access to health care, i.e. transportation
and waiting time. The utility of the patient, and thus the demand for GP care, is higher the
lower the fee, the distance and the waiting time. Finally, the presence of alternative health care
provision also a⁄ects the demand for GP services.
GPs are assumed to maximize utility by setting the amount of contacts to induce. The
GP takes into account that an induced contact increases utility through the extra income it
generates, but decreases the utility through an increase in workload and inducement costs. She
will thus make a trade-o⁄ between the marginal bene￿ts of inducement and the marginal costs.
Assuming for simplicity that GP utility is linear in its components and with f the remuneration
of a GP per contact, w the workload associated to a contact5 and ic the cost of induction (which
depends on the amount of inducement), the trade-o⁄ can be represented as:
UGP
Y :f 7 UGP
W :w + UGP
D :ic (3.2)
To come to testable hypotheses, the ￿rst order condition(s) of the maximization problem of the
GP is examined: how does the degree of inducement vary with e.g. price levels, the number of
providers or the innate demand for care.
5It can also be assumed that w di⁄ers according to whether it is an induced visit or not. That is, it can be
expected that the workload of an induced visit is less for the GP as the contact in actually not required.
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Reviewing the literature, we can identify three general empirical techniques to study supplier
inducement. First, most of the empirical work investigates how di⁄erences in the environment
of GPs a⁄ect the utilization of care. This involves either di⁄erences in the fees paid to GPs
(Feldstein 1970) or di⁄erences in the number of direct competitors in the market (Cromwell and
Mitchell 1986, Carlsen and Grytten 1998). In both cases, GP income di⁄ers depending on the
location of the GP. Therefore, once controlled for di⁄erences in the demand of care, variation
across locations in the use of primary care can indicate inducing behavior by GPs in less
pro￿table locations. Second, inference on the presence of demand inducement can be made by
looking at di⁄erent types of providers, care services or consumers. That is, when a country holds
two types of GPs that work under a di⁄erent remuneration system, di⁄erences in the incentives
can results in variation in the provided levels of care by the di⁄erent types, which can be used
to identify inducement (Grytten et al 1995). The same variation can results from the presence
of di⁄erent consumer types where e.g. some are better informed or some are di⁄erently ensured
(Hay and Leahy 1982) and in the presence of di⁄erent components of the care provision (Birch
1988, Rossiter and Wilensky 1984, Delattre and Dormont 2003). Finally, natural experiments
are studied to identify changes in the behavior of GPs as a reaction to changes in their income
level. Mostly, these studies look at changes in the number of competitors and price or cost
changes throughout time (Rice 1983, McGuire and Pauly 1991, Gui⁄rida and Gravelle 2001),
but also changes in the demand structure can be used as an identifying variation in the use of
care (Gruber and Owings 1995).
3.3 The Belgian primary care market
The paper aims to empirically test for the presence of GP induced demand in Belgium. This
section explores the organization of the Belgian primary care market as it determines the
economic environment in which GPs operate. We brie￿ y relate this to the likelihood that the
Belgian market is characterized by inducing behavior of GPs. We also present the dataset on
the performance of GPs that is used in the analysis below. In the next section, we will elaborate
on how this paper tests for the presence of supplier inducement in the Belgian primary care
market, given the available data.
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3.3.1 Organization of primary care
The Belgian health care market is characterized by a very good availability of health care.
For the primary care market, there is on average one active GP per 803 inhabitants (2001).
Consumers can choose freely among all GPs and since there is no gatekeeping role for GPs,
there is moreover direct access to also specialist care. For a total population of about ten
million there are close to 40;000 active physicians (GPs and specialists), which makes Belgium
the second physician dense country in Europe, after Greece (OECD Health Data). As a result,
there generally are no waiting lists.
The delivery of health care in Belgium is mainly private and based on the principles of
independent medical practice. Minimum educational standards are in place, but once a GP
is licensed, she can operate anywhere in the country. GPs typically operate from an o¢ ce in
which they receive their patients (i.e. consultations) and also perform visits at patients￿homes.
Our data shows that on average 39% of all GP contacts are visits. With this high frequency
of visits, Belgium is at the top of the international ranking (Boerma and Groenewegen 2001).
Moreover, GPs are joined in a system of night and weekend duty to guarantee permanent access
to primary care.
GPs are reimbursed for their activities through a fee-for-service system, where the GP
receives a ￿xed fee per contact with a patient, with the fee independent of the number of
contacts. Fee schedules are established periodically as an agreement between all parties involved
(sickness funds, government and GP representation) and di⁄er for consultations and visits.
Although GPs can opt out of the negotiated fees by formally rejecting them, reports indicate
that 85% of all GPs comply with the ￿xed fees (RIZIV/INAMI 2001). Moreover, GPs who
commit themselves to continue training and to be involved in the local organization of the
primary health care, get an o¢ cial ￿ accreditation￿which entitles them to charge a higher (￿xed)
fee for consultations.6 The higher fee however does not imply a higher consumer price. In 2001,
the fee for a consultation was ￿xed at 15:53e for an accredited GP and at 14:75e for other
GPs, whereas the fee for visits was set at 19:9e, independent of the GP being accredited.
6This can be interpreted as a signal of quality toward the consumers, although not all GPs (a minority) are
in a position to get the accreditation.
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An important di⁄erence with other countries is that GPs get no extra reimbursement for the
number of prescriptions or the number of laboratory tests they request. This implies that the
GP has no bene￿ts of inducing more tests and therefore will not be inclined to do so. The only
means for GPs to induce demand is through increasing the number of contacts. To generate a
higher number of contacts, the GP can e.g. overstate the importance of regular check-ups or
follow-ups or perform extra laboratory tests of which the results then need to be discussed in
an extra contact.
Finally, Belgian consumers contribute to the costs of primary care through a co-payment,
where a third-party (sickness fund) pays the remaining cost. Although the consumer￿ s co-
payment is relatively high in Belgium (18% for GP consultations), the frequency of GP contacts
is much higher compared to other European countries. That is, the Belgian Health Survey of
2001 indicates that, on average, Belgians have yearly 6:5 contacts with a GP, whereas the EU
average tops at 3:6 (EUPHIX).7
Given these features, the Belgian primary care market provides an excellent setting for
GP inducement. First, the high GP density implies a limited pool of patients for each GP.
The pressure on the average GP income is thus considerably high, which adds to persuading
her to induce additional demand for her services. Second, due to the fee-for-service system,
GP income is positively related to her activity. Any reduction in consumers￿utilization thus
automatically leads to a proportional decrease in GP income, as she has very few options to
increase the revenue per item of service. Third, since patients only pay a part of the costs,
their marginal costs of a higher utilization are rather low, relative to the bene￿ts for the GP. In
other words, consumers are less sensitive to using another contact. Note also that due to the
high GP density, it is unlikely to have demand excesses (there are no waiting list).8
7Note that this is the average number of contact with a GP only. The same survey indicates that the average
number of contacts with specialists is a bit more than 3 per year (WIV 2002). EUPHIX indicates an average of
4:9 visits per capita for Belgium in 2001, which is still higher than in the other European countries listed.
8Remark that the basic characteristics of the Belgian primary health care market is similar to the Norwegian
one, studied extensively by Grytten et al (1995), Carlsen and Grytten (1998), Słrensen and Grytten (1999) and
Grytten and Słrensen (2001). However, Belgium only has contract physicians and no salaried physicians (that
work independently of a hospital).
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3.3.2 Data
We use a unique dataset from RIZIV/INAMI, the National Institute for Sickness and Disability
Insurance of Belgium, on the location and performance of non-specialists as they are mainly
responsible for the primary care. The identi￿cation of the genuinely active and available GPs
from the dataset is in accordance with a new regulation that is e⁄ective since July 1st, 2006.
This stipulates that a GP only remains certi￿ed in case she has at least 500 contacts in one of
the last ￿ve years. We furthermore restrict a GP to have at least 50 patients in one of the last
￿ve years.9;10 This selection is not an exclusion of small GPs, but rather a selection of the GPs
that are available to the public, active and somewhat viable. We identify 12;137 GPs in 2001,
for which we observe yearly GP-level data. Due to privacy reasons, the records are however
anonymous which leaves us with little GP-speci￿c information.
We categorize our data into four groups of variables; we have an indicator of the supply of
primary care, indicators of the level of consumption of primary care and GP-speci￿c control
variables from RIZIV/INAMI. This dataset is enriched with additional market-speci￿c demand
and supply controls for 2001. We continue by discussing these variables in more detail and
refer to Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 for the descriptive statistics of respectively the supply and
consumption variables and the market-level demand and supply characteristics. Table 3.1
provides additional insight in the supply and consumption variables by assigning markets to
one of ￿ve groups according to their GP density: group 1 contains the 20% markets with the
lowest GP density, whereas group 5 collects the 20% markets with the highest GP density (GP
dense markets).
Note that we use performance data from 2000 to 2004 to select GPs. Although we have access
to it, we do not use the panel in the subsequent analysis, but focus instead on the year 2001.
Next to data issues, the identi￿cation in the panel estimation (with a ￿xed e⁄ect estimator)
9A patient is uniquely assigned to the GP which he contacted most during that year. About 95% of the
Belgian population indicates having a ￿xed GP (2001). Patients do come in contact with other GPs in case
primary care is needed outside working hours (during guard duty).
10Our selection criterion is based on "Ministerieel besluit tot vaststelling van de criteria voor de erkenning
van huisartsen (21/02/2006)". The selection criterion is applied to exclude the GPs who are solely or mainly
connected to companies/government and who only do guard duty. These should not be considered as real rivals of
the regular GPs. Adding the restriction of at least 50 patients in one year is done on suggestion of RIZIV/INAMI.
Note that for physicians with at least 500 contacts, the restriction to at least 50 patients is not at all strong.
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would be based on entries and exits of GPs from particular markets, so that the variation clearly
su⁄ers from the potential reverse causation argument: GPs generally move to more pro￿table
areas. Robustness checks for the other years are performed under the assumption of constant
market characteristics and we ￿nd no deviations from the general conclusion of the paper.
Supply indicator
As measure of local supply of primary health care, we de￿ne GP density, denoted by R, as
the ratio of the number of active GPs in the local market (N) to the number of inhabitants
(x10;000). This measure takes into account the magnitude of the local market and thus gives a
good proxy of the degree of competition in the direct environment of the GP. Since the majority
of the population has a ￿xed GP and since patients in general do not travel far for primary
care, GP density is de￿ned on the level of Belgian zip codes.11 We identify all Belgian zip
codes with at least one active GP, i.e. we work with information on 993 out of the 1;144 zip
codes.12 As presented in Table 3.1, the average GP density in 2001 is 12:45. On average , a
market thus held one GP per 803 inhabitants. However, there is a high degree of variation
across markets: the ￿rst group of markets, with the lowest GP density, have an average of
7:12 GPs per 10;000 inhabitants, whereas the group 5-markets are characterized by an average
GP density of 20:25. Remark that there are signi￿cantly more GPs operating in group 3- and
group 4-markets. As their GP density is moderate, this implies that the markets of group 3
and 4 also on average have a larger population size. The cities of Belgium are thus not to be
found in group 5, which collects the markets with the highest GP density. There instead is a
hull-shaped relation between GP density and population and population density. That is, the
market with the lowest population density and the lowest number of inhabitants are part of the
20% markets with either the lowest or the highest GP density. The appendix gives an insight
in the spread of the GP density across Belgium zip codes for 2001.
11Since GPs are anonymous in the dataset, we only have limited information on their location (only zip code).
This prevents us to work on a lower level of aggregation. Furthermore, data on the patient ￿ ows would help us
determine the relevant market. We however have no access to this information. As a robustness check, we also
perform the analysis on a bigger relevant market de￿nition (municipalities).
12For the other markets, we have no information on health consumption. In the empirical analysis below, the
number of inhabitants of the dropped markets will help explain the consumption in nearby markets.
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Performance/Consumption indicators
Our data includes the yearly number of patients and the yearly number of contacts for every
GP in 2001. In the subsequent analysis we focus on the yearly number of contacts per GP,
denoted by Q. We ￿nd that the average Belgian GP had a total of 3;909 contacts in 2001 or 6:8
contacts with each of her patients13. The dataset also provides a split up of the total number
of contacts according to the type of contact. We concentrate on the number of consultations
(Q_consult) and the number of visits during working hours (Q_visit). As indicated before,
there is a high consumption of visits, with an average of 1;540 visits per GP per year. The
average GP ￿nally performed 2;282 consultations in 2001. There however is a high degree of
variation in the performance of GPs, also after grouping GPs according to the GP density in
the market in which they are active. As expected, the average GP has a higher number of
patients and a higher number of contacts (of all types) when she operates in a market with a
low GP density compared to a GP dense area. The percentage visits on the other hand is lower
in markets with a low GP density: whereas an average GP in group 1-markets completes 37%
of her contacts at patients￿homes, on average 42% of all contacts are visits in markets of group
5.
GP-level control variables
Because the data is anonymous, there is only limited information on the individual GP.
Next to the location in which she operates (zip code), we only have information on her level
of accreditation (accr). This gives the percentage of time the GP chose to work under the
accreditation system in that year; e.g. a GP that becomes accredited only from July onward
will have a level of accreditation of 50%. The average level of accreditation is rather high at
78%. This average can roughly be interpreted as the fraction of the GPs that are accredited.
Upon closer investigation of this GP-level variable we ￿nd an important link with the GP
density in the market. That is, whereas in areas with a low GP density on average 86% of the
GPs is accredited, the accredited GPs only account for 66% of the GPs in GP dense areas. To
13To give some idea of the magnitude of this ￿gure, taking that a full time GP works six days out of seven
and takes two holidays of two weeks a year, this implies that the average GP has 13 contacts per day. Note that
the performance ￿gures are considerably higher in case we focus attention to those GPs that are neither just
entering or have decided to exit the market. For 2001, the yearly average number of visits per GP would then
be 4;300, of which 2;503 were o¢ ce visits and 1;702 were visits during working hours.
753.3. The Belgian primary care market
the extent that this relation is not due to e.g. di⁄erence between Belgian Communities, this
￿nding is counterintuitive since we would expect that the higher competition in GP dense areas
would urge GPs to get a higher price for every contact they complete. On the contrary, it is in
the regions with a high workload per GP, that GPs are typically accredited.14
Market-level control variables
For every GP, we add information on demographic characteristics (2001) of the market in
which she operates (Table 3.2).15 We use several indicators of the composition of the population
in local markets: the age structure of the inhabitants (kids, young, adults and old) and the
gender (female) and nationality composition (foreign). Furthermore, we add the region of the
local market (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia), the mean income level (meaninc) and the
unemployment rate (unempl).16 The general attitude towards health issues is proxied by the
use of medication (both prescribed and OTC drugs). The variable drugs measures the average
monthly units of all medication consumed in 2002.17 These variables proxy the average health
status and the health habits of the local population. We also add data on the location and the
capacity of both hospitals (hospbeds) and rest and nursing houses (restbeds). The presence of
such institutions will have its impact on the workload of a GP, irrespective of her behavior. For
example, until recently, emergency rooms of hospitals were often used as a substitute for GP
contacts, especially by less well-o⁄ individuals (partly because of payment modalities).
14It is possible that there is a relation with the percentage of visits: GPs get no extra reimbursement for being
accredited when performing visits. As the percentage visits is higher in GP dense areas, the bene￿ts of being
accredited are smaller.
15The market-speci￿c characteristics are provided by the NIS (National Institute of Statistics), Ecodata (Fed-
eral Government Agency for Economics) and RSZ (the National Institute of Social Security).
16In WIV (2002) the link between the demographic variables and the health status is studied. It shows e.g.
that subjective health is decreasing in age and increasing in the education level. The subjective health is also
better in Flanders compared to the other regions of Belgium and females are more susceptible to chronic diseases
whereas men smoke more.
17We use data from IMS Health Belgium, that provided us with sales of medication according to geographic
regions. The data is on a higher level of aggregation than our market de￿nition (147 regions) so we assume a
homogeneous use of drugs within these regions. We work with the units sold instead of with the value of the
medication sold, since this would re￿ ect the income level of the population.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, as we have very little information on the individual GPs, we construct some
additional market-level variables to proxy GP characteristics. We use a general dataset of
RIZIV/INAMI on characteristics of non-specialists. This dataset provides insights in the per-
centage of active non-specialists per market that signed the ￿xed fee agreement discussed above
(agree) and on the percentage females (fem). We ￿nd that almost 90% of non-specialists charge
the same ￿xed fee as stipulated in the agreement. This share is however negatively correlated
with GP density: it drop from 93% in group 1 markets to 85% in group 5 markets. On average
30% of non-specialists in a local market are female and this percentage is increasing in GP den-
sity. We furthermore construct proxies of the experience level of the active non-specialists per
market: we de￿ne three variables that capture the percentage non-specialists with an experi-
ence level of respectively less than 10 years (exp-10yrs), between 10 and 20 years (exp10-20yrs)
and more than 20 years (exp+20yrs). There is a more or less even spread these experience
categories, although there is a high degree of variation within local markets. There is a small
correlation with GP density: the percentage non-specialists with little experience is increasing
in GP density, whereas the percentage of medium and highly experienced GPs decreases in GP
density. This indicates that entry more often occurs in GP dense areas.
3.4 Empirical approach
Our dataset consists of the location and the performance (i.e. number of contacts) of all active
and available Belgian GPs that operate in an environment where prices are ￿xed on the national
level. Therefore, the empirical approach followed in this paper is in the tradition of the strand
of empirical work that looks for systematic di⁄erences across geographical markets in the level
of per capita consumption of primary care according to the number of GPs in the market
(GP density). We ￿rst present the theoretical framework that yields testable hypotheses on
supplier-induced demand and subsequently discuss the empirical implementation of it.
3.4.1 Hypotheses on inducement
Building on the GP utility maximization model (section 3.2), consider the consequences for
GP utility of a higher level of supply. The presence of an extra GP in the market reduces the
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number of patients per GP and therefore the total number of contacts per GP. This directly
reduces the income level and thus GP utility. On the other hand, the higher supply results in a
lower workload, which positively a⁄ects GP utility. The relevant question is how the higher level
of supply a⁄ects the trade-o⁄ for the inducement decision of the GP, as presented in expression
(3.2). That is, as GPs induce demand whenever marginal bene￿ts (income) outweigh marginal
costs (workload and inducement costs) of inducing an extra contact, will the GP induce more
or less demand in the presence of more direct competitors?
First, compared to a situation with fewer GPs in the market, the marginal bene￿t of inducing
one contact is higher. This stems from the fact that the marginal utility of income is decreasing:
the income level is lower in the presence of more GPs, so that the fee of an extra contact yields
a higher increase in utility. Second, compared to the situation with fewer GPs in the market,
the workload of the GP is lower as there are fewer patients per GP (more leisure). Since the
utility loss of the extra workload is increasing in the workload, inducing a contact has lower
marginal costs compared to a situation with fewer GPs. In sum, both the income and workload
component of the trade-o⁄ imply that GPs have increased incentives to induce (more) demand.
However, these incentives are tempered by inducement costs. Although the mere inducement
costs are not a⁄ected by the increase in the number of direct competitors, the utility loss is
increasing in the induced amount of contacts. The same goes for the risk of losing patients:
the more one induces, the higher is the probability of detection. Although these costs temper
the degree of inducement, models of utility maximization in general predict that the level of
inducement increases in the number of direct competitors in a given market.
Adding to this model, remember that the opportunity to induce demand is driven by the
presence of information asymmetry in the market and that the higher the information asym-
metry in the market, the higher is the potential for inducement (Dranove 1988, Rochaix 1989,
Calcott 1999). When the number of GPs in the market increases, the degree of information
asymmetry in the market changes as well and this a⁄ects the costs of inducement.18 The di-
rection of this e⁄ect depends on assumptions on consumer behavior. When health care services
are considered reputation goods and the market is monopolistically competitive, information
18Formally, this implies the cost of induction (ic) is a function of GP density (R).
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on GPs stems from those who contact the GPs19. Following the argumentation in Pauly and
Satterthwaite (1981), when there are more GPs in the market, there are fewer patients per
GP so that the (average) amount of information on any speci￿c GP diminishes. Information
asymmetry thus increases with the number of GPs, so that the opportunity to induce demand
increases (the inducement costs decrease). This ￿ consumer information model￿thus predicts
that there will be more inducing behavior in GP dense markets, as is in line with the pre-
dictions above. On the other hand though, it can be argued that when consumers especially
search for a good agent, i.e. a GP that does not misuse her agency position, the availability of
more GPs in the market decreases the search costs for external information. Patients especially
search for external validation of the services they receive from their individual GP. The more
providers in the market, the higher is the probability that other consumers have information on
alternative GPs and the lower are the costs for gathering information on any other GP to create
a benchmark. It is thus easier for the patient to detect inducing behavior when the number of
GPs in the market is higher, which increases the cost of inducement for GPs. If this reasoning
holds, there will be fewer incentives to induce demand when GP density is high.20 To take
away from this discussion is that the e⁄ect of more providers in terms of changes in the degree
of information asymmetry in the market can alter the predictions of the basic model.
As models of utility maximization predict more inducement to take place when there are
more providers in the market, the estimation of the variation in per capita consumption due
to di⁄erences in GP density across markets has been a popular empirical strategy. There are
however some problems with the identi￿cation of inducement in this context. The ￿nding
of a positive correlation between per capita consumption and supply can be ascribed to and
explained by some other e⁄ects (Reinhardt 1985). First and foremost, an availability e⁄ect can
be the cause of the positive correlation between consumption and supply (Birch 1988). That
is, an increase in supply triggers a decrease in the shadow price of GP care: the access costs
of care decrease as the average travel and waiting time drop. Therefore, optimal consumer
19This is related with the view of treatment as a sequence of actions and learning process (see McGuire 2000).
20When patients detect inducement, they can either decide to contact another GP or decide to reduce the
number of times to contact any GP (demand impedement): e.g. the GP makes an ￿ o⁄er￿and the patient chooses
to reject it (Rochaix 1989). Remark that data for Belgium and empirical work on how patients choose care
providers (Hoerger and Howard 1995) indicate that patients rarely change GP and use especially recommendation
of relatives and friends.
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behavior results in an increase in the demand for primary care services as a reaction to supply
increases. Second, the positive relationship between per capita consumption and GP density
can be explained by the presence of excess demand, i.e. an increase in supply allows for this
excess demand to be met. Alternatively, the e⁄ect can stem from the mere fact that GPs choose
to locate their o¢ ce in markets with a higher demand (reverse causation).
In the empirical analysis, the econometrician is typically able to reject the rationing e⁄ect
within the estimation and to control for the reverse causation e⁄ect by treating the supply
variable as endogenous (Stano 1985). Controlling for or separately identifying the availability
e⁄ect however hinges on hypotheses from the theoretical framework (Escarse 1992). In this
paper, we follow the identi￿cation strategy as proposed in Carlsen and Grytten (1998). That
is, it is hypothesized that inducement and availability e⁄ects occur for di⁄erent types of markets.
More precisely, in markets with a low GP density increases in per capita consumption due to
increases in the supply of care is the result of consumer behavior (availability e⁄ect). In markets
with a high GP density on the other hand, the positive relation stems from GP inducement.
The conjecture on availability and inducement e⁄ects in Carlsen and Grytten (1998) is based
on the assumption that consumer utility is not linear in distance and waiting time. Instead,
when access costs for care are high, consumers￿marginal utility gains from drops in time and
distance are higher compared to lower access costs. As a result, the impact of an increase in
the number of GPs has a di⁄erential impact on consumer behavior for markets with di⁄erent
GP density levels. In markets with a low GP density, where there is a high number of patients
per GP and thus high access costs for care, the presence of an extra GP decreases the shadow
price of care signi￿cantly which triggers an increase in consumption. On the other hand, in a
GP dense market the average access costs for care are already low, so that an additional drop
due to increases in the supply of primary care has virtually no e⁄ect on the consumer utility
level and thus on consumer demand. Availability e⁄ects thus occur mainly in markets with a
low GP density.
GP utility maximization in turn predicts that GP behavior is a⁄ected in the opposite way
by the level of GP density. The increase in the number of competitors decreases the number
of patients per GP. This decreases the number of visits and thus GP income. In line with
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the previous discussion, in GP scarce markets GPs have on average a high income level, so
that the drop in GP utility due to the income drop is not important. The presence of the
extra GP also reduces GP workload which positively a⁄ects utility. In GP scarce areas, this
e⁄ect is important as the baseline workload was high (increasing marginal disutility). It is
therefore unlikely that there are incentives to induce demand in this type of markets, given
also the presence of inducement costs. Also note that in case availability e⁄ects are important
in this market, little change in income and workload is to be expected due to an increase in
the number of competitors. For markets with a high GP density and thus few patients per
GP, the situation reverses. The already modest GP income and their already low workload
decrease due to increased competition (availability e⁄ects are unlikely). Therefore a lot can be
gained from inducing an extra visit, at a small workload cost. Taken together, with the costs
of inducement constant over markets, GP induced demand occurs especially in market with a
higher GP density.
In conclusion, a positive e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consumption is predicted to stem
from availability e⁄ects in GP scarce markets and from inducing behavior by GPs in GP dense
markets. These predictions from the theoretical model form the basis of the testable hypotheses
we can take to data.
It should be noted though that GPs can also use their discretionary in￿ uence over the pref-
erences of consumers to demand less care than the optimal level. That is, GPs have incentives
to reduce the number of contacts in case the marginal costs of the last contact outweigh the
marginal bene￿t of it: reducing the demand for primary care increases the utility level of the
GP. This type of demand management is expected to occur when the workload of GPs is very
high, i.e. in markets with a low GP density. When an additional provider enters the market,
the workload drops and with it, the incentives for GPs to downwardly manage demand. The
￿nding of a positive relation between GP density and per capita consumption in the markets
of group 1 are thus not solely to be attributed to consumer behavior (availability e⁄ects).
To complete the discussion, remember that the e⁄ect of the degree of information asymmetry
can change the model predictions in terms of the inducing behavior. Whereas the consumer
information model (Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981) strengthens the predictions of the model,
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a high GP density in the market can be associated with lower incentives to induce demand
when patients are assumed to search for a perfect agent. That is, in the latter case inducement
costs increase in GP density as information asymmetry decreases and with it the risk of losing
patients in the future. When there are more GPs in the market, the individual GP then has
incentives to act more as a perfect agent, which results in a decrease of the incidence of supplier
inducement.
3.4.2 Implementation
Abstracting from other possible explanations, inducement is characterized by the ￿nding of
a positive correlation between per capita consumption and supply. As the data we work with
consists of GP-level information on consumption, consider the following reduced form explaining
the per GP number of contacts. We denote the number of contacts of GP i which operates in
local market j as Qij and Rj represents the GP density in that local market.
ln(Qij) = ￿1 + ￿ ln(Rj) + controlsij + "ij (3.3)
Coe¢ cient ￿ then captures the percentage change in per GP consumption due to a percentage
increase in GP density (elasticities). An easy transformation of the model shows that the
e⁄ect of a percentage increase in GP density results in an increase of (￿ + 1) percent in per
capita consumption.21 As a result, the absence of any e⁄ect of GP density on per capita
consumption requires that ￿ is estimated not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1. Intuitively, if per
capita consumption is not increasing with an additional entrant, GPs share the total workload
among one more GP. Furthermore, the absence of an e⁄ect on GP workload (￿ = 0) implies
that per capita consumption is increasing proportionally with GP density. Intuitively, if every
GP maintains her workload, but now an extra GP is active, total consumption has to increase.
21Denote population size of market j as mpopj, the number of GPs as Nj and total consumption as Qj (per























= ln(Qij)￿ln(Rj). Given equation (3.3), the e⁄ect of GP density on the
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In sum, the necessary condition for the presence of supplier inducement in a health care system
is that ￿ is estimated signi￿cantly larger than ￿1. (Carlsen and Grytten 1998, Delattre and
Dormont 2003).
As the ￿nding of an e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consumption can also be explained
by GPs locating in the most attractive locations, the empirical analysis should control for
this possible reverse causation. Since we estimate the demand for a single GP, we escape the
identi￿cation critique by Auster and Oaxaca (1981) where it is shown that the e⁄ect of market
supply on market demand can not be identi￿ed. It can furthermore be argued that endogeneity
concerns related to the e⁄ect of GP density on GP level consumption of care are not severe:
individual level unobservables are less correlated with overall market demand. However, to
ensure the validity of the results, the empirical analysis below will treat GP density as being
endogenous.
To separately identify the inducement e⁄ect from availability e⁄ects, we divide the local
markets into ￿ve equal-sized groups, according to GP density. That is, group 1 contains the
20% markets with the lowest GP density, while group 5 collects the markets with the 20% highest
GP density. We work with ￿ve groups instead of with three (Carlsen and Grytten, 1998) as we
want to allow for a richer range of e⁄ects. First of all, we expect the middle groups to contain
valuable information. Because of the generally high GP density in Belgium, the markets with
the lowest GP density are hardly GP scarce areas. We thus expect that availability e⁄ects might
quickly disappear and inducement can be something GPs resort to quite fast (e.g. already in
markets with a medium GP density). Secondly, Belgium holds markets with a very high GP
density (see section 3.3.2). It is thus possible that changes in the information asymmetry have
an impact on inducing behavior (as in the search theory). With DRxj a dummy variable for
local market j to be assigned to group x (x 2 [1;5]), the reduced form to be estimated is given
by:
ln(Qij) = ￿1 + ￿2DR2j + ￿3DR3j + ￿4DR4j + ￿5DR5j + ￿1 ln(Rj) ￿ DR1j
+￿2 ln(Rj) ￿ DR2j + ￿3 ln(Rj) ￿ DR3j + ￿4 ln(Rj) ￿ DR4j
+￿5 ln(Rj) ￿ DR5j + controlsij + "ij (3.4)
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We thus split up the e⁄ect of GP density on the number of contacts over ￿ve groups, with ￿k
the e⁄ect of GP density in local markets of group k. This splitting-up of the e⁄ect is the basis
of the identi￿cation strategy: following the hypotheses of Carlson and Grytten (1998), it allows
us to separately identify inducement e⁄ects from availability e⁄ects.22
The availability hypothesis expects a positive e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consumption
only in GP scarce areas. Group 1 collects the markets with the lowest GP density in Belgium.
We will refer to this group as GP scarce market, although this concept is relative. In case
GP density is low enough to generate substantial changes in consumer utility due to drops
in access costs of GP care, we expect to ￿nd ￿1 to be estimated signi￿cantly larger than ￿1
and possibly close to zero, as this implies a proportional increase with GP density. Possibly
these e⁄ects remain present in the group 2-markets (and group 3). In the latter markets, the
e⁄ect of availability should however be less than in the group 1-markets as the average distance
and waiting time are smaller. We thus expect to ￿nd that, in the presence of only availability
e⁄ects, ￿2 (and possibly ￿3) is still signi￿cantly larger than ￿1, but more negative compared to
￿1. For the markets with a higher GP density, changes in the availability of health services are
expected not to have any impact on the demand. In other words, we expect to ￿nd estimated
coe¢ cients (￿3,) ￿4 and ￿5 not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1.
On the other hand, the e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consumption can be driven by
inducing behavior of GPs. Since it is expected that inducement is optimal only given a certain
level of GP density, we expect to ￿nd coe¢ cients that are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1
for GP scarce areas. In markets with a higher GP density on the other hand, the estimated
coe¢ cients will be such that a higher GP density implies a higher per capita consumption (or
a lower drop in per GP consumption). It is hard to conjecture on the level of GP density for
which it becomes optimal for GPs to induce demand as a response to intensi￿ed competition.
Given the generally high levels of GP density in Belgium, we expect this to occur rather soon
(i.e. group 3-markets). Note that in case a higher GP density is associated to decreases
22Note that this speci￿cation only di⁄ers slightly from Carlsen and Grytten (1998). There are more groups and
GP density is interacted with every group to facilitates interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients: in Carlsen
and Grytten (1998), group 1 is used as the base group, which implies that the e⁄ect of GP density for markets
of group 2 is given by (￿1 + ￿2) instead of by ￿2 as in our speci￿cation.
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in information asymmetry, markets with a high GP density (e.g. group 5-markets) could be
characterized by less inducement compared to markets with a lower GP density (search theory).
Under the consumer information model on the other hand, there is expected to be a further
increase in inducement.
We can summarize the implications of the two hypotheses as follows:
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5
H0: availability ￿1= 0 0 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿1 0 > ￿3￿ ￿1 ￿4= ￿1 ￿5= ￿1
H0: inducement ￿1= ￿1 ￿2= ￿1 0 ￿ ￿3> ￿1 ￿4= 0 0 ￿ ￿5￿ ￿1
Both the availability and the inducement e⁄ects can be present simultaneously in the Belgian
primary care market. This would result in the ￿nding of signi￿cant e⁄ects on per capita
consumption for almost all groups, depending on how ￿ long￿availability e⁄ects last and how
￿ soon￿GPs start inducing demand.
Finally, note that the neoclassic model also predicts that a supply increase results in an
increase in the total consumption of the good/service. However, this mechanism is driven by
a simultaneous drop in prices. As in Belgium prices are ￿xed and ￿xed independently of the
GP density, the interpretation of the positive relation between per capita consumption and GP
density is simpli￿ed.
3.5 Empirical analysis
We are now ready for the empirical analysis of the presence of supplier inducement in the
Belgian primary care market. We start the discussion with interpreting initial insights in the
data after which we move to applying the empirical approach on the number of contacts per
GP as discussed above.
3.5.1 Initial insights
Regional di⁄erences in the consumption of health care services are often the trigger of studying
GP behavior. More precisely, high variation in usage ratios between areas of the same country
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that have a comparable demand for care is a necessary condition for the presence of supplier
inducement (McPherson 1990). Although we know already that this clearly is not a su¢ cient
condition, it is a natural starting point. Aggregating the data to the zip code level, we ￿nd a high
variation in the total number of contacts with GPs, but more importantly also in the number
of GP contacts per capita. In particular, we ￿nd that the average per capita consumption of
primary care in the dataset equals 4:89 with a standard deviation of 2:07. Variation across
markets remains present once we aggregate to municipality level (mean=4:85, sd=1:33) and
to province level, for which the average number of per capita consumption varies from 4 to
5:12 contacts per year. The Belgian primary care market is thus characterized by signi￿cant
variation in per capita consumption.
Furthermore, this variation in per capita consumption is connected to the degree of compe-
tition in the GP market. That is, plotting per capita consumption levels of care with respect to
GP density, as is presented in Figure 3-1, reveals a positive link between per capita consumption
and per capita number of GPs. Again, this is a necessary condition for the presence of supplier
inducement. We thus have reasons to closer investigate GP behavior in Belgium.


































* We exclude the 10 zip codes w ith the highest GP density (more than 31 GPs per 10,000 inhabitants),
to show that the trend is not driven by outliers. Including these local markets amplifies the effect.
On market level, the average number of contacts per patient of a GP can give some indication
of inducement. Since the costs of establishing the agency relation is important, the marginal
cost of inducing is generally smaller for the current clientele (Birch 1988). Therefore, we believe
that the ratio of the number of contacts to the number of patients contains information on the
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inducing behavior of GPs. We compute the average number of GP contacts per patient per
market and ￿rst relate this to the average number of patients per GP. We ￿nd that there is a
negative signi￿cant correlation between both variables: the higher the number of patients, the
lower the average number of consultations per patient.
Finally, we can look at the disaggregate data for some initial insights. We focus on the
number of contacts of the average GP. Figure 3-2 indicates that the number of contacts of the
average GP is decreasing in GP density. The higher the number of GPs per capita, the lower
is the number of patients per GP, so that the pool of patients from which the GP can draw
is smaller. This implies that we can reject the rationing hypothesis: in case there are demand
excesses, an increase in GP density would not result in a decrease in the number of contacts per
GP, as extra GPs only meet (part of) the excess. But more importantly, note that this trend
is convex: the higher GP density in the market, the smaller is the e⁄ect of an increase in GP
density on the number of contacts per GP. This is a ￿rst indication of the presence of demand
management and/or availability e⁄ects.






































* We excluded the 10 zip codes with the highest GP density (more than 31 GPs per 10,000 inhabitants),
to show that the trend is not driven by the outliers. Including these local markets amplifies the effect.
The econometric model as described above can be used to identify whether this trend is signif-
icant and which type of markets drives the convexity. That is, if the convexity is driven by the
markets with a low GP density, the convexity is proof of availability e⁄ects, whereas GP dense
markets causing convexity of the relation implies evidence of inducing behavior of the GPs.
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3.5.2 Supplier inducement in the Belgian primary care
Identi￿cation
To control for possible endogeneity concerns, we instrument the e⁄ect of GP density on the
number of contacts with GPs. In line with Carlsen and Grytten (1998), we use variables based
on the number of inhabitants as instruments. It is thus assumed that population measures only
a⁄ect the demand for GP services through GP density, which in turn hinges on the assumption
that per capita consumption does not depend on the number of inhabitants in the market.
Furthermore, the number of inhabitants measures market size and market opportunities, what
implies a correlation with the number of entrants in the market and thus the density of health
providers. The lower panel of Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the four instruments
we use in the estimation: the number of inhabitants in the relevant market (mpop) and the
logarithm of the population (lnmpop), population density in the local market (dens) de￿ned
as the number of inhabitants per squared kilometre and ￿nally, the number of inhabitants
in markets within a range of 5 km (npop5), accounting for the possible absence of GPs in
nearby markets. We use a transformation of population to allow for a ￿ exible relation between
population and GP density. For population density, there is no reason why a patient would
demand more contacts per GP when there is a higher/lower population density, other than the
extent to which this a⁄ects GP density.23 The nearby population measure is added to control
for potential demand in the area. Note that for the model in which the endogenous variable is
interacted with dummies, the instruments are interacted as well.24
Since we work with GP-level data, endogeneity concern on GP density in the estimation of
the number of contacts per GP is rather limited. Therefore, we report both the results of the
OLS and the IV-estimation. Concerning the validity of our instruments, we use the validity
test proposed in the market-level analysis of Dranove and Wehner (1994): instruments are
only valid if the correlations between the residuals of the OLS-estimation and the instruments
23Since the local markets are relatively small in terms of surface, the transportation cost component in the
shadow price of care can be neglected.
24This implies that we treat the group dummies as being exogenous. Previous work (Carlsen and Grytten
1998) makes the same assumption.
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are low and insigni￿cant, implying that they would be excluded from the demand equation.
Correlation matrices indicate that all instruments are valid for the estimation of the number of
contacts per GP and ￿rst-stage estimates indicate statistical insigni￿cant partial correlations of
all instruments with the explanatory variable. Finally, a heteroskedasticity-robust validity test
on the over-identifying restrictions is not rejected. The conclusions in terms of inducing behavior
in the Belgian primary care market are also checked to be robust against the exclusion of some
of the instruments (e.g. population density) and against the inclusion of other transformations
of population (e.g. population squared).
As indicated in section 3.3.2, we de￿ne the relevant market as the zip code area. However,
it might be that consumers cross the border of the zip code area for primary health care to e.g.
a market with a higher supply (Dranove and Wehner 1994). To correct for this border-crossing,
we also ran the analyses when the relevant market is the municipality and when GP density
is thus de￿ned accordingly. We have moreover experimented with the exclusion of big cities
as they attract commuters. Although individual parameter estimates di⁄er, the results on the
￿nding of inducement and availability are not sensitive to either experiment.
Also, implementation of the model implies correcting for market and physician controls.
As Grytten et al (1995) indicates, the health status is an important predictor of the number
of contacts. Omitting variables capturing the health status would lead to biased results. But
also GP characteristics are important. Suppose e.g. that markets with a high GP density also
typically attract a higher percentage of male GPs. As male GPs more often work full-time
and thus have more contacts, omitting GP-speci￿c characteristics leads to falsely concluding in
favour of demand inducement in GP dense areas. We use the market-level demand and supply
controls introduced in section 3.3.2 and presented in Table 3.2 to obtain unbiased results on
the e⁄ect of GP density on per GP consumption of primary care.
Finally, in the estimation procedure we control for common shocks in the demand of GPs
that share the same market. That is, we allow the GP-speci￿c error terms to be correlated
within the market (cluster). The estimation thus consists of a clustered IV regression of the
reduced form presented in equation (3.4). We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
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Results on Supplier Inducement
We start by estimating the model that explains the total number of contacts per GP in which we
make no distinction according to GP density (equation 3.3). This provides initial insights on the
relation between GP density and per GP (or per capita) consumption of primary care services.
The ￿rst two columns of Table 3.3 present the results of this estimation. The OLS-estimation
indicates a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of GP density on the number of contacts. The coe¢ cient is
estimated accurately: it is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from both ￿1 and 0. More precisely, the results
suggest that a 1% increase in GP density leads to a signi￿cant decrease in number of contacts
per GP of 0:284%. In terms of per capita consumption, the results imply that a 1% increase
in GP density leads to a 0:716% increase in per capita consumption.25 Once we correct for
the possible endogenous nature of the supply, by estimating using instrumental variables, the
estimated coe¢ cient of the e⁄ect of GP density on primary care usage is no longer signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. It however remains signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1. This implies that per
capita consumption increases in GP density and possibly proportionally so. Do patients react
strongly to increased availability? Or rather, do GPs have so much power over the demand
that they can almost fully absorb an increase in competition? To get a better insight, we move
to the model that can distinguish between these possibilities.
The third and fourth column of Table 3.3 present the results of the estimation of equation
(3.4), in which the e⁄ect of GP density on per GP consumption is split up over ￿ve groups. This
allows us to infer in which group of markets GP density a⁄ects the consumption of primary
care, where we group markets according to their GP density. For the interpretation of these
e⁄ects, we report Wald-tests on the estimated coe¢ cients of GP density (￿k) in Table 3.4 for
respectively the OLS and the IV estimation.
Without instrumentation, we ￿nd that ￿1 is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1, while this coef-
￿cient is not estimated signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This indicates a possible proportional
increase in per capita consumption of primary care with an increase in GP density, for markets
25With the estimated coe¢ cient negative, we can exclude demand rationing as the remaining alternative
explanation for a positive e⁄ect of supply on per capita consumption. Demand rationing would namely imply
that individual GPs are not a⁄ected by an additional entrant.
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with the lowest GP density in Belgium (among the 20% lowest). For markets of group 2, we
￿nd that GP density proportionally reduces the consumption of care per GP. In other words,
per capita consumption is not a⁄ected by an increase in the number of providers. Given the
hypotheses from the model put forward in section 3.4, we ￿nd that GP density in the group
1 markets is su¢ ciently low for the presence of availability e⁄ects. That is, consumer utility
is a⁄ected by decreases in access costs to care to such an extent that consumers increase their
consumption of GP care. The availability e⁄ect however dies out once GP density increases
further (group 2). For completeness, this positive relation in the group 1 markets can also be
explained by GPs downwardly managing the demand for their services instead of by consumer
preferences.
As GP density continues to increase, we again ￿nd evidence of some relation between per GP
consumption of primary care and GP density. As availability e⁄ects have died out, this relation
is explained by the behavior of GPs. For group 3-markets, per GP consumption decreases
with GP density, but less than proportionally. GPs thus exert some discretionary in￿ uence
on the demand of markets with a medium GP density. Finally, a proportional increase of per
capita utilization with GP density is found in the markets of group 4 and group 5: ￿4 and ￿5
are estimated signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1 while not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Based
on the theoretical model attributes, this positive partial correlation is attributed to inducing
behavior of the GPs in these GP dense areas.
When we correct for the possible endogeneity of GP density in the explanation of per
GP consumption, the main conclusion remains although the coe¢ cients are estimated very
imprecisely. For market with the lowest GP density (group 1), per capita consumption increases
proportionally with GP density as ￿1 is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1, while not estimated
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Contrary to the OLS estimation, no e⁄ect is found for markets
with an intermediate GP density. However, in markets with the highest GP density (group 5),
we again ￿nd evidence of the positive relation between GP density and per capita consumption.
That is, per GP utilization of care does not decrease with GP density.26
26Remark that as the coe¢ cients in this IV estimation are estimated imprecisely, the estimated coe¢ cients of
GP density for the di⁄erent groups of markets are no longer signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other.
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Table 3.3: Estimation results of cross-section analysis on the total number of contacts per GP,
without and with distinction on the level of GP density (2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Coe⁄. (St. E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.)
E⁄ect of GP density
￿1 -0.284￿￿￿ (0.04) -0.067 (0.22) -0.115 (0.12) 0.232 (0.47)
￿2 - - -0.720￿￿ (0.30) 0.266 (2.17)
￿3 - - -0.472￿￿ (0.18) 1.689 (3.09)
￿4 - - 0.124 (0.30) 1.123 (1.41)
￿5 - - 0.013 (0.09) 0.075 (0.30)
Supply Control variables
accr 1.002￿￿￿ (0.04) 1.011￿￿￿ (0.04) 1.002￿￿￿ (0.04) 1.004￿￿￿ (0.04)
agree 0.053 (0.08) 0.047 (0.09) 0.054 (0.08) 0.046 (0.09)
fem -0.365￿￿￿ (0.08) -0.381￿￿￿ (0.09) -0.329￿￿￿ (0.08) -0.312￿￿￿ (0.09)
exp1020yrs 0.367￿￿￿ (0.08) 0.426￿￿￿ (0.09) 0.373￿￿￿ (0.08) 0.381￿￿￿ (0.09)
exp+20yrs 0.321￿￿￿ (0.10) 0.430￿￿￿ (0.14) 0.325￿￿￿ (0.09) 0.360￿￿ (0.11)
Demand Control variables
kids -1.343 (0.89) -0.857 (1.17) -1.610￿ (0.90) -1.901￿ (1.10)
young -2.454￿￿￿ (0.81) -2.512￿￿ (1.10) -2.657￿￿￿ (0.80) -2.801￿￿￿ (0.92)
old -1.645￿￿￿ (0.61) -1.999￿ (1.03) -1.651￿￿￿ (0.58) -1.757￿￿￿ (0.67)
female 3.144￿￿￿ (0.97) 2.974￿￿￿ (1.10) 3.140￿￿￿ (0.95) 2.848￿￿ (1.12)
foreign -0.733￿￿￿ (0.18) -0.673￿￿￿ (0.21) -0.739￿￿￿ (0.17) -0.785￿￿￿ (0.19)
Flanders 0.081￿￿ (0.03) 0.132 (0.10) 0.054￿ (0.03) 0.059 (0.04)
Brussels -0.156￿￿ (0.07) -0.163￿￿ (0.08) -0.134￿￿ (0.06) -0.128￿ (0.07)
unempl 1.431￿￿￿ (0.51) 1.513￿￿￿ (0.56) 1.307￿￿￿ (0.50) 1.337￿￿ (0.64)
meaninc -0.107￿￿￿ (0.03) -0.130￿￿￿ (0.04) -0.112￿￿￿ (0.03) -0.117￿￿￿ (0.04)
hospbeds -0.086￿￿￿ (0.02) -0.097￿￿￿ (0.03) -0.079￿￿￿ (0.02) -0.092￿￿￿ (0.03)
restbeds -0.001 (0.02) -0.001 (0.03) -0.013 (0.02) -0.001 (0.03)
drugs 0.005￿￿ (0.00) 0.005￿￿ (0.00) 0.005￿￿￿ (0.00) 0.004￿￿ (0.00)
￿1 7.221￿￿￿ (0.52) 7.024￿￿￿ (0.86) 6.978￿￿￿ (0.56) 6.494￿￿￿ (1.10)
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Column (1) and (2) give the results for the estimation of equation 3.3, with no distinction according to GP
density. Column (3) reports the estimated coe¢ cients for the estimation of equation 3.4, with towns divided
into ￿ve equal sized groups according to the GP density. ￿1 relates to the towns with a GP density amongst
the 20% smallest in Belgium, whereas ￿5 refers to the 20% markets with the highest GP density. IV estimation
is performed using mpop, npop5, dens and lnmpop as instruments for logarithm of GP density (R). Standard
errors are reported between brackets. ￿;￿￿ and ￿￿￿ indicate signi￿cance at respectively a 10, 5 and 1% level.
The other constants (￿5) are estimated insigni￿cant and therefore not reported.
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Table 3.4: Wald tests on the estimated coe¢ cients of the e⁄ect of GP density on number of
contacts per GP for ￿ve groups of markets (2001)
OLS-estimation IV-estimation
￿k = -1 ￿k = 0 ￿k = -1 ￿k = 0
F (prob) F (prob) F (prob) F (prob)
￿1 55.23 (0.000) 0.93 (0.335) 6.96 (0.009) 0.25 (0.619)
￿2 0.84 (0.359) 5.60 (0.018) 0.34 (0.560) 0.02 (0.903)
￿3 8.35 (0.004) 6.66 (0.010) 0.76 (0.384) 0.30 (0.585)
￿4 13.62 (0.000) 0.17 (0.684) 2.28 (0.131) 0.64 (0.424)
￿5 115.2 (0.000) 0.02 (0.893) 12.48 (0.000) 0.06 (0.806)
The Wald-tests are based on the coe¢ cient estimates of the OLS and IV estimations of
equation (3.4) for total number of contacts, as presented in Table 3.3. ￿1 gives the e⁄ect
of GP density on per GP consumption in the 20% markets with the lowest GP density of
Belgium (group 1), whereas the e⁄ect of the 20% markets with the highest GP density is
represented by ￿5.
The results of our estimations indicate that per capita consumption increases as GP density
increases. Furthermore, our ￿ndings can not rule out that this e⁄ect is partly due to GP
behavior: Belgian GPs induce demand for their services. Depending on the speci￿cation one
prefers (instrumentation or not) this inducing behavior is present already in medium dense
markets or is mostly a feature of the markets with the highest GP density. Next to this
inducement e⁄ect in the primary care market, we also ￿nd evidence of either a reaction of
consumers to the increased availability of care or downward demand management by GPs in
the 20% markets with the lowest GP density.
Results on control variables
For completeness, consider also the e⁄ects of the variables controlling for GP characteristics
and market demand. For the supply control variables, we ￿nd that GPs who have a (higher
level of) accreditation complete more contacts on yearly basis. As expected, the percentage
of female providers in the market reduces the number of contacts per GP. This indicates that
female GPs either have fewer contacts or work part-time. Finally, the higher the percentage of
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providers with an intermediate or high experience level, the higher is the number of contacts.
As it takes some time to build a patientele, we indeed expect GPs with little experience to
complete fewer contacts.
For market demand characteristics and with the percentage of adults (24-64 years) as the
base group, the percentages of kids, youngsters and elderly in the population have a negative
impact on the utilization of GP care. First, remember that we control for GP density in the
estimation. As a results, the estimated coe¢ cients give the e⁄ect on the number of contacts per
GP, net of the e⁄ect on the number of providers that chose to enter this market. Interpretation
is therefore not straightforward. The ￿ndings of the negative e⁄ects can be rationalized by
several dynamics in the market. First, (parents of) kids often resort to the care of pediatricians,
which reduces the number of contacts of this age groups with GPs. The negative sign for the
elderly can be explained by a similar argument as they resort to other types of care, such as
retirement homes and geriatric care. Note that we also separately control for the percentage
female population, which is highly correlated with the percentage elderly. For the percentage
population in the 10-24 age group, it could be argued that their general health status is better
than that of adults and that the type of care they seek is often specialized (dermatologist,
physiologist). Also the fact that adults need a sick note to be excused from work and are the
most important consumers of drugs (prescriptions) can help explain the results.
Further, in line with reports on the use of health care services in general, the higher the
percentage of the female population, the higher is the use of GP care. Possibly due to di⁄erent
habits and culture, the percentage foreigners has a negative e⁄ect on the number of contacts.
Also the mean income level of the market has a negative impact on the number of GP contacts.
This implies that the higher the income level in a town, the lower is the workload of the average
GP, after controlling for the total number of providers that enter the market. This can be due
to several reasons. Whereas it is tempting to conclude that money prevents illness, this e⁄ect is
more likely due to the fact that higher incomes more easily substitute toward specialist care. It
is also possible that we pick up an education e⁄ect and that we ￿nd that it is harder to induce
demand for your services if your patients are highly educated (Pauly 1978). This is also in line
with the ￿nding of a positive impact of the unemployment rate in the market on the number of
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contacts with a GP. Note also the unemployed is often unemployed because of health problems.
Finally, for the regional e⁄ects, we ￿nd that the use of primary care per GP is signi￿cantly less
in the Brussels area and possibly higher in Flanders, compared to the southern part of Belgium.
We also ￿nd the number of hospital beds to have a negative in￿ uence on the workload
of the GP. Since the proximity of many hospital beds generally implies the presence of many
specialists, this variable can indicate the ease to refer a patient to a specialist or the ease for
patients to substitute towards specialist contacts or towards emergency contacts. It should
be noted that once we controlled for the number of hospitals beds, the inclusion of a variable
proxying specialist density has no signi￿cant impact on the number of contact with the average
GP in the market and has no e⁄ect on the conclusion on inducement and availability e⁄ects.
The number of beds in rest and nursing homes has no signi￿cant impact on the number of visits
per GP. Finally, the general attitude towards health, proxied through the use of medication, is
found to positively in￿ uence the number of contacts GPs perform.
In addition, we estimated the model with separate coe¢ cients for the control variables for
the di⁄erent groups of markets. First, the conclusions in terms of the e⁄ect of GP density on
per capita consumption remain valid. Second, most of the control variables have a signi￿cant
impact on only some groups of markets. Note that the grouping of markets according to GP
density results in a decrease in the variance of some of the controls, which helps explain part
of the results. For the supply controls, we ￿nd that the accreditation level of GPs signi￿cantly
impacts the number of contacts per GP for all groups, whereas the experience level a⁄ects only
the markets with a higher than average GP density. The age and gender composition of the
population is especially important for explaining the number of contacts per GP in the markets
of group 3 and group 4, although some signi￿cant e⁄ects are also found for group 1-markets.
The utilization of GP care in markets with a lower than average GP density is a⁄ected by the
mean income level. As there is no signi￿cant impact on the higher GP density markets, the
education e⁄ect mentioned before is unlikely to explain the negative e⁄ect. The unemployment
rate and the percentage foreigners a⁄ect per GP consumption only in high density markets.
Finally, regional dummies, the presence of alternative care and the level of consumption of
drugs a⁄ect mainly the consumption of care in the markets of group 1.
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3.6 Type of contacts
As we have found indication that Belgian GPs are to some extent inducing demand for their
services, it is furthermore interesting to investigate which type of contacts GPs typically employ
for this activity. We distinguish between two types of contacts: consultations (Q_consult) and
visits during working hours (Q_visit).27 Before going to the empirical analysis, we ￿rst conjec-
ture on which type of contacts GP employ for inducement following the theoretical discussion
in section 3.2.
3.6.1 Inducing consultations or visits
Utility maximization implies that GPs are most likely to induce demand for those contacts that
have the best trade-o⁄between marginal bene￿ts and marginal costs of inducement (Evans 1974
and Rossiter and Wilensky 1984). In terms of the theoretical framework put forward in this
paper, expression (3.2) indicates that the likelihood of inducing demand is higher the higher
are the fees (f ) and the lower are the workload intensity (w) and the costs of inducement (ic).
We compare the components of marginal costs and bene￿ts of inducement for the two types of
contacts to conjecture whether GPs are more likely to induce consultations or visits.
As indicated in section 3.3.1, the fee a GP receives for a consultation is substantially lower
than the reimbursement for visits. The marginal bene￿ts of inducement are thus higher for
visits. All other things equal, utility maximization therefore predicts that a GP will rather
be inclined to induce demand on visits than on consultations. As for the workload intensity,
consultations have a lower e⁄ort cost, since the patient incurs the transportation and waiting
costs. By de￿nition, it is the GP who incurs the transportation and time costs in case of a visit.
Under the assumption that the di¢ culty of an average visit and consultation is the same28, the
e⁄ort costs of the average visit are higher compared to a consultation. This utility component
27We do not consider visits outside working hours, because they do not take place in the same time frame.
Furthermore, they only represent a small part of all contacts. Finally, as Giu⁄rida and Gravelle (2001) indicates,
most GPs regard out-of-hours work as a negative aspect of their medical career (a source of stress), even though
the fee for a night visits is often rather high compared to other visits (on average 32:49e in 2001).
28Some argue that a visit is more di¢ cult because the GP has less material at hand to examine and treat the
patient. Also, it might be that visits imply more severe sickness (although this is probably true for a certain
percentage of visits, it is hard to generalize this).
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therefore suggests a preference of GPs to induce consultations over visits. Note though that
the higher the GP density becomes, the lower are also the transportation costs for GPs to visit
patients, which reduces the preference of inducing consultations over visits.
It is hard to ￿nd convincing arguments on whether the costs of inducement are higher or
lower for visits compared to consultations. First, the di⁄erent types of contacts typically concern
di⁄erent consumer types. WIV (2002) reports that e.g. elderly and females make signi￿cantly
more use of visits. It can be conjectured that it is takes less e⁄ort to induce an extra visit
with elderly, but also that the moral costs of inducing a contact with this age group are higher.
Second, one can argue that it takes less e⁄ort to convince a patient to consume an additional
visit compared to an additional consultation as patients bear no transportation costs. On the
other hand though, the monetary contribution is higher for a visit. As inducement is expected
to matter especially in GP dense areas, the utility di⁄erence of the monetary contribution
is expected outweighs the utility di⁄erence of the access costs. If there is a di⁄erence, it
probably takes less e⁄ort to induce an additional consultation. Third, with respect to the
intertemporal costs of inducing demand, the higher the number of contacts of a certain type,
the more information about this type of contact is available in the market. Since the majority
of contacts are consultations (and since specialists perform consultations but no visits), it can
be that the information asymmetry is changing faster for consultations compared to visits.
Depending on whether this change in information asymmetry increases (consumer information
model) or decreases (search theory) the opportunities to induce demand, the cost associated to
the risk of losing patients is resp. less or more important for consultations.
Taking these components together yields a mixed story. The marginal bene￿t of inducing
an extra visit is higher compared to an extra consultation. On the other hand, the cost side
suggests the opposite. Depending on which e⁄ect dominates, the GP will prefer inducement
through one type of contact over the other one.29
Finally, remember that the availability e⁄ect implies an increasing per capita consumption
because of the preferences of consumers. An additional GP in the market decreases time and
transportation costs to have access to the primary care, which results in an increase of the
29A GP can only induce a contact when there is a initial relation with the patient. Therefore, the fact that
GPs perform visits (in the guard duty system) to attract new patients is not relevant here.
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demand. Since for visits the GP incurs the transportation costs, the availability e⁄ect will
be considerably less for this type of contacts compared to for consultations. And because the
opportunity costs of waiting for the GP are generally low for a visit, we expect availability
e⁄ects to be virtually non-existing for visits.
3.6.2 Empirical analysis
We estimate the e⁄ect of GP density and market and supply control variables for the number
of consultations and the number of visits during working hours of a GP. Again, to distinguish
between inducement and availability e⁄ects, we estimate the e⁄ect of GP density for ￿ve groups
of markets according to their level of GP density (equation 3.4). We also control for common
shocks in the demand of GPs that share the same market by allowing the GP-speci￿c error
terms to be correlated within the market (cluster) and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors. To control for possible endogeneity of GP density in the estimation of the number of
contacts of di⁄erent types, we use instrumental variable regressions. Importantly, whereas the
number of inhabitants, its logarithm and the nearby population are good instruments for both
types of contacts, population density does not pass the tests described above for visits (section
3.5.2). For the IV estimation, we thus include population density as an explanatory variable
of the number of GP visits instead of as an instrument for GP density. Table 3.5 presents
the estimated coe¢ cients of the estimation for consultations and visits respectively, with both
the OLS estimates and the IV estimates. Table 3.6 gives the corresponding Wald-tests on the
estimated coe¢ cients ￿k for both type of contacts. Note that the IV-coe¢ cients are estimated
very imprecisely.
Start by looking at the results for the number of consultations per GP. The estimated
coe¢ cients of both the OLS and the IV estimation put forward evidence of both availability
e⁄ects (or downward demand management) amongst markets with the 20% lowest GP density
and inducement e⁄ects in the markets with a high GP density (group 4 and 5). The results of
the IV estimation deserve some further attention. Although the e⁄ect is only signi￿cant at a
10% signi￿cance level, we ￿nd a positive impact of GP density on per GP consumption of care.30
30The e⁄ect of GP density on the number of per GP consultations remains signi￿cant under di⁄erent combi-
nations and the exclusion and inclusions of instruments.
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In other words, per capita consumption of GP care increases more than proportionally with
increases in GP density. For the markets of group 5, this is no longer the case: at most, there
is a proportional increase in per capita consumption. Our discussion on the possible impact of
GP density on information asymmetry can provide an interpretation for this: the lower degree
of information asymmetry on consultations in markets of group 5 compared to group 4 markets
can limit the extent to which GPs induce demand. In other words, the increase in the number
of providers decreases the degree of information asymmetry in the market, as in line with the
conjecture that patients are searching for a perfect agent. That is, when there are more close
competitors, it is easier for a patient to ￿nd a benchmark for the behavior of his GP, which
decreases information asymmetry and thus increases the risk of detection of inducing behavior of
GPs. Note that we at least ￿nd no evidence of the e⁄ect suggested by the consumer information
model of Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981). The increase in the number of competitors does not
seem to increase the information asymmetry in the market, as this would increase the incentives
to induce even more demand.
For visits during working hours, the results of the OLS estimation and the IV estimation
di⁄er. The OLS estimates indicate a positive relation between per capita consumption and GP
density in group 1- and group 5-markets. Consistent with the model, this indicates the presence
of availability and/or downward demand management and inducement e⁄ects. We however
expected to ￿nd no availability e⁄ect for visits as the GP incurs the transportation costs. Our
results for group 1-markets thus indicate the presence of important consumers costs associated
to waiting or that GPs actively reduce the demand for visits in these markets with a low GP
density, with the latter case more probable explanation (Boerma and Groenewegen 2001). The
IV estimates on the other hand indicate no impact of GP density on per GP consumption,
except for markets of group 5. First, there is no evidence of an availability e⁄ect. Second,
there is a positive e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consumption in high density market.
Remark that we control for population density when estimating of the number of visits per
GP. Therefore, our ￿ndings cannot be explained by a substitution from visits to consultations
triggered by the lower population density (and thus the high distances) in markets of group
5.31
31As we also estimate a constant term per group, the argument that GPs complete more visits in higher density
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The results on the impact of supply controls are in line with the results for the total con-
sumption of GP care. An accredited GP performs more consultations and visits and also the
experience level of GPs a⁄ects the number of both contact types. However, the percentage of
female physicians (-) and of very experienced GPs (+) has only a signi￿cant impact on the
number of visits.
We ￿nd di⁄erent e⁄ects of market controls on per GP consumption of the di⁄erent types of
contacts. More precisely, we can attribute the e⁄ects on the total number of contacts mostly
to one of the types. There is however a striking di⁄erences in the e⁄ect of the percentage
of kids (under the age of 10). Whereas there is signi￿cantly less demand for consultations
when the proportion of this age category is high, there is signi￿cantly more demand for visits
(i.e. parents mainly go to the paediatrician with their young children, but specialists generally
do not perform visits). The negative impact of the percentage young is attributed to fewer
visits compared to adults, whereas the elderly population only negatively a⁄ects the number of
consultations of GPs. For the other market-level e⁄ects, the impact on total contacts of GPs
can be attributed to consultations for the region of Flanders (+) and the number of hospital
beds (-), whereas the number of beds in rest and nursing homes (-), the mean income level (-),
the unemployment rate (+), the percentage of foreigners (-) and the region of Brussels (-) have
their impact on the number of GP visits.
In conclusion, the estimation results indicate that GPs use both types of contacts to induce
demand. However, GPs seem to resort to inducing consultations more and possibly more quickly
(in the sense of less competitive pressure) than to inducing visits. We also ￿nd some indication
of downward demand management by GPs and of an information e⁄ect in the market that
limits the possibility of further inducing consultations. This can be due to patients looking for
a perfect agent, so that the information asymmetry in the market decreases with the increase
in the number of providers.
markets because they simply have the time for it is not explaining our results on inducing behavior.
1013.6. Type of contacts
Table 3.5: Estimation results of simultaneous cross-section analysis on the number of di⁄erent
types of contacts per GP (2001)
Consultations Visits
OLS IV OLS IV
Coe⁄. (St.E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.)
E⁄ect of GP density
￿1 -0.078 (0.16) 0.453 (0.57) -0.145 (0.19) -0.289 (0.78)
￿2 -0.540 (0.39) -2.023 (2.80) -0.895 (0.66) 7.756 (9.70)
￿3 -0.597￿￿ (0.23) 3.529 (4.59) -0.488 (0.38) -0.927 (7.89)
￿4 0.227 (0.43) 5.004￿ (2.58) 0.191 (0.73) -0.511 (2.92)
￿5 0.097 (0.11) -0.166 (0.40) -0.384 (0.27) 1.131 (0.82)
Supply Control variables
accr 1.069￿￿￿ (0.04) 1.067￿￿￿ (0.04) 2.184￿￿￿ (0.08) 2.202￿￿￿ (0.08)
agree -0.182￿￿ (0.09) -0.169 (0.11) 0.492￿￿￿ (0.16) 0.365 (0.23)
fem -0.170 (0.10) -0.157 (0.13) -0.716￿￿￿ (0.18) -0.622￿￿￿ (0.22)
exp1020yrs 0.243￿￿ (0.10) 0.257￿￿ (0.11) 0.707￿￿￿ (0.17) 0.803￿￿￿ (0.21)
exp+20yrs 0.098 (0.11) 0.153 (0.15) 0.800￿￿￿ (0.21) 1.059￿￿￿ (0.27)
Demand Control variables
kids -1.600 (1.14) -3.136￿ (1.66) 3.755￿ (1.91) 4.410￿￿ (2.29)
young -0.207 (1.01) -0.740 (1.32) -10.72￿￿￿ (1.77) -10.28￿￿￿ (2.46)
old -1.789￿￿ (0.73) -1.989￿￿ (0.96) -1.290 (1.37) -2.100 (1.47)
female 1.771 (1.45) 0.246 (1.75) 9.513￿￿￿ (2.32) 10.63￿￿￿ (3.00)
foreign -0.598￿￿￿ (0.22) -0.616￿￿ (0.27) -1.535￿￿￿ (0.40) -1.733￿￿￿ (0.53)
Flanders 0.210￿￿￿ (0.04) 0.180￿￿￿ (0.06) -0.158￿￿￿ (0.08) -0.099 (0.11)
Brussels -0.001 (0.08) -0.054 (0.10) -0.591￿￿￿ (0.13) -0.449￿ (0.21)
unempl -0.058 (0.62) -0.277 (0.89) 4.931￿￿￿ (1.14) 4.459￿￿ (1.69)
meaninc -0.072￿ (0.04) -0.080 (0.05) -0.241￿￿￿ (0.08) -0.293￿￿￿ (0.09)
hospbeds -0.058￿￿￿ (0.02) -0.137￿￿￿ (0.05) -0.120￿￿￿ (0.04) -0.079 (0.08)
restbeds -0.023 (0.03) 0.040 (0.04) -0.027￿￿ (0.04) -0.095 (0.10)
drugs 0.006￿ (0.00) 0.008 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01)
dens - - -0.052￿￿ (0.02) -0.030 (0.27)
￿1 6.706￿￿￿ (0.85) 6.711￿￿￿ (1.52) 2.164￿ (1.21) 1.944 (2.08)
R2 0.19 0.16 0.25 0.24
The table shows the results of the simultaneous estimation of the number of di⁄erent type of contacts
on GP level, with towns divided into ￿ve equal sized groups according to the GP density. ￿1 relates
to the towns with a GP density amongst the 20% smallest in Belgium, whereas ￿5 refers to the 20%
markets with the highest GP density. Column (1) reports the estimated coe¢ cients for the consultations,
while Column (2) gives the results for visits during working hours. IV estimation is performed using
mpop, npop5, dens and lnmpop as instruments for logarithm of GP density (lnR) in the consultation
regression and using mpop, npop5 and lnmpop for the visit regression. Standard errors are reported
between brackets. ￿;￿￿ and ￿￿￿ indicate signi￿cance at respectively a 10, 5 and 1% level.
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Table 3.6: Wald tests on the estimated coe¢ cients of the e⁄ect of GP density on number of
consultations and visits per GP for ￿ve groups of markets (2001)
OLS-estimation IV-estimation
￿k = -1 ￿k = 0 ￿k = -1 ￿k = 0
F (prob) F (prob) F (prob) F (prob)
A. Consultations
￿1 35.12 (0.000) 0.25 (0.619) 6.49 (0.011) 0.63 (0.427)
￿2 1.39 (0.240) 1.92 (0.167) 0.13 (0.715) 0.52 (0.470)
￿3 2.97 (0.085) 6.54 (0.011) 0.98 (0.323) 0.59 (0.442)
￿4 8.11 (0.005) 0.28 (0.599) 5.42 (0.020) 3.76 (0.053)
￿5 98.34 (0.000) 0.77 (0.381) 4.26 (0.039) 0.17 (0.681)
B. Visits
￿1 19.84 (0.000) 0.57 (0.450) 0.84 (0.360) 0.14 (0.710)
￿2 0.03 (0.874) 1.83 (0.177) 0.81 (0.367) 0.64 (0.424)
￿3 1.77 (0.183) 1.61 (0.205) 0.00 (0.993) 0.01 (0.907)
￿4 2.68 (0.102) 0.07 (0.793) 0.03 (0.867) 0.03 (0.861)
￿5 5.15 (0.023) 2.00 (0.158) 6.72 (0.010) 1.89 (0.169)
The Wald-tests are based on the coe¢ cient estimates of the OLS and IV estimations of equation
(3.4) for total number of contacts, as presented in Table 3.5. ￿1 gives the e⁄ect of GP density
on per GP consumption in the 20% markets with the lowest GP density of Belgium (group 1),
whereas the e⁄ect of the 20% markets with the highest GP density is represented by ￿5.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the Belgian primary care market for empirical evidence of supplier induced
demand. Using GP-level data on all registered Belgian GPs (rather than a sample), we test
whether a higher GP density results in a higher per capita consumption of GP services, due
to the behavior of the GP. Furthermore, we investigate the way GPs induce demand. That is,
do GPs employ consultations or rather visits to increase the demand for their services. Our
empirical approach is based on the utility maximization framework of Carlsen and Grytten
(1998).
The empirical analysis shows a positive relation between GP density and the number of
contacts per capita. Our results can furthermore not reject that Belgian GPs are partly re-
sponsible for this ￿nding by inducing demand for their services. If they induce demand, we ￿nd
that GPs have a preference to induce through consultations, despite the higher fee for visits. In
the margin of the analysis, we furthermore ￿nd some indication that GPs in markets with a low
GP density use their discretionary in￿ uence over the demand to reduce the number of contacts
(visits). Also, our ￿ndings seem not to support the consumer information model of Pauly and
Satterthwaite (1981) where it is conjectured that the presence of more providers increases the
information asymmetry in the market and thus the discretionary power of providers. Instead,
we ￿nd some indication of an information e⁄ect that limits the opportunities to induce demand
when competition becomes ￿erce. Note that whereas we conclude with some indication of the
presence of inducement in Belgium, it remains unclear whether the inducing behavior of GPs
decreases consumer welfare (Labelle et al 1994).
Two caveats in our analysis are worth mentioning. First, the empirical exercise is limited to
Belgian GPs. We thus only look at inducing behavior by the primary care providers, whereas
it is expected that also specialists resort to inducing behavior. Second, due to data availability
we have very little GP-speci￿c information and speci￿c information on the health status of the
population. As a result, the explanatory power of the model is limited. Do note though that
the explanatory power of the estimation in this paper does better than reference work, in which
the R2 amounts to only 0:16 (our R2 = 0:22).
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Evidence on SID by GPs in other countries has been mixed. Rossiter and Wilensky (1983)
for example ￿nds evidence of physician-initiated medical expenditures in the US, based on
market level data. Some evidence of SID is found in France by Delattre and Dormont (2003),
based on a panel data study of a sample of GPs. There also is some clear indication that
physicians in general do respond to ￿nancial incentives in the UK (Croxson et al 2001).
On the other hand, in a series of papers on Norway where the system is comparable to
the Belgian health care system, Grytten and co-authors ￿nd no empirical evidence of inducing
behavior of GPs. However, whereas the institutional setting is more or less the same, the level
of GP density is much lower in Norway. Grytten et al (1995) documents that for the 20%
Norwegian markets with the highest GP density, the average population per physician is 1;818.
In Belgium on the other hand, the 20% most GP dense markets have an average of only 496
inhabitants per GP. It might therefore be that the level of competition for which the bene￿ts of
inducing outweigh the costs of inducing is not yet reached in Norway. Put di⁄erently, if the GP
density in Belgium would be decreased to the Norwegian level, it is expected that the incentives
for GPs to induce demand will disappear.
The ￿nding of indications of GP-induced demand in Belgiium has some implications for
public health policy. To limit the extent to which GPs induce demand, regulating the number
of GPs in a local market can be a good idea. In this sense, our ￿ndings could be seen as an
argument in favour of the existence of the numerus clausus of GPs, limiting the in￿ ow in the
profession. It is however especially the recently installed project of the Flemish government to
improve the geographical spread of GPs across the country that is expected to have an impact
on inducing behavior by GPs and thus on the health expenditure. This project, named Impulseo
I, provides ￿nancial incentives to start an o¢ ce in markets with a low GP density. Secondly,
our results highlight the presence of positive consequences of the decrease in the number of
students that opt for a career as GP. Whereas the media talks about a daunting shortfall of
GPs in Belgium, limiting the inducing behavior of the GPs is an expected positive e⁄ect of this
evolution. Signi￿cantly decreasing the number of GPs however has consequences for the overall








Abstract: We propose to estimate strategic interaction e⁄ects between general practitioners (GPs) and
di⁄erent specialist types to evaluate the viability threat for specialists associated to the introduction of
a mandatory referral scheme. That is, we show that the specialists￿loss of patientele when patients can
only contact them after a GP referral has important consequences for the viability of the specialist types
whose entry decisions are strategic substitutes in GPs entry decisions.
To estimate the strategic interaction e⁄ects, we model the entry decisions of di⁄erent physician types
as an equilibrium entry game of incomplete information and sequential decision making. This model
permits identi￿cation of the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects as it does not rely on restrictive
assumptions on the underlying payo⁄ functions and allows for the strategic interaction e⁄ects to be
asymmetric in sign. At the same time, the model remains computationally tractable and allows for
su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity.
Our ￿ndings for the Belgian physician markets, in which there is no gatekeeping, indicate that entry deci-
sions of dermatologists and pediatricians are strategic substitutes in the entry decisions of GPs, whereas
the presence of gynecologists, ophthalmologists and throat, nose and ear-specialists has a positive impact
on GP payo⁄s of entry. Our results thus indicate that transition costs are likely upon the implemen-




In health systems with gatekeeping, patients can access secondary care only following a re-
ferral from their general practitioner (GP).1 Since the presence of a gatekeeper is believed to
contribute to e¢ ciency and cost containment, policy makers in countries without gatekeeping
are increasingly interested in the adoption of a mandatory referral scheme. France for example
introduced a system of non compulsory coordinated care pathways for patients in January 2005,
which includes the introduction of a preferred GP scheme and a reduction in patients￿freedom
of choice through ￿nancial incentives (HealthPolicyMonitor). Belgium and Germany recently
introduced price di⁄erences between referred specialist visits and self-referrals and ￿nancial
incentives are given to register with a preferred GP.2
The introduction of (elements of) gatekeeping however changes the entire organization of
health care provision and a⁄ects the market opportunities for health providers. As a mandatory
referral scheme restricts access to specialists, secondary care remains only available for those
patients that really require it. Whereas this explains the believed e¢ ciency bene￿t, it also
entails a possible loss in viability for the current body of specialists. That is, the specialists￿
patientele will drop to the extent that patients were using their free choice of health provider to
consume secondary care while GP care would have su¢ ced (i.e. patients wrongly self-refer). As
a result, the changing market opportunities can lead to a decrease in the number of specialists
that is sustained in the market. The related transition costs are relevant for the policy debate
on the introduction of gatekeeping. Amongst others, policy makers have to decide whether
or not to maintain the entire body of specialists through ￿nancial mechanisms or to retrain a
portion of them.3
Quantifying the extent to which di⁄erent specialist types are likely to be threatened in their
viability is however hard. Constructing a direct measure would require detailed patient-level
1To be more speci￿c, gatekeeping is present in a health care system if the following three criteria are ful￿lled:
Enrolment of patients with a speci￿ed GP for a ￿xed period of time; payment for GPs is mainly by capitation
per enrolled patient; and specialist care is usually only granted following referral by a GP (De Maeseneer et al
1999). This paper focuses on the mandatory referral scheme (element 3) in the discussion on gatekeeping.
2For the US, 70% of all Americans with health insurance were enrolled in some form of managed care plan
(Gried 2000). Several of the HMOs also practice gatekeeping. Recently, however, some HMOs have relaxed the
restrictions on access to specialists (Ferris et al 2001).
3Also, the network incentives for GPs and specialists will increase substantially, resulting in an additional
change in market conduct and market structure.
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or specialist-level data, with an objective measure of the necessity of secondary care. As this
data is not available, this paper suggests studying the strategic interaction e⁄ects of specialist
types on GP payo⁄s as a proxy of this threat.4
But the nature of the strategic interactions between general practitioners and specialists is
a priori not clear. That is, there are arguments for both complementarity and substitutability
of their services. On the one hand, GPs and specialists are intended to be complementary: the
GP is trained to have a very broad knowledge on all current medical problems and can refer the
more complicated and more care intensive cases to specialists, who are in turn better trained
in specialized ￿elds. GPs thus bene￿t from the presence of a specialist as they can refer when
it would otherwise require a lot of e⁄ort to treat the patient. We refer to this as the referral
e⁄ect. On the other hand, to some extent GPs and specialists deliver the same services, i.e.
they diagnose patients and propose (and possibly perform) a treatment. Mainly when patients
can choose freely among health providers, specialists are competing for patients with GPs.5
This is referred to as the competition e⁄ect. Whereas GPs bene￿t from the option to refer,
they thus also risk that patients visit the specialist directly. This is especially detrimental for
GPs when it concerns health problems GPs can treat at reasonable costs. With both e⁄ects
present, it is not clear a priori whether the referral or the competition e⁄ect dominates the
strategic interactions between GPs and di⁄erent specialist types. Furthermore, this critically
depends on the type of specialist and the regulatory framework in which health professionals
are active.
We argue that specialist types whose presence currently has a negative impact on GP payo⁄s
are most likely to experience viability problems upon the introduction of a mandatory referral
scheme. That is, the negative e⁄ect indicates that the competition e⁄ect dominates the referral
e⁄ect. Furthermore, it shows that many patients self-refer to specialists while often specialist
care is not required. This is exactly the ￿ ow of patients that is excluded under a mandatory
referral scheme.
4Throughout the paper, we assume that only GPs will be assigned as gatekeepers. Gynecologists and pedi-
atricians are thus not allowed to act as the primary care doctor for certain population groups. A US study by
Kirk et al (1998) indicates that only a minority of gynecologists identify themselves as primary care providers.
5Newhouse (1990): "In reality, however, there is a certain amount of competition among specialties; this is
perhaps most apparent between a general (or family) practitioner, on the one hand, and a general internist (or
general pediatrician) on the other hand, but almost all specialists perform some services or procedures that other
specialists also perform." (p.211)
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To infer whether the competition or the referral e⁄ect dominates the strategic interaction
of di⁄erent specialist types with GPs, we model their entry decisions as a strategic game in
the tradition of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) and Mazzeo (2002). The paper proposes the use
of a sequential incomplete information game to answer the research question. These modeling
assumptions avoid issues of non-existence of equilibria in case the strategic interaction e⁄ects are
asymmetric in sign. They furthermore avoid restrictions on the underlying payo⁄function with
respect to the e⁄ect of other-type ￿rms, while allowing for su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity. Contrary
to most models in the literature, our model thus has the appropriate ￿ exibility to identify the
nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects, while it remains computationally tractable. We apply
the structural entry model to the Belgian physician markets, which are characterized by free
choice of physician and a fee-for-service system. We simultaneously estimate the drivers of
pro￿tability and strategic interaction e⁄ects for GPs and di⁄erent specialist types.
Our results indicate that specialist types bene￿t from the presence of GPs in the market.
On the other hand, the e⁄ect of specialists on GP payo⁄s depends on the specialization ￿eld.
Dermatologists and pediatricians have a negative impact on GP payo⁄s, while the entry deci-
sions of gynecologists, ophthalmologists and throat, nose and ear-specialists (TNE) are strategic
complements to the entry decision of GPs. No signi￿cant e⁄ect is found for psychiatrists and
physiologists. Our ￿ndings therefore indicate that dermatologists and pediatricians attract a lot
of patients for whom GP care would su¢ ce, while the patientele of gynecologists, ophthalmolo-
gists and TNE-specialists either get referred or correctly self-refer to these specialist types. We
thus expect considerable transition costs when gatekeeping would be introduced in the Belgian
care system. Especially dermatologists and pediatricians are likely to experience a fall in the
demand for their services, which can result in viability problems.
There is a large literature that evaluates the e¢ ciency gains and the quality or budget e⁄ects
of the presence of a gatekeeper in health care systems (Kulu-Glasgow et al 1998, Delnoij et al
2000, Gerdtham and J￿nsson 2000, Ferris et al 2001, Brekke et al 2007). This paper deviates
from the literature as we instead start from the observation that several European countries
(e.g. Germany, France and Belgium) are currently introducing elements of gatekeeping. Policy
makers seem to be convinced that the arguments in favor of gatekeeping outweigh the possi-
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ble negative e⁄ects. Although we perform no welfare analysis, we want to increase awareness
of the transition costs that accompany the change in the health care system due to changing
market opportunities for health providers. Our analysis is furthermore related to the literature
on managed care (Glied 2000) and physician behavior, such as on the referral practice of GPs
(Marinoso and Jelovac 2003), on the degree of specialization in the care markets (Baumgard-
ner 1988, Newhouse 1990) and on the competitive behavior between experts and non-experts
(Bouckaert and Degryse 2000).
The methodology used in this paper contributes to the growing literature on equilibrium
models of entry. Traditionally, the focus of modeling entry decisions of di⁄erent ￿rm types
has been on questions of product di⁄erentiation: are ￿rm payo⁄s a⁄ected to the same extent
by the entry of other-type ￿rms as they are by the entry of same-type ￿rms? The literature
provides a wide range of applications such as on the competition between airlines (Berry 1992,
Ciliberto and Tamer 2004), between motels (Mazzeo 2002) and between banks (Cohen and
Mazzeo 2007). There are only few examples that cover positive strategic interaction e⁄ects, i.e.
strategic complementarity (Sweeting 2007, Schaumans and Verboven 2008). The current paper
distinguishes itself from previous work as it is a priori not clear how the strategic interaction
e⁄ects are characterized. As a result, we do not follow the common practice of making restrictive
assumptions on the e⁄ect on payo⁄s of other-type ￿rms to construct a well-de￿ned likelihood
function. That is, we do not restrict the strategic interaction e⁄ects to be negative or positive.
Furthermore, we do not impose the interaction e⁄ects to be symmetric in sign. The latter is
needed as we can not exclude that e.g. GPs are strategic complements for specialists￿payo⁄s,
while these specialists are strategic substitutes in the entry decision of GPs.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 4.2 by discussing the characteristics
of the organization of health care markets in Belgium and issues of gatekeeping. We explain
how identi￿cation of strategic interaction e⁄ects between physician types translates into the
probability of viability issues upon the introduction of gatekeeping. Section 4.3 presents the
entry model to determine the strategic interaction e⁄ects and discusses the particular strengths
of the model given the research question. Section 4.4 follows with the data description and
the empirical implementation of the equilibrium model to the Belgian physician markets. The
results of the analyses are presented and discussed in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 The Organization of Health care Markets
Before introducing the equilibrium model of entry to identify strategic interaction e⁄ects be-
tween GPs and di⁄erent specialist types, we brie￿ y discuss the characteristics and the organiza-
tion of the primary and secondary health care in Belgium. We focus on the entry requirements,
the conduct and the interaction between physician types. We continue with some background
on the literature on gatekeeping and focus on providing additional intuition on how the estima-
tion of an entry model is of interest for the discussion on the introduction of mandatory referral
schemes.
4.2.1 The Belgian Health care Market
The delivery of health care in Belgium is mainly private and based on the principles of inde-
pendent medical practice. The Belgian health care market is characterized by a high physician
density. For 2005, we account for the presence of one GP per 859 inhabitants. Furthermore,
for a total population of about ten million there are close to 40;000 active physicians (GPs and
specialists), which makes Belgium the second most physician dense country of Europe, after
Greece (OECD Health Data). The high availability of medical care is also associated with a
high consumption level of care services: Belgians on average have 4:6 contacts with a GP and
2:3 contacts with specialists per year.
Entry into the medical professions is conditional on minimum educational standards (licens-
ing). First of all, because of the high physician density in Belgium, the government decided
in 1998 to limit the in￿ ow of professionals. This regulation is transposed in the Flemish re-
gion (North) to restrictions on the in￿ ow of students for medical studies, whereas the Walloon
region (South) opted for a limitation further in the educational cycle. All medical students
start with a six-year program, which covers the basics for all physician types, followed by a
one-year introduction to the preferred specialization, which mostly consists of internships. Af-
ter this initial period of seven years, medical students start their study of a specialty to obtain
a license to practise: such ￿elds of specialization include e.g. general medicine, gynecology
and dermatology. Again, there exists a restriction on the number of students that can start in
each specialization ￿eld. These further studies consist of two years of internships and seminars
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for GPs and on average 5 years of study and internships for the di⁄erent specialist types. It
should be noted that retraining to another specialization ￿eld is very rare: also retraining from
a specialist type to a GP requires additional study. Apart from these educational requirements
and some administration, entry in the Belgian physician markets is free. That is, a certi￿ed
and registered physician of any type can choose to locate an o¢ ce anywhere in Belgium.6
Most GPs operate solo, frequently without any sta⁄ except perhaps a medical secretary.7
GPs typically perform a combination of open o¢ ce hours, appointments and home visits. Fur-
thermore, most GPs are enrolled in a local system of night and weekend duty to ensure availabil-
ity of primary care at all times. Specialists are on the other hand often associated to hospitals.
However, some ￿elds of specializations do not necessarily require the hospital environment for
their services, which results in a situation in which specialists have several o¢ ces: one within the
hospital and a private practice. Depending on the type, patients therefore often visit specialists
outside the hospital: this is especially the case for dermatologists, pediatricians, ophthalmolo-
gists and gynecologists (about 50% of all specialist visits). In this context, specialists typically
perform consultations on appointment.
Both GPs and specialists are in general remunerated through fee-for-service payment where
fee levels are set at the national level by the Convention Committee of the mutualities and
physicians. As a result, a drop in workload directly translates into a decrease of income.
The fee-for-service system furthermore prevents price competition amongst physicians of the
same type. A consultation with a specialist is however substantially more expensive than a
GP contact: in January 2005, patients￿copayment for a consultation was 3:29e with a GP,
while the patient pays on average more than 10e for a specialist contact. Although there is no
price competition and furthermore self-regulation traditionally prevented physicians to compete
through advertising, physicians do however have a wide range of other instruments they can
6This is in contrast to the regulation in some neighboring countries. In The Netherlands and Germany, there is
regulation on the number of physicians per local market. Belgium has similar regulation for the pharmacy market.
Adjustments to the entry model for these entry restrictions for the study of these markets are demonstrated in
Schaumans and Verboven (2008).
775% of the population indicates visiting a GP that operates solo (WIV 2006). The percentage of GPs
working solo is expected to be a bit higher than this. Note that there are centers, known as integrated health
care practices, which operate as a multidisciplinary team. The number of such practices is growing, although
there is still only a small minority of people a¢ liated to them. Our dataset however does not allow us to identify
them.
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use to compete with: quality of treatment, time spend on a consultation, availability, home
visits (for GPs), waiting time and so on.
The Belgian health care system does not include a gatekeeping role for GPs. Neither referral
nor enrolment system is in place. There is free choice of physician and since the functions and
roles of most health care personnel have not been clearly de￿ned, specialists often form the ￿rst
point of contact. Therefore, as discussed in the introduction, GPs bene￿t from the presence
of specialists as they can refer to them, but at the same time their presence is a source of
competition. Note that for specialists, referrals are likely to be less costly as the initial tests
have already been performed and the health problem is very likely to match the specialist￿ s
expertise.
A study by WIV (2006) on the utilization of medical services in Belgium reports that about
6% of GP contacts end in a referral to a specialist. The bulk of specialist contacts concerns
follow-ups: only 31% of specialist contacts are new, compared to 82% for GPs. Furthermore,
about 55% of these new contacts occur on the patient￿ s own initiative. However, there is a large
di⁄erence according to the type of specialist: for contacts to dermatologists (gynecologists),
patients initiate 68% (67%) of the contacts, whereas for internists or (neuro-) psychiatrists
only resp. 41% and 26% of the contacts are self-referrals. The high frequency of self-referred
specialist contacts suggests that specialists are responsible for limiting the demand for GP
services. We however have no indication on the character of the complaint and thus on whether
or not a GP would be able to treat these patients. A study in the Netherlands, one of Belgium￿ s
neighboring countries, though indicates that patients self-refer for medical complaints for which
they expect to end up at the specialist anyway and when the problem is considered to be speci￿c
for the specialist (Kulu-Glasgow et al 1998). Remember that patients do have an incentive to
contact a GP for general or minor health concerns, instead of a specialist because of the price
di⁄erence.
Containment of health expenditure has been on the political agenda since the eighties and
in 1993, some initiatives were launched to serve this purpose: amongst others there was a
signi￿cant increase of copayment. But with the challenges of ageing and the development
of expensive new medical techniques, initiatives on cost containment and e¢ ciency remain
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important. In 1999, the Belgian authorities started with ￿nancial incentives for patients to
participate in a system of enrolment with a preferred GP. Over the ￿rst ￿ve years, more than
30% of the population already enrolled. Moreover, in 2004, 95% of the population indicates
having a regular GP (WIV 2006) and a 2001-survey of one of the Belgian mutualities indicates
that 75% of the patientele of a GP is loyal to his/her GP.8 This indicates that the majority
of patients seem not to be ￿ shopping around￿as far as GP care is concerned. Secondly, as of
February 1st, 2007 a specialist contact that is not initiated by a GP referral has become more
expensive for the patient, although the price di⁄erence of 5e is only valid for one visit per year.9
It is thus clear that initial steps towards a gatekeeping system are taken, while the debate on
implementing a full gatekeeping system is still ongoing.
The characteristics of the Belgian health care markets motivate the modeling assumptions
made in the entry model presented in section 4.3. First, because of the educational requirements
in the physician markets, each ￿rm knows its type before the entry game starts. Entrants
therefore make no type choice. Furthermore, although licensing limits the total number of
potential physician entrants, the lack of restrictions on the number of entrants in a local market
implies that the pool of entrants for a speci￿c local market is large.10 Second, since the majority
of GPs still operate in a solo-practice and because data availability prevents identifying those
physicians connected to a group or hospital, we treat all entry decisions as individual decisions.
The presence of hospitals will however be an important indicator for the pro￿tability of mainly
specialist types.
4.2.2 Gatekeeping
Gatekeeping delegates the responsibility of the use of all secondary care to GPs through their
referral behavior (Scott 2000). As such, GPs are in charge of e⁄ectively and e¢ ciently guiding
8Loyalty is here de￿ned as not having any contacts with any other GP throughout the year. (Socialistische
Mutualiteit, ￿ Flits￿Oktober 2001).
9De Artsenkrant, No. 87 (31/01/2007). Note that because we are working on data prior to the introduction
of the fee-di⁄erential related to a referral, the model is able to capture the way specialists and GPs interact in
the absence of gatekeeping.
10To the extent that there are too few licensed physicians to cover the di⁄erent geographic markets, the model
changes in the constant term: the positive payo⁄ condition to trigger entry is then replaced by the condition of
payo⁄s higher than the best alternative. This is just a matter of normalization of the outside option.
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patients through the health care system. The introduction of gatekeeping is therefore believed
to make the use of secondary care more e¢ cient. That is, an informed player (the GP) decides
on the use of the expertise of specialists rather than patients, who are subject to uncertainty,
asymmetric information and moral hazard (Arrow 1963). Furthermore, as the GP becomes
the primary coordinator and communicator, the enhanced long run relationship can further
increase e¢ ciency as it allows taking the more general background of the patient into account.
Gatekeeping is also believed to contribute to cost control, as it prevents wasteful duplication
of diagnostic tests and unnecessary use of expensive secondary care (Franks et al 1992). These
possible cost (quality) and e¢ ciency gains of a gatekeeping role for GPs make legislators prone
to implement it in their health system.11
Although the arguments in favor of gatekeeping seem convincing, there is actually little
empirical evidence for the believed e¢ ciency and cost bene￿ts. For example, Barros (1998)
and Delnoij et al (2000) both ￿nd that the magnitude of health expenditure is not a⁄ected by
the presence of a gatekeeping role. The only e⁄ect they can account for is a slower increase in
the costs (for ambulatory care) in time. Ferris et al (2001) ￿nd little evidence of substantial
changes in the use of specialty services by US HMO members in the ￿rst 18 months after
abolishing gatekeeping and Nivel (2003) indicates that gatekeepers are in general not better
informed about their patients.12 Brekke et al (2007) furthermore suggests that gatekeeping
can be associated with overspecialization and excessive quality competition and survey results
indicate a lack of support by patients and physicians for the introduction of gatekeeping. Also
the danger of diagnostic delay is used as an argument against the introduction of gatekeeping.
11A bit simpli￿ed, more or less half of the Western-European countries do restrict access to secondary care by
referral (UK, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal), whereas the other half do
not delegate this role to their GPs (Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Greece and
Austria). The United States is characterized by a mixed system, depending on the patient￿ s choice of health
insurance. Patients that are enrolled in an HMO are generally monitored by a gatekeeper, whereas patients that
choose to sign in on a PPO have direct access to all care. However, several HMO￿ s in the US are gradually
opening up access to specialist care for their enrolled patients (e.g. Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates).
Source: CESifo 2000 DICE, Boerma 2003.
12Evidence on the general health outcomes would be instructive in the discussion but is hard to come by. There
is some indirect evidence that gatekeeping has a positive e⁄ect on health outcomes in Macinko et al (2003). Here
it is shown that countries with a strong primary care system (Primary Care score test) are more successful
in preventing mortality. Since countries with gatekeeping generally have a stronger primary care system, the
positive relation might carry through (Gress et al 2004).
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An additional argument against the implementation of gatekeeping concerns costs related to
altering an existing care system based on free choice towards a system with mandatory referrals.
One such transition cost is directly related to the viability of the active professionals.
In a system with free choice, a patient can visit a specialist or a GP, irrespective of whether
or not he/she requires specialist care. In case the patient needs specialist care, the GP will
refer the patient to the appropriate specialist. The choice of directly contacting a specialist
reduces transaction costs in case the patient would end up with this specialist type either way,
but holds the risk of paying a higher fee than necessary (when one could have been treated by
the GP) or the risk of delay or a wrong treatment (when the patient visits the wrong type of
specialist). With the introduction of gatekeeping, the option of directly visiting the specialist
is excluded. All patients visit the GP in a ￿rst instance and only those that need specialist care
are redirected to the appropriate specialist type. This implies that specialists loose a part of
their patientele: those patients that only need GP care will no longer end up in the specialist￿ s
o¢ ce. In case specialists are paid according to a fee-for-service system, this drop in patientele
directly a⁄ects their pro￿tability. And to the extent that this ￿ ow of patients is important,
the changing market opportunities due to the installment of a gatekeeper a⁄ect the viability of
specialists and therefore reduces the total number of specialists that can operate in the market.
This argument is in line with survey results from Germany where specialists indicate to fear
￿nancial losses due to gatekeeping (Gress et al 2004).
For insights on the likelihood of these viability issues for a specialist type, we rely on the
strategic interaction e⁄ect of this type of specialists on the entry decision of GPs. This strategic
interaction e⁄ect captures whether GP payo⁄s are increasing or rather decreasing in the number
of specialists in the market. To facilitate the discussion, take for now that GP payo⁄s are given
by variable pro￿ts minus ￿xed costs:
￿GP = q ￿ S ￿ (p ￿ mc) ￿ F
with q the average number of patient￿ s contacts with a GP, S the total number of patients, p
the ￿xed fee, mc the average marginal cost of a contact and F the ￿xed costs. GP payo⁄s are
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a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways by the presence of specialists. First, it allows GPs to refer complicated
or care intensive cases which reduces the average marginal costs of treatment for the GP (mc). In
general, payo⁄s are thus higher when specialists are present in the market, due to the referral
e⁄ect.13 Second though, patients can contact the specialist instead of the GP (competition
e⁄ect). This implies a drop of the average number of contacts a patient has with the GP (q).
However, when patients self-select and only go to the specialist directly when they actually need
specialist care, the drop in the number of contacts is associated with a drop in GP marginal
costs. It is therefore especially when most patients wrongly diagnose themselves as in need of
specialist care that GP payo⁄s will decrease due to the competition e⁄ect. That is, average
marginal costs do not drop, while patients contact the GP less frequently.
When GP payo⁄s are increasing in the number of specialists of a certain type, the bene￿ts of
referrals outweigh the costs of competition (strategic complementarity). Patients that require
the care of these specialists thus mainly access secondary care through the GP (high referral
e⁄ect) and only few patients misdiagnose themselves in their self-referred visits to specialists
(low competition e⁄ect). On the other hand, payo⁄s decreasing in the number of specialists of
a type indicate that the competition e⁄ect dominates the referral e⁄ect (strategic substitutes).
Patients access secondary care primarily through self-referral (or more precisely, GPs rarely
need to refer patients to this specialist type), while many of them don￿ t require specialist care
(high competition e⁄ect).
Again, the introduction of a mandatory referral scheme excludes the possibility of patients
to access secondary care directly. All patients that previously visited specialists while GP care
would have su¢ ced will no longer be part of the specialist￿ s patientele. Given the previous
discussion, we know that this will especially threaten the viability of those specialist types that
negatively a⁄ect GP payo⁄s. That is, for these specialist types, the loss of patientele will be
substantial.
13Whereas the number of visits of these patients to the GP drops, the availability of the GP increases, which
could counterbalance the drop in number of visits. That is, other patients visit the GP more frequently as the
shadow price of care (=monetary+transportation costs+waiting costs) decreases.
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4.3 Entry Model
In this section, we present a static entry model to estimate the strategic interaction e⁄ects
between specialist types and GPs. This allows us to determine whether the competition e⁄ect
or the referral e⁄ect dominates the impact of specialist types on GP payo⁄s. In turn, this is
instructive for the likelihood of viability threats for a specialist type once gatekeeping is intro-
duced: the pro￿tability of mainly specialist types whose entry decisions are strategic substitutes
for the entry decision of GPs will be a⁄ected (section 4.2.2).
We propose to model the entry decisions of the di⁄erent types of physicians as a sequential
game of incomplete information with ￿rm heterogeneity: ￿rms have private information about
their payo⁄s in a market and the types make their entry decisions in a pre-speci￿ed order.
We start this section by introducing the model set up, ￿rm behavior and the equilibrium of
the game. This is followed by a discussion on the choice of the modeling assumptions: the
model is especially designed to identify the signs of strategic interaction e⁄ects, while allowing
for su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity and asymmetric strategic interaction e⁄ects. We contrast our
model mainly to models of complete information.
4.3.1 The Empirical Model
The empirical model to tackle our research question is closest related to the incomplete infor-
mation game in Einav (2003). In a study to explain the observed demand patterns in the movie
industry, Einav presents a sequential game of incomplete information to explain the timing
decision of movie distributors: Each ￿rm makes a zero/one decision for the ￿ entry￿of the movie
in a time horizon. Our model di⁄ers in two respects. First, in our setting ￿rms make decisions
to enter geographic markets. The unit of observation is therefore a local market as opposed
to a point in time. Second and more importantly, the setting of Einav concerns few potential
entrants with observable heterogeneity, for which he considers the timing decision separately.
This paper on the other hand groups physicians into homogeneous types and looks at the ag-
gregate decision of each physician type. We thus study the equilibrium number of entrants per
type, which increases the dimensionality of the model. We subsequently present ￿rm payo⁄s
of entering the market and the assumptions of the game and discuss ￿rm behavior and the
conditions under which a market structure is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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Set-up and payo⁄s
Let the set of players in market m be grouped in T types, with Ft potential ￿rms of type t
(t 2 [1;T]). The action space of all players consists of entering or not entering the market.
Following the discussion in section 4.2.1 (and as in Einav 2003), ￿rms are considered to be
individual decision makers and are not ex ante the same.14 Each ￿rm knows its type before the
entry game starts and all types have a large pool of potential entrants. We denote GPs as ￿rms
of type 1 and the di⁄erent specialist types are assigned type 2 to type T. While payo⁄s of not
entering the market are normalized to zero, we represent payo⁄s of a ￿rm f of type t entering
market m by the following reduced form:
￿m
f;t = ￿ ￿t(Xm;nm
1 ;:::;nm
t ) ￿ "m
f;t








Firm payo⁄s depend on market characteristics (Xm, such as the number of inhabitants) and
the entry decisions of other ￿rms. Type-speci￿c coe¢ cients allow for the payo⁄s to vary across
types. Furthermore, payo⁄s vary across (same-type) ￿rms because of ￿rm-speci￿c characteris-
tics. These ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics are assumed to be unobserved by both the researcher
and other ￿rms ("m
f;i), although the distribution of the random variable of which the private
information is a realization is known by all players.15 Since ￿rms of the same type are therefore
observationally the same, the exact identity of the entrants of a type is irrelevant for pay-
o⁄s. Instead, payo⁄s are a⁄ected by the realized number of entrants of the di⁄erent types in
the market (nm
1 ;:::;nm
T ). Consistent with the existing literature, same-type ￿rms are strategic
substitutes, so that payo⁄s are decreasing in the number of ￿rms of the own type: ￿t < 0.16
14This is in contrast with for example Mazzeo (2002), where ￿rms make both an entry decision and a type
decision. In his setting, all ￿rms are ex ante homogenous.
15The ￿rm-level error can be interpreted as both non-strategic considerations that make some players more
likely to choose to enter this speci￿c market or as an optimization error (Einav 2003).
16Note that we use this assumption in deriving the equilibrium behavior of the ￿rms, but do not restrict the
related coe¢ cient in the estimation procedure. Instead, the data demonstrates this competitive e⁄ect.
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For the e⁄ect on payo⁄s of the number of entrants of other types, we make a simplifying
assumption:
￿tj = 0 8t 6= 1;j 6= 1
It is assumed that payo⁄s of all specialist types (t 6= 1) are a⁄ected only by the number of
own-type rivals and by the number of GPs in the market. In other words, the entry decisions
of ￿rms of di⁄erent specialist types are independent from each other, at least in ￿rst order:
there remain some indirect e⁄ects between specialist types through their simultaneous e⁄ect on
the GP market. The restriction on the strategic interaction e⁄ects reduces the computational
burden of the model to a considerable extent, so that it allows for the estimation of a high
degree of ￿rm heterogeneity. Given the characteristics of the application, the assumption is not
strong: specialists rarely refer patients directly to other specialist types.17;18 Note that GPs￿
payo⁄s (type 1) on the other hand are a⁄ected by the number of physicians of all types.
In contrast to most of the existing empirical literature, we make no assumptions on the
signs of the strategic interaction e⁄ects. Instead, estimation of the model will yield insights on
this. A negative e⁄ect (￿tj < 0) indicates that the entry decisions of type-j ￿rms are strategic
substitutes to the entry decision of ￿rms of type t: the entry of a type-j ￿rm in the market yields
an additional competitive e⁄ect. A positive e⁄ect (￿tj > 0) on the contrary implies strategic
complementarity in the entry decisions for ￿rms of type t as payo⁄s of entering a market increase
in the number of other-type ￿rms. Furthermore, the strategic interaction e⁄ects between any
two types of ￿rms are allowed to be asymmetric, both in magnitude (￿12 6= ￿21) and in sign
(￿12 < 0 & ￿21 > 0). The latter is a particular strength of the model and worth elaborating
on: for expositional reasons we delay the discussion to section 4.3.2. Remark that the current
17The restriction is more severe within the context of a hospital in which specialists do ￿ refer￿to each other.
As our dataset does not allow us to identify which specialists are associated to which hospital, we can however
not control for this. The number of hospital beds will however be taken up as an explanatory variable in the
estimation of the model, to partly control for this.
18In case the application does not allow to make similar simplifying assumptions on the strategic interaction
e⁄ects, the researcher has to go back to a (T + 1)-stage game, in which a precise order is speci￿ed (see Einav
2003 for the consequences).
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application cannot exclude the possibility of this asymmetry in sign: whereas specialists are
expected to be positively a⁄ected by the entry decision of GPs, the competitive e⁄ect can
dominate the strategic e⁄ect of a specialist type on GP payo⁄s.
With ￿rms￿payo⁄s of entering market m at hand, we model their entry decisions as a
strategic three-stage game: in the ￿rst stage, all potential entrants of type 1 simultaneously
make their entry decisions. In the second stage, type-2 to type-T players simultaneously decide
on entry. When all potential entrants made their entry decisions, all ￿rms that have entered
market m interact with each other and payo⁄s are realized.
Two remarks are in place. First, the assumption that GPs make their entry choices ￿rst
is motivated by the consideration that a GP￿ s patientele is mainly trust-based and very local
whereas this is rather reputation-based in the specialists￿markets. As such, GPs sunk costs
of entering a speci￿c local market and therefore their commitment power is higher.19 Second,
because of the assumption on the strategic independence of specialists types, the simultaneous
entry stage for all specialist types (stage 2) yields the exact same market equilibrium as a game
in which the di⁄erent types would enter sequentially in a pre-speci￿ed order: the second stage
would then consist of (T ￿ 1) stages (see Einav 2003).
Firm behavior and Equilibrium
As payo⁄s contain a private information component, ￿rms make entry decisions based on their
expected payo⁄s of entry. Each ￿rm forms its expectation on payo⁄s using all observable
information in the market and the private realization of its unobservables, together with a
conjecture on the actions of all other ￿rms. Note that the choice behavior depends only on the
expected actions of other ￿rms and not on the exact realizations of the unobservables of the
other ￿rms (as is the case in complete information games). Using this information, each ￿rm
decides whether or not to enter the local market m. Since ￿rms are assumed to be rational
19This is in contrast with the general argument that material investments to enter a market as a specialist are
higher. Note though that these costs are not market-speci￿c. To the extent that specialists are mainly associated
to hospitals, their sunk costs can be higher, which would justify a reverse order of play. The current sequence of
entry decisions is however convenient as it reduces computational burden in the presence of more than two types.
Finally, note that instead of making an assumption on the sequence of entry, Einav (2003) allows to estimate the
likelihood of the di⁄erent orders of play. This however requires that the dataset is very rich.
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payo⁄s maximizers, ￿rms enter when they deem it to be pro￿table. Therefore, in the long run,
the equilibrium market structure in market m consists of the maximum number of ￿rms that
is viable, given their product di⁄erentiation.
Firms furthermore decide according to a pre-speci￿ed order of play: GPs (type 1) are the
￿rst-movers while the di⁄erent specialist types simultaneously decide in the second stage of the
game. As a result, the model can be solved backwardly for its perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(Einav 2003).
Second stage
In the second stage of the game, type-1 ￿rms have already made their entry decisions and the Ft
potential entrants of the other types t (t 2 [2;T]) now simultaneously decide on entry in market
m. They use all available information and thus condition their choice behavior on the observed
number of type-1 entrants (N1 = nm
1 ). Furthermore, the entry decisions are independent across
type. Given the payo⁄ speci￿cation in (4.1), ￿rms of type 2 to type T thus base their entry
decision on the following conditional expected payo⁄s of entering market m:
E(￿m
f;tjnm
1 ) = E (￿ ￿t(Xm;nm
1 ;Nt)) ￿ "m
f;t
= ￿tXm + ￿tE(Ntjnm
1 ) + ￿t1nm
1 ￿ "m
f;t (4.2)
For notational convenience, we often refer to the deterministic part of these expected condi-
tional payo⁄s as E (￿ ￿m
t jnm
1 ). With all other determinants of payo⁄s observed, type-t ￿rms
only conjecture on the choice behavior of their own-type rivals to form their expected payo⁄s.
Each individual type-t ￿rm enters the market when its private information realization allows
pro￿table entry, given the expected market structure: E(￿ ￿m
t jnm
1 ) ￿ "m
f;t.
As payo⁄s of all ￿rms of the same type are observationally symmetric and the distribution
of the private information is common knowledge (G), all ￿rms of type t have in equilibrium the
same conjecture on the number of entrants of its type in market m. That is, ￿rm f￿ s conjectured
probability of a rival ￿rm g entering the market is the same as the probability of any other
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1 )).20 This also
implies that the probability of being viable in a market with (nm
1 ;nm
t ) entrants is the same for
all ￿rms of type t. As a result, the probability that the equilibrium market structure consists
of nm
t entrants of type t coincides with the probability that a single ￿rm is pro￿table (and thus
enters) given this market structure but would not be pro￿table in the presence of an additional
competitor (i.e. nm
t +1 entrants). For any realization of the number of type-1 ￿rms (N1 = nm
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Potential entrants of type 1 make their entry decisions ￿rst and decide based on their expected
payo⁄s of entering market m. In contrast to the second movers, type-1 ￿rms conjecture on the
choice behavior of their own-type rivals and of the ￿rms of all other types:
E(￿m
f;1) = E(￿ ￿1(Xm;N1;N2;:::;NT) ￿ "m
f;1






The potential entrants however anticipate on the choice behavior of type-t ￿rms: their decision
rules are deduced from their equilibrium behavior in the second stage of the game as given
in expression (4.3). Note that the decision rules of the type-2 to type-T ￿rms depend on
20In the presence of ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics, type-t ￿rms can be considered as heterogeneous and not only
the number but also the identity of the entrants becomes relevant for payo⁄s. Expectations can then di⁄er across
￿rms (Seim 2007).
21Remark that we get the same probability of observing a market structure as in the case where the error term
is the same for and observed by all type-t physicians (only!). This is due to the symmetry assumption.
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the realization of the number of entrants of type 1 so that the expectation of the number of
other-type ￿rms depends directly on the expectation of the number of same-type rivals. The
expected number of ￿rms of type 2 to type T in market m in the payo⁄s of type-1 ￿rms (E(Nt)
in expression 4.4) can thus be updated by integrating out over the probability of observing nm
t






t jE(N1)) ￿ nm
t 8t 6= 1 (4.5)
As a result, the expected payo⁄s can be written to only depend on the expectation of
the number of entrants of the own type (E(￿ ￿1(Xm;N1;N2;:::;NT) = E(￿ ￿1(Xm;N1)). The
symmetry of the payo⁄s of type-1 ￿rms and the common knowledge of the distribution of the
private information component implies that all GPs form the same equilibrium conjecture on
the number of entrants. Furthermore, individual rational behavior yields conditions for the
equilibrium number of type-1 ￿rms entering the market. That is, the probability that a market
structure with nm
1 ￿rms of type 1 is a Nash equilibrium, is given by the probability of a type-1
￿rm being pro￿table in the presence of nm
1 rivals, but unpro￿table with an additional entrant
in the market:
Pr(N1 = nm
1 ) = Pr
￿
E(￿ ￿1(Xm;nm
1 )) > "m




1 ))) ￿ G(E(￿ ￿t(Xm;nm
1 + 1))) (4.6)
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
From the second stage of the game, we derive the equilibrium behavior of all ￿rms of type 2 to
type T (i.e. of all specialist types) conditional on the number of entrants of type 1. In the ￿rst
stage of the game, we deduced the equilibrium number of type-1 entrants that realizes taking
into account the reactions of the other types to these entry decisions. In sum, the assumption
of rational ￿rm behavior yields a probability of observing a number of ￿rms of any type in the
market (equations (4.3) and (4.6)). Combining both stages, the probability of observing market
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structure (n1;n2;:::;nT) in market m is described by:
Pr (N1 = nm
1 ;N2 = nm
2 ;:::;NT = nm
T )
= Pr(N1 = nm
1 ) ￿ Pr(N2 = nm
2 jnm
1 ) ￿ ::: ￿ Pr(NT = nm
T jnm
1 )
Given a speci￿cation of the reduced form payo⁄ function for ￿rm types and an assumption on
the distribution of the private information, the estimation proceeds through the maximization
of a likelihood function, where every market is treated as an independent game. With nm￿
t the





1 ;N2 = nm￿
2 ;:::;NT = nm￿
T ) (4.7)
4.3.2 Discussion
The entry model put forward in section 4.3.1 is one of incomplete information and ￿rms de-
ciding in a pre-speci￿ed order. These modeling assumptions are used explicitly to meet the
requirements of the research question at hand:
1. We intend to identify the sign of the strategic interaction e⁄ects between di⁄erent physi-
cian types.
2. We cannot exclude the possibility that the strategic interaction e⁄ects between GPs and
a specialist type are asymmetric in sign. That is, GPs￿payo⁄s might decrease in the
number of a specialist type, while this specialist type bene￿ts from the presence of GPs
in the market.
3. There exists a lot of di⁄erent types of physicians: GPs, dermatologists, pediatricians,
gynecologists, psychiatrists, and so on. We thus want to allow for su¢ cient ￿rm hetero-
geneity (at least more than two ￿rm-types).
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The bulk of the literature considers games of complete information: all characteristics of
payo⁄s are common knowledge for the ￿rms, including the realization of the error terms. There-
fore, the action of every ￿rm depends not only on the realization of its own unobservables, but
also on the realization of the unobservables of the other potential entrants. We use a graph-
ical representation of the entry game to show that when the information set is complete, the
probability of observing a market structure critically depends on the nature of the strategic
interaction e⁄ects. Figure 4-1 represents the empirical model with two types and one potential
entrant for each type under complete information and simultaneous decision making for three
cases: (A) the interactions between ￿rms is given by strategic substitutability (payo⁄s of entry
decrease in the entry of the other type), (B) strategic complementarity in the entry decisions
of both ￿rms (￿rms bene￿t from the presence of the other type ￿rm) and (C) the strategic
interaction e⁄ects are asymmetric in sign. The X-axis represents realizations of the unobserv-
ables of the ￿rm of type 1, whereas the Y-axis gives the realizations of the unobservables of
the type-2 ￿rm. The broken lines represent threshold values for entry: if the realization of the
own error term lies below this threshold value, rational ￿rm behavior prescribes ￿rms to enter
the market (e.g. ￿ ￿1(Xm;1;N2) ￿ "m
1 ). As this entry decision depends on the realization of
the error of the other-type ￿rm, each ￿rm has two threshold values, one for the entry decision
when the ￿rm is the only entrant (nm
￿i = 0) and one for the entry decision when the other ￿rm
is present in the market (nm
￿i = 1). Given the threshold values of both ￿rms, we can associate
equilibrium market structures to error term realizations. The areas associated with equilibrium
market structures (nm
1 ,nm
2 ) are depicted on the graphs.
The problem with complete information games should be clear directly: while we aim to
identify the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects, the probability associated to a market
structure depends on the assumption made on the strategic interaction e⁄ects.22 In other words,
when the researcher want to take a complete information game to the data, de￿ning the likeli-
hood function implies making an assumption on the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects.
It is straightforward that we do not want to make such assumptions. Moving towards a setting
of incomplete information avoids this: ￿rms make their entry decisions based on their expected
22Look back at Figure 4-1, assuming without loss of generality that ￿rm 1 moves ￿rst (to solve for the multi-
plicity issue). The equilibrium mapping for market structure (0;1) is a rectangle in the strategic complementarity
case, whereas it takes a di⁄erent form under the assumption that the entry decisions are strategic substitutes.
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payo⁄s, which consists of a conjecture of the likelihood of entry of the other ￿rm given observable
information on the other ￿rm￿ s payo⁄s. Firms use this conjecture to determine its entry deci-
sion: the ￿rm will enter in case expected payo⁄s are positive (e.g. E(￿ ￿1(Xm;1;Nm
2 )) ￿ "m
f;1).
Figure 4-2 gives the graphical representation of the empirical game under incomplete informa-
tion and simultaneous decision making. Importantly, the same mapping results for the three
possible cases of strategic interactions between ￿rms. That is, as opposed to the complete
information game, each ￿rm only has one threshold value due to the independence of its entry
decision of the realization of the error term of the other-type ￿rm. The strategic interactions
between ￿rms however determine the level of these threshold values.
The second requirement of the empirical application is the fact that the strategic interactions
need to be ￿ exible. In a setting of complete information and pure equilibrium strategies, a game
with strategic interactions that are asymmetric in sign su⁄ers from issues of non-existence of an
equilibrium for certain realizations of the model primitives. In case one ￿rm is harmed by the
presence of the other, while the other ￿rm bene￿ts from the presence of the ￿rst, as depicted in
panel C of Figure 4-1, it is possible that any strategy by the players has a pro￿table deviation
by at least one of them.23 For such realizations of the model primitives no equilibrium exists,
so that no well-de￿ned likelihood function can be speci￿ed. Models of complete information
therefore do not only require the strategic interactions to be known a priori, but also that the
strategic interaction e⁄ects between two types have the same sign. When in contrast ￿rms decide
based on expectations of the actions of the other players, as in Figure 4-2, an equilibrium exists
for all realizations of the model primitives. Note though that while an equilibrium always exists,
the incompleteness of the information set gives rise to ex-post regret. That is, once the entry
decisions of the other players become clear, the ￿rm￿ s decision to (not) enter might not have
been the optimal one. Remark furthermore that an alternative solution to the non-existence
problem in the complete information game consists of allowing for mixed-strategy equilibria
(Bajari et al 2007, Aradillas-Lopez 2007).
23The ￿rm of type 1 is willing to enter the market if it can be alone in the market. But in case the type-1 ￿rm
enters, it is optimal for the type-2 ￿rm to enter as well since its entry is pro￿table given this market structure.
However, in the latter case, the type-1 ￿rm would not be pro￿table.
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Whereas an equilibrium always exists in the incomplete information game, the issue of
multiple equilibria remains. For the same model primitives, the equilibrium conjecture on the
behavior of other ￿rms might not be unique (Berry and Reiss 2006). Most of the empirical
work on incomplete information games constrains the shape of the payo⁄ function or assumes
that the same equilibrium is chosen in similar markets to solve for multiplicity concerns (Seim
2007, Aradillas-Lopez 2007, Vitorino 2007).24 However, as in games of complete information,
the assumption of sequentiality results in unique equilibria as well: the second mover conditions
its choice on the action of the ￿rst mover, so that the ￿rst mover can perfectly anticipate his
choice behavior. Given the sequentiality assumption, only the ￿rst mover is subject to ex-post
regret (Einav 2003). For the current application, we work with the sequentiality assumption
to solve for the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For completeness, we add the graphical
representation of this model with the ￿rm of type 1 as the ￿rst mover in Figure 4-3, where
panel A and panel B respectively present the case in which the ￿rm of type 1 is a strategic
substitute or a strategic complement in the entry decision of the type-2 ￿rm.25
Finally, allowing for a high degree of ￿rm heterogeneity is less demanding in an incomplete
information setting (Seim 2007). Within the complete information framework, specifying the
conditions for which a speci￿c market structure with e.g. three ￿rm-types is the equilibrium is
complex: it results in complicated regions of integration. Recent developments in the literature
however do allow for estimating a higher degree of ￿rm heterogeneity in this setting, but reduces
identi￿cation to the set of models for which the data is consistent (e.g. Ciliberto and Tamer
200426). Instead, an incomplete information setting retains point identi￿cation while being less
computationally intensive.
24Sweeting (2007) is an exception as this paper uses the multiplicity of equilibria explicitly in the identi￿cation
strategy.
25Note that the speci￿cation of this model is invariant to the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ect: the
relevant threshold values for any market structure to be an equilibrium is the same in both panels.
26Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) does more than just dealing with the multiplicity concerns: they also allow for a
￿ exible estimation of the underlying payo⁄s through giving up on point identi￿cation of the model. This method
implies that the data itself will be used to determine how the areas of error term realizations connected to a
certain market structure are de￿ned. Computational burden however increases fast when the binary model is
extended to estimating the number of ￿rms of a type entering the market. Furthermore, although type speci￿c
variables and exclusion restrictions are not per se needed, they help reduce the bounds of the parameter set.
Finally, an extension of the model is needed to allow for mixed equilibria when the strategic interaction e⁄ects do
not have the same sign. Apart from these technical drawbacks in the empirical implementation, this methodology
however does allow for a ￿ exible estimation of the strategic interactions and correlation in the unobservables.
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Related to this computational burden, we decrease the complexity of the equilibrium and
therefore the computation time further by assuming strategic independence between the dif-
ferent specialist types. In his timing game, Einav (2003) demonstrates the development of an
equilibrium market structure in case there is strategic dependence between all types. That is,
in a (T + 1)-game where the order of play is clearly determined, all but the last mover antici-
pate on the behavior of some types and all but the ￿rst mover condition their expectations on
other ￿rms￿choices. Finally, as indicated by Einav (2003) the equilibrium calculus is linear in
the number of players in the market, and thus has the bene￿t over simultaneous incomplete
information games, which rely on numerical search algorithms.
In sum, the modeling assumptions made are speci￿cally required by the nature of the re-
search question at hand.27 First, the speci￿cation of the empirical model is invariant to the
nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects and thus makes no related assumptions on the un-
derlying payo⁄ function. Second, it allows for asymmetric strategic interaction e⁄ects in GP-
specialist interactions, as it avoids related issues of non-existence of equilibria. Furthermore,
we can model and estimate the entry decisions of multiple types of ￿rms simultaneously while
retaining point identi￿cation.
4.4 Empirical Implementation
To use the empirical entry model to explain the characteristics of the Belgian primary and
secondary care markets, it remains to specify the reduced form payo⁄functions for the physician
types and to make an assumption on the distribution of ￿rm level unobservables. We start the
empirical implementation section by introducing the data on the Belgian health care markets
after which we discuss further implementation and identi￿cation issues.
27A recent working paper by Vitorino (2007) addresses a related issue using a simultaneous game of incomplete
information. She studies the presence of agglomeration e⁄ects of shopping centers and also uses the property of
the incomplete information game of allowing for the e⁄ect of same type stores to be either positive (agglomeration
dominates) or negative.(competition dominates). The setting is quite di⁄erent though. She considers a limited
number of potential entrants (3) with ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics of a limited number of potential types (3)
to choose to enter a shopping mall. Note that there is a di⁄erent interpretation of the concept of ￿ same-type
e⁄ects￿as in the current paper (Vitorino￿ s types are comparable to our classes of specialists). Instead of assuming
sequential entry, it is assumed that the same equilibrium is picked in similar markets. As a result, her estimation
approach is more complex to solve for the equilibrium.
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4.4.1 Data on Belgian health care markets
In this section, we present the dataset for the study on Belgian GPs and specialists. The ￿rst
step in the application of the entry model to Belgian physician markets consists of de￿ning
the relevant geographic market. There is however little guidance on this: unlike in the US,
antitrust has not addressed any cases of merging physician o¢ ces, because this phenomenon is
marginal in Belgium and prices are ￿xed. We nonetheless know that physicians cannot engage
in advertising or other promotional selling activities. Therefore, patient choice is largely guided
by local information. Furthermore, 95% of the Belgian population indicates having a regular
GP which is conveniently located close to their home. The town might thus be as far as the
sphere of in￿ uence for a GP reaches. For specialists on the other hand, it is generally believed
that patients are willing to travel further, making the relevant geographic market of specialists
larger (Ettinger 1998).
Belgium is made up of towns that are grouped into 586 municipalities, where the average
municipality counts 17;590 inhabitants. In this paper, we de￿ne the municipality as relevant
geographic market for all physician types.28 Allowing for di⁄erences in relevant market de￿ni-
tion is subject of future research. For the empirical implementation of the model, we drop the
big cities (> 100;000 inhabitants) from the dataset and concentrate on markets with at least
one physician (of any type) active. This reduces the dataset to 576 Belgian municipalities.
Health providers
Privacy concerns limit the data availability on health care professionals to a location measure
(= zip code). For general practitioners, we rely on a dataset of the Belgian Institute for Sickness
and Invalidity Insurance (RIZIV/INAMI). From this dataset, we deduce the number of GPs that
are truly active and available to the public (outside of hospitals). The selection of active and
available GPs is based on their performance. As selection criterion we use a recent regulation
(July 1st, 2006) which states that GPs will only remain certi￿ed if they have more than 500
visits in one of the last ￿ve years. From dialogue with RIZIV/INAMI, we add the restriction
28The relevant geographic market of a GP can be smaller than this, whereas the relevant geographic market
of some specialist types can be larger. Working on an intermediate level (municipality) seems to be a good
compromise. This de￿nition is also in line with the empirical work on physicians in for example Baumgardner
(1988) that works on US county level and Newhouse (1990) that uses the US towns as market de￿nition.
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that GPs should have at least 50 patients in one of the last ￿ve years.29 We used data on the
number of visits of all registered GPs from 2000 until 2004 to deduce the number of active GPs
in the beginning of 2005. This procedure results in the identi￿cation of 11;842 GPs. These
GPs have on average 3;794:27 contacts per year (s.d. 3;464) and each serves on average 591:55
patients (s.d. 408).30
For specialists, a dataset from Dendrite Belgium gives the number of active specialists in
Belgian zip codes according to their self-reported ￿eld of specialization in April 2005.31 We opt
to work with every location where a specialist is active. That is, we are not able to distinguish
between the locations in terms of the time a specialist spends at certain o¢ ces. However, even
if the specialist is only active in a local market for a small time period, he/she will still be
available to patients and can thus be considered to interact with other health care providers.32
We furthermore aggregate specialties as to come to a manageable and more or less homogenous
group of specialist types and de￿ne three classes of specialists. First, there are those who are
claiming a role in the ￿rst line care (WIV 2006). In this class, we identify dermatologists
(der), gynecologists (gyn), pediatricians (ped) and ophthalmologists (opht). The second class
of specialists are in principle concerned with second or third line care, but often have a private
o¢ ce outside the hospital. This class consists of psychiatrists (psych), throat, nose and ear-
specialists (TNE) and physiotherapists (phys).33 A third class of medical specialists is especially
active in hospitals. Whereas internists (int) and surgeons (sur) are also available for private
29The basic selection rule corrects for non-specialists uniquely associated to a company and retired GPs that
still treat their own family. As they are not open to the public, their impact on other GPs or specialists can
be assumed away. The limitation with respect to the number of patients aims to ￿lter out those GPs that only
perform guard duty. They are excluded as they do not work within the same time frame as the genuine GPs, so
that they cannot be considered genuine competitors.
30An o¢ cial report of RIZIV/INAMI (03/07) indicates the presence of 11;799 active GPs in 2005. We do not
have the appropriate data to simulate their criteria exactly, although we are pretty close.
31There can be some di⁄erence between the o¢ cial ￿eld of specialization, by their RIZIV-number or by the
hospital they might work for, and the self-reported ￿eld of expertise. We choose to work with the self-reported
￿elds as they probably capture the specialists￿activities best. Furthermore, we do not use the ￿eld of ￿ general
medicine￿ , as it overlaps with the GP dataset. Note ￿nally, that the RIZIV/INAMI dataset could not be used
for specialists, as the home address is reported instead of the working address.
32An alternative is to work based on the preferred address of the specialist. We believe that this understates
the availability of specialists as well as the e⁄ect its presence has on other physicians in the same markets. We
furthermore restrict the sample of specialists to those who have ￿nished their degree completely. In other words,
we do not take up assistants, which however do treat people. As they are always connected to a specialist, we
regard the entire work sta⁄ of the specialist as one. The presence of assistants however helps to justify the use
of all the working addresses of specialists.
33Note that some of the specialist groups we use, are a groups of di⁄erent specialists. For example, physiother-
apists comprise both the specialists in sports health and in physiotherapy.
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Table 4.1: Total and average number of physicians per municipality in Belgium, according to
physician type for the sampled markets (nobs=576)
Physician type Total number Average per market
of physicians mean (s.d.)
GP 9;884 17:16 (16:76)
der 776 1:35 (3:24)
gyn 1;431 2:48 (7:06)
ped 1;082 1:88 (4:99)
opht 1;052 1:83 (4:14)
psych 1;924 3:34 (9:12)
TNE 708 1:23 (3:15)
phys 846 1:47 (2:75)
int 3;814 6:62 (19:77)
sur 2;700 4:69 (12:64)
hos 5;936 10:31 (28:48)
Source: own calculations based on RIZIV (2005) and Dendrite (2005).
consultations, there is no direct access to the remainder of the specialists. We consider them as
one group which we name the ￿ hospital specialists￿(hos). Our focus lies on the ￿rst and second
class of specialists.
A count of the Belgian physicians according to their type in the sampled municipalities is
presented in the ￿rst column of Table 4.1. We identify for example 776 dermatologist and 1;431
gynecologist o¢ ces in Belgium. The average number of physicians per type on municipality level
is given in the second column of the table. There are on average 17 GPs active in the selected
municipalities, with a large variance: the dataset consists of both markets with only 1 GP and
with more than 100 active GPs. The average number of specialists lies a lot lower at between
1 and 3 specialists of each type per market. Many municipalities lack speci￿c specialists: on
average 57% of all municipalities does not hold a specialist type. This is especially the case for
markets that do not have a hospital: for these 74% of the markets, there are on average only
0:7 specialists of a speci￿c type active. Note though that only 19% of all municipalities have no
specialist of any type. It is also clear from the data that there is a strong positive correlation
between the numbers of physicians of each type in a market. For example, the number of GPs
has the highest correlation with the number of dermatologists, with a correlation coe¢ cient of
0:85 and the correlation between specialist types averages around 86%.
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Market characteristics
To control for demand and cost characteristics in the di⁄erent municipalities and for di⁄erences
in the value of the outside option, we add a dataset with market characteristics for which
the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.2. According to studies on health status
and morbidity, the age, gender and ethnicity composition together with the socio-economic
status of the service population are important indicators for the demand of GP care (Boerma
2003). We have information from the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) on the number
of inhabitants (pop, in thousands) and the population density (dens). The dataset moreover
includes variables indicating the age composition of the local population. We opt to work with
seven age groups; ￿ age0_4￿gives the percentage population under the age of 5, ￿ age5_14￿ ,
￿ age15_29￿ , ￿ age30_44￿ , ￿ age45_59￿and ￿ age60_75￿give the percentage population in the
respective age groups and ￿nally ￿ age75+￿gives the percentage elderly, de￿ned as over the age
of 75. Further market characteristics are the percentage female population (female), the mean
income level measured in ten thousand euros (income), the unemployment rate (unempl) and
the percentage of foreign population (foreign).
We also add other sources of health supply that can have an e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of
physicians. We control for the number of hospital beds in the municipality (beds_hosp) and the
number of beds in retirement homes (beds_rest). Finally, we have dummy variables indicating
in which of the 11 provinces/regions of Belgium the market is located, to identify common
pro￿tability shocks (or value of the outside option) across municipalities in the same area.
Note already that our conclusions on the strategic interaction e⁄ects between physician types
are robust against di⁄erent grouping of age categories and against the use of region dummies
and alternative measures related to hospitals.
4.4.2 Model implementation and Identi￿cation
We use the payo⁄ speci￿cation as introduced in equation (4.1) in which both the market char-
acteristics and the number of ￿rms enter linearly (for computational reasons). Note that this
implies that we assume that an extra entrant always has the same impact on payo⁄s, irrespec-
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of market characteristics (nobs=576)
Variable Mean (s.d.)
pop number of inhabitants (x1;000) 15:01 (13:59)
dens population density (x1;000) 0:50 (0:83)
age0_4 percentage under age of 5 0:06 (0:01)
age5_14 percentage in age category 5 ￿ 14 0:13 (0:01)
age15_29 percentage in age category 15 ￿ 29 0:18 (0:01)
age30_44 percentage in age category 30 ￿ 44 0:23 (0:01)
age45_59 percentage in age category 45 ￿ 59 0:20 (0:01)
age60_75 percentage in age category 60 ￿ 75 0:14 (0:02)
age75+ percentage over age of 75 0:07 (0:01)
female percentage female 0:51 (0:01)
foreign percentage foreigners 0:05 (0:06)
income mean income level (x10;000) 2:51 (0:37)
unempl unemployment rate 0:05 (0:03)
beds_hosp number of hospital beds (x100) 1:55 (4:18)
beds_rest number of beds in retirement homes (x100) 1:85 (2:20)
Ant province dummy for Antwerpen 0:12 (0:33)
Bru region dummy for Brussels 0:03 (0:16)
VlB province dummy for Vlaams-Brabant 0:11 (0:32)
Bwa province dummy for Brabant wallon 0:05 (0:21)
WVl province dummy for West-Vlaanderen 0:11 (0:31)
OVl province dummy for Oost-Vlaanderen 0:11 (0:31)
Hai province dummy for Hainaut 0:12 (0:32)
Lie province dummy for Liege 0:14 (0:35)
Lim province dummy for Limburg 0:07 (0:26)
Lux province dummy for Luxembourg 0:08 (0:27)
Nam province dummy for Namur 0:06 (0:25)
Source: NIS (2001), RIZIV (2005). See text for the de￿nitions of the variables.
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tive of the number of entrants that is already present in the market.34 We allow for asymmetries
both in magnitude and in sign, in the strategic interaction e⁄ects by estimating type-speci￿c
coe¢ cients. Standard t-tests su¢ ce to infer the nature of strategic interactions between Bel-
gian physicians of di⁄erent types. The market characteristics control for the demand of medical
care and for the inherent pro￿tability of the local market: we use the market characteristics
discussed above in the analysis (section 4.4.1). Note that we use the age category 5 ￿ 14 and
the region of Brussels as the baseline and that we have no exclusion restrictions: all market
characteristics can a⁄ect the payo⁄s of all physician types.
We treat the model unobservables ("m
f;t) as realizations of a standard logistic distribution.
Using this distributional assumption of the private information component of payo⁄s, we can
specify the probabilities of observing nm
t physicians of type t, de￿ned in equations (4.3) and
(4.6), as ordered logit expressions:35
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These probabilities are used directly to form the likelihood function as speci￿ed in equation
(4.7). Remark that GPs decide based on expected payo⁄s, where they anticipate the choice
behavior of the di⁄erent specialist types. Calculating these expected payo⁄s therefore implies
computing the probability of observing any number of specialists of any type conditional on any
possible number of GP entrants (equation 4.5).36 For estimation, we reduce the dimensionality
of the problem by limiting the number of physicians of each type to a maximum of 30 (8t : Ft =
34Theoretically, one can estimate a more realistic pattern of e⁄ects, with e.g. ￿xed e⁄ects for all market
structures. However, our dataset restricts the extent to which we can identify such parameters: we have few
markets with a low number of GP entrants and a lot of markets with no specialist entrants. Our assumption
furthermore contains the number of parameters to estimate.
35We can also estimate the model under the assumption that the unobservables are distributed according to a
standard normal. This yields ordered probit expressions and our conclusions are robust against the distributional
assumption.
36Note that the computational bene￿t of assuming GPs to move ￿rst lies here. In case the di⁄erent specialist
types were to decide ￿rst, each of them would have to anticipate on the choice behavior of the GPs, which
condition on the entry decisions of all specialist types. As a result, one specialist type now has to take into
account the choice behavior of all other specialist types.
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30). With 87:5% of our markets containing less than 30 GPs and virtually all municipalities
having less than 30 specialists of a speci￿c type, this assumption is not restrictive.
Estimation of the model identi￿es the coe¢ cients related to the market characteristics (￿t)
and the coe¢ cients related to the number of ￿rms of own type and of the other types (￿t;￿tj).
All these coe¢ cients are identi￿ed up to the scale of the error term. Furthermore, the e⁄ects
of the other-type ￿rms are not separately identi￿ed from possible correlation in the unobserv-
ables. The current framework does not allow for correlation in the realizations of the error
terms.37 Consequently, the ￿nding of a positive (negative) interaction e⁄ect can be due to real
complementarities (substitutability) between the professionals, but can also originate from a
positive (negative) correlation in the market unobservables.38 We follow two approaches to
limit the related concerns: ￿rst, we correct for a lot of market characteristics, as to reduce the
magnitude of the unobservables and second, we estimate the model while allowing for a high
degree of ￿rm heterogeneity in the market, which reduces the possible bias on the individual
interaction e⁄ects in the GP payo⁄ function.
Ideally, we would estimate a speci￿cation with a payo⁄ function for all physician types
separately. However, despite the reduction of computational burden due to the assumption
of strategic independence between specialist types, we are still confronted with optimization
problems (we have no exclusion restrictions). We therefore use the classes of specialists to
reduce the number of ￿rm types in the empirical model (see section 4.4.1). With our primary
interest in the e⁄ect on GP payo⁄s of specialists of classes 1 and 2, we estimate the model
twice. In the ￿rst estimation, we focus on the strategic interaction of the entry decisions of
GPs and specialist types of class 1, while grouping the other specialist types by class. That is,
we specify payo⁄s for seven physician types: GPs, dermatologists, gynecologists, pediatricians,
ophthalmologists, class-2 specialists and class-3 specialists. The second estimation does the
same but then considers the specialist types of class 2. Payo⁄s are de￿ned for six types: GPs,
37Note that models of complete information in general do not alleviate this problem: whereas they do allow for
correlation in strategic interaction e⁄ects, separate identi￿cation of the correlation coe¢ cient from these e⁄ects
is not straightforward and requires good instrumentation in the payo⁄s of all types (Athey & Stern 2003).
38Also note that the assumption implies no correlation between the unobservables of the same ￿rm in two
markets and no correlation between the unobservables of two same type ￿rms in the same markets. Complete
information models on the other hand assume there to be perfect correlation within type - the error term
realization is market and type speci￿c but not ￿rm speci￿c. The reality probably lies in between.
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psychiatrists, TNE-specialists, physiologists, class-1 specialists and class-3 specialists. Note that
the entry behavior of class-3 specialists is always included as an endogenous control variable in
the identi￿cation of the strategic interaction e⁄ects of the other specialists.39 Our conclusions
seem to be robust against alternative groupings of specialist types.
4.5 Estimation Results and discussion
Tables 4.3 and 4.5 present the results of the estimation of the empirical entry model in which we
focus on the ￿rst class of specialists, for the strategic interaction e⁄ects and the market charac-
teristics respectively. The estimated coe¢ cients for the speci￿cation with class-2 specialists are
given in Tables 4.4 and 4.6. The di⁄erent columns of the tables give the estimated coe¢ cients
for the di⁄erent physician types of the simultaneous estimation.
As a goodness-of-￿t measure, we simulate the number of entrants of all types given the
market characteristics. That is, for 1;000 random draws for the error terms (from a logistic
distribution), we calculate the equilibrium number of entrants in each market. We are able to
predict the number of entrants rather accurate: the observed number of entrants of all types
always lies within the con￿dence bounds of the mean of our simulated number of entrants per
market. Following Berry and Waldfogel (1999), we compute the correlation of the predicted and
the actual number of entrants per type to construct a R2 for the regression. For the estimation
with the class-1 (class-2) specialist types, we get an average R2 of 0:82 (0:84).40
First, consider the estimated coe¢ cients for the strategic interaction e⁄ects in Tables 4.3
and 4.4. The estimation results indicate that the e⁄ect of the number of ￿rms of the own type
is always negative. The higher the number of same-type rivals, the lower payo⁄s of entering
the market. This is both consistent with economic theory and required by the equilibrium
model we put forward. For the e⁄ect of the number of ￿rms of the other types, the results are
39Remark that we make the simplifying assumption that all specialist types of the same class are homogeneous.
This implies that the entry of e.g. an internist has the same impact on internists￿payo⁄s as the entry of a surgeon
does. As we are not primarily interested in this group, we allow for this stringent assumption to lighten further
computational burden.
40Note that the estimation with the focus on the class-2 specialists yields a very high predictive power for GPs
with a type-speci￿c R
2 of 0:93. The estimation with the class-1 specialists does worse in predicting the number
of GP entrants (R
2=0:67), but the predictive power for the specialist types remains accurate.
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Table 4.3: Estimation results on the strategic interaction e⁄ects of the empirical model with
seven types: GPs, dermatologists (der), gynecologists (gen), pediatricians (ped), ophthalmolo-
gists (opht), class-2 specialists (class2) and class-3 specialists (class3)*
GP der gyn ped opht class2 class3
N_GP ￿1:252 0:042 0:048 0:068 0:083 0:047 0:055
(0:13) (0:01) (0:01) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:05)
N_der ￿68:185 ￿0:982 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(39:04) (0:06)
N_gyn 57:928 ￿ ￿0:580 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(21:05) (0:03)
N_ped ￿40:435 ￿ ￿ ￿0:759 ￿ ￿ ￿
(21:10) (0:04)
N_opht 31:617 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:904 ￿ ￿
(16:64) (0:06)
N_class2 ￿5:787 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:541 ￿
(1:85) (0:03)
N_class3 ￿0:054 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:265
(0:10) (0:01)
* Each column gives the estimated coe¢ cients of the e⁄ect of the number of physicians of
the di⁄erent types (rows) on the payo⁄s of a physician type. Standard errors are reported
within brackets. Class 2 groups all psychiatrists, TNE-specialists and physiologists together,
while class 3 groups internists, surgeons and hospital specialists. The associated estimated
coe¢ cients for the market controls are presented in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.4: Estimation results on the strategic interaction e⁄ects of the empirical model with
six types: GPs, psychiatrists (psych), throat-, nose- and ear specialists (TNE), physiologists
(phys), class-1 specialists (class1) and class-3 specialists (class3)*
GP psych TNE phys class1 class3
N_GP ￿0:933 0:067 0:081 0:039 0:013 0:074
(0:07) (0:03) (0:02) (0:03) (0:04) (0:05)
N_phys ￿0:148 ￿0:575 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(0:65) (0:03)
N_TNE 4:437 ￿ ￿0:841 ￿ ￿ ￿
(1:32) (0:06)
N_phys -0:600 ￿ ￿ ￿0:986 ￿ ￿
(0:90) (0:06)
N_class1 ￿1:056 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:430 ￿
(0:39) (0:03)
N_class3 0:152 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:263
(0:07) (0:02)
* Each column gives the estimated coe¢ cients of the e⁄ect of the number of physicians of
the di⁄erent types (rows) on the payo⁄s of a physician type. Standard errors are reported
within brackets. Class 1 groups all dermatologists, gynecologists, pediatricians and ophthal-
mologists together, while class 3 groups internists, surgeons and hospital specialists. The
associated estimated coe¢ cients for the market controls are presented in Table 4.6.
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mixed. First, the number of GPs in the market positively a⁄ects payo⁄s of all specialist types
(insigni￿cant for physiologists). This can be explained by the lower workload of referred visits
compared to self-referrals. That is, when a patient is referred by a GP, basic tests have been
performed and the specialist can directly target the established health issues. A self-referral in
contrast requires the specialist to spend more time and to perform more tests before he can pin
down the real issue.
The strategic interaction e⁄ects in the GP payo⁄ function on the other hand have varying
signs. GP payo⁄s are positively a⁄ected by the number of gynecologists, ophthalmologists
and TNE-specialists in the market. In other words, the bene￿ts for GPs from the ability to
refer outweigh the costs associated with the free access to these specialist types. Patients that
require the care of these specialists thus mainly access secondary care through the GP (high
referral e⁄ect) or correctly self-refer (low competition e⁄ect). The number of dermatologists and
pediatricians however has a negative impact on GP probability of entry. The costs due to the
competition for patients here outweigh the referral bene￿ts. A high proportion of the patients
that use these types of secondary care services thus visit specialists without a referral while not
necessarily requiring it (high competition e⁄ect). Finally, we ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect of the
presence of psychiatrists and physiologists on GP payo⁄s. For Belgium, we can thus conclude
that the use of gynecologists￿ , ophthalmologists￿and TNE-specialists￿services can be considered
as complementary to GP services, whereas the use of dermatologists￿and pediatricians￿services
are mainly substitutes to GP services.
The results from the Belgian health survey (WIV 2006) can help explain this grouping. This
survey indicates pediatricians and dermatologists as the two specialist types that generate the
lowest percentage of follow-up contacts (62% and 56% respectively). Therefore, a large part of
their income depends on the new visits for which they can compete with GPs. The survey also
identi￿es these specialist types as attracting the highest percentage of patients that self-refer
(73% and 68%). For gynecologists and ophthalmologist on the other hand, the survey indicates
that the percentage of follow-up contacts is high (82% and 73%), which implies fewer incentives
to compete directly with GPs.
To illustrate the meaning of the magnitudes of the estimated strategic interaction e⁄ects,
we simulate the predicted change in the number of GP entrants due to changes in the number
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of a specialist type under the current behavior of patients, GPs and specialists. The results
of such simulation are especially relevant in the direction of the change that they indicate
and no so much in the magnitude of this change.41 For 1;000 random draws for the error
terms (from a logistic distribution), we calculate the equilibrium number of GP entrants in
each market given 0, 1, 2 or 3 specialists of a type, holding market characteristics and the
observed number of entrants of other types constant.42 For dermatologists (pediatricians), we
￿nd that the equilibrium number of GP entrants decreases in the presence of more of these
specialists. More speci￿cally, the average market sustains 15:85 (15:15) GPs in the absence of
dermatologists (pediatricians), while this decreases to an average of 8:24 (9:46) GPs when there
is 1 of these specialists present in all markets and to 4:80 (6:06) GPs when every market holds
3 dermatologists (pediatricians). For e.g. gynecologists (TNE-specialists) the predictions go
in the opposite direction as GPs bene￿t from the presence of these specialist types. Whereas
the average market sustains 5:14 (10:28) GPs in the absence of gynecologists (TNE-specialists),
the average number of GPs increases (non signi￿cantly) to 18:73 (14:68) when there is 1 of
these specialists present in all markets and to 24:31 (23:12) GPs when every market holds 3
gynecologists (TNE-specialists).
The ￿ndings on the nature of the strategic interaction e⁄ects have further relevance for pol-
icy makers. When a mandatory referral scheme would be introduced in Belgium (or in case the
price di⁄erence between referrals and self-referrals for specialist visits are su¢ cient to induce
a comparable change in behavior by patients), the market opportunities of all health profes-
sionals change. The main e⁄ect of this is to be expected for dermatologists and pediatricians.
That is, these specialist types now realize a substantial part of their business (income) from
41We assume in the estimation that the e⁄ects of the number of ￿rms of any type is linear. This implies that
the e⁄ect of the ￿rst specialist-entrant has the same impact on GP payo⁄s as the entry of the third entrant of
the same type. This might not be entirely realistic, but reduces the computational burden in the estimation
to a signi￿cant extent. Also, we assume the behavior of all players to be constant over the di⁄erent scenarios:
obviously this is a strong assumption. Put di⁄erently, in a small market with e.g. 1 GP we simulate the impact
on his pro￿tability of entry of an entry by various numbers of specialist entrants, even though this could not
realize in reality as the population size does not allow for any specialist to enter.
42Note ￿rst that the status-quo prediction of the average number of GPs in a market is rather accurate for
the estimation of the class-2 specialists: in the presence of the observed number of entrants of all types, the
average equals 13:28, with the observed average, after we reduce the maximum number of entrants per market to
30 for estimation, equals 14:49. The average number of GP entrants per market under the observed number of
specialists in the estimation on the class-1 specialist types does worse with 7:67, but a large standard deviation.
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unnecessary self-referrals. Since this patient ￿ ow gets diverted to GPs upon the introduction
of gatekeeping, substantial drops in patientele are likely. Since patients that use gynecologist,
ophthalmologist and TNE-care mainly get referred to specialists or correctly self-refer, the main
source of pro￿tability is expected to remain intact for these health professionals.
An important remark is in place. In the analysis, we estimate the net e⁄ect of the presence
of specialist types on GP payo⁄s. Therefore, the ￿nding of a positive e⁄ect only implies that the
referral e⁄ect dominates the competition e⁄ect. It can thus be the case that the competition
e⁄ect is very big, but that the referral e⁄ect is slightly more important. In this case of course,
a substantial impact of the introduction of gatekeeping is to be expected as well. That is, still
a large proportion of the patientele (and the income) of the specialist type results from wrong
self-referrals. Whereas dermatologists and pediatricians are expected to experience the largest
drop in market demand, the other specialist types will also be a⁄ected to some extent by the
introduction of mandatory referral schemes. We thus identify the ￿ lower bound￿of the e⁄ect.
Consider for completeness the estimation results of the e⁄ects of market characteristics on
the entry probabilities of the physician types in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Caution is to be advised in
the interpretation of these results: our controls for market demand, costs and outside option are
aggregate and exhibit a strong colinearity. In general though, we ￿nd that GP payo⁄s of entering
a market are positively a⁄ected by population size. The bigger the potential market, the more
pro￿table and thus probable is entry of a GP. Some less signi￿cant e⁄ects are found for the
income level of the population and the presence of hospitals (only in one of the speci￿cations).
The ￿nding of the positive e⁄ect of mean income level is unexpected. That is, most studies ￿nd
a negative impact: a lower income also indicates a lower health status and mostly a lower use
of specialist care. Also the positive impact of the number of hospital beds might be surprising
as emergency rooms of hospitals are often used as an alternative for GP care in the weekend
or at night (although the regulator tries to limit this). Note though that we also control for
the number of specialists in these hospitals, which makes a clean interpretation hard. Other
demographic characteristics seem not to matter for GP payo⁄s, once the presence of specialist
types is accounted for.
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The e⁄ects of market characteristics show similar patterns for the di⁄erent specialist types.
Market size (population) and the presence and size of hospitals are important indicators for the
pro￿tability of any specialist: the higher the number of inhabitants (except for psychiatrists)
and the higher the number of hospital beds, the higher the probability of observing more
specialists of any type. For most types, the age structure of the population also has an e⁄ect.
With the baseline the percentage of kids (5 ￿ 14), the percentage of toddlers (0 ￿ 4) and the
percentage population in the 45￿59 age category lower the payo⁄s of entry of (gynecologists),
pediatricians and ophtamologists. On the other hand, entry payo⁄s of most specialist types are
positively a⁄ected by the percentage population in the 15￿29 age group. The results seem not
to be very intuitive in all cases, but should be taken into context. Consider e.g. pediatrician
payo⁄s is negatively a⁄ected by the percentage toddlers. The estimation controls for a lot of
other characteristics of the market. Therefore, this coe¢ cient has the interpretation of the
residual e⁄ect of the percentage toddlers, conditioned on e.g. the percentage of females in the
market and conditional on the percentage of young adults. As expected, the percentage females
and the mean income level positively a⁄ect the payo⁄s of especially the class-1 specialists. The
unemployment rate of the population negatively a⁄ects especially pediatricians. Finally, the
province/region dummies are all estimated negatively, which can indicate a low value of the
outside option for health professionals in the Brussels region. These dummies are however not
signi￿cant for the GP and for class-3 specialists.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the nature of the strategic interactions between general practitioners
and specialists of di⁄erent types. More precisely, we study whether GPs bene￿t from the
presence of a specialist due to the option of referral, or that rather the competition e⁄ect a
GP experiences from specialists dominates their interaction. The entry literature lends itself
nicely for studying health care markets, as data availability is often an issue. We put forward a
sequential incomplete information entry game that has the ￿ exibility to identify the sign of the
strategic interaction e⁄ects between di⁄erent types of ￿rms. The model is designed to avoid
restrictions on the underlying payo⁄ functions with respect to the e⁄ect of other-type ￿rms
and to avoid issues of non-existence of equilibria in case the strategic interaction e⁄ects are
asymmetric in sign. At the same time, the model remains computationally tractable and allows
for su¢ cient ￿rm heterogeneity. We use this game to study the strategic interactions in the
Belgian physician markets, in which there is no gatekeeping role for GPs.
Whereas the entry literature has traditionally focused on questions of product di⁄erenti-
ation, this paper demonstrates the use of entry models to tackle a di⁄erent type of research
question. That is, we study the precise nature of the strategic interactions between di⁄erent
types of ￿rms. Although the entry literature has boomed in the last ￿ve years, not much atten-
tion has been given to this problem. Because of the tradition of studying problems of product
di⁄erentiation, the assumption of types being strategic substitutes in the entry decision is ubiq-
uitous. Often the strategic interactions between types of ￿rms are however not this simple:
even though the competition e⁄ect is most obvious, at least some positive e⁄ect from the pres-
ence of other-type ￿rms are likely (think of e.g. agglomeration e⁄ects, Vitorino 2007). When
modeling the strategic interactions between types of ￿rms, it is therefore advisable to allow for
the possibility that this positive e⁄ect is present and possibly dominates the negative e⁄ect.
To model and estimate ￿rm conduct while allowing for these more ￿ exible interactions between
￿rm types requires the researcher to abandon either the pure strategy equilibrium assumption
or the assumption of complete information, with the latter strategy demonstrated in this paper.
For the Belgian physician markets, the results indicate that we can group specialists into
three categories. First, the decisions of certain specialist types are strategic complements to
1474.6. Conclusion
the entry decision of GPs. This category includes gynecologists, ophthalmologists and throat,
nose and ear-specialists (TNE). As GP payo⁄s are increasing in the number of specialists of
these types, we ￿nd that the competition e⁄ect (patients go to the specialist instead of to the
GP) is dominated by the referral e⁄ect (GPs￿cost of treatment drop). Patients are especially
referred to these specialist types or correctly self-refer to them. A second group of specialists
consists of dermatologists and pediatricians, whose entry decisions are found to be strategic
substitutes in the entry decision of GPs. These specialist types especially compete for patients
with GPs. Self-referred visits make up a signi￿cant part of the income of these specialists and
often concern health issues that do not require specialist care. The availability of a third group
of specialist services has no signi￿cant impact on GP payo⁄s. That is, the positive referral
e⁄ect balances out against the negative competition e⁄ect for psychiatrists and physiologists.
On the other hand, specialists of all types bene￿t from the presence of GPs in the market.
As there is no gatekeeping in Belgium, the sign of the strategic interaction e⁄ects of special-
ist types on GPs￿entry decisions is furthermore instructive for the likelihood of viability threats
upon the introduction of gatekeeping into the care system. As the mandatory referral scheme
excludes the possibility for patients to self-refer to a specialist, our ￿ndings suggest that mainly
dermatologists and pediatricians are likely to be threatened in their viability with the intro-
duction of gatekeeping. This is especially the case when gatekeeping is gradually introduced as
in the case in Belgium and neighboring countries. That is, in case a mandatory referral scheme
is implemented without the accompanying capitation system, the income level of specialists is
directly a⁄ected. Furthermore, because of this, specialists have incentives to (start to) induce
more demand for their services as to maintain their income level. The anticipated bene￿ts in
terms of cost containment would then not realize. Remark that data from RIZIV/INAMI on
the number of contacts per GP for 2000-2004 indicates that the average workload of GPs has
dropped over this time period: the average GP used to have 4;025:25 contacts per year (s.d.
2;587), whereas this average dropped to 3;794:27 contacts per year in 2004 (s.d. 3;464). The
drop in the average contacts per year goes hand in hand with a drop in the average GP income
level. We therefore expect that in a ￿rst reaction to the introduction of a mandatory refer-
ral scheme, GPs will experience the opportunity to restore their income level (in the current
fee-for-service system). GPs will therefore have no incentives to redirect as many patients as
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possible to specialized care, so that the realization of substantial income drops for certain types
of specialists is likely, at least in the medium run.
In case the mandatory referral scheme is combined with a capitation system, comparable
problems emerge. To ensure viability, the ￿xed fee per patient enrolled with a specialist will
have to be set high, both in absolute terms and compared to the capitation for the GP, as
the number of patients per specialist will be relatively low. From a budget perspective, this
will not be maintainable. In case the regulator puts a more realistic ￿xed fee for specialists,
a proportion of the health professionals will experience viability problems and the transition
costs will materialize. Note that the only way viability issues would not emerge is when GPs
do not get the correct incentives. That is, in case GPs minimize their e⁄ort level and always
refer patients to specialists, the current body of specialists can be sustained.
4.7 Appendix
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Figure 4-1: Empirical entry game under complete information and simultaneous decision
making (2 ￿rms).
Panel A represents the mapping in case payo⁄s of both ￿rms are decreasing in the presence of the
other ￿rm (strategic substitutes), panel B assumes strategic complementarity in the entry decisions for
both ￿rms and panel C represents the case with asymmetric strategic interaction e⁄ects (in sign): the
decision of ￿rm 2 is a strategic substitute for the decision of ￿rm 1, while ￿rm 1￿ s decision is a strategic
complement to the decision of ￿rm 2.
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Figure 4-2: Empirical entry game under incomplete information and simultaneous decision
making (2 ￿rms)
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Figure 4-3: Empirical entry game under incomplete information and sequential decision making
(￿rm 1 decides ￿rst).
Panel A represents the mapping when the entry decision of ￿rm 1 is a strategic substitute in the entry
decision of ￿rm 2, whereas panel B assumes payo⁄s of entry for ￿rm 2 are increasing in the presence of
￿rm 1 (strategic complement).
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